People on the minority side of scientific opinion often accuse their
opponents (scientists on the majority side) of being blinded by
philosophical commitments. These philosophical commitments, so the
accusation goes, make the "majority" scientists unwilling or incapable
of seeing and fairly evaluating data which challenges their theories.
I'm not just referring to the modern debates over evolution and
intelligent design. Similar accusations are made by modern proponents of
steady-state cosmology, cold fusion, certain kinds of
"alternative" medical therapies, and by certain groups in the
debate over global climate change, to name just a few modern examples.
This is nothing new. Accusations of philosophical bias or philosophical
blindness to data are probably as old as scientific disputes
themselves. The making of such accusations appears endemic to groups who
are in the scientific minority for prolonged periods of time. (Not
that *all* scientific minorities make such accusations. For example, I
don't believe that Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen or Bell, who were in a
scientific minority opposing the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics, made such accusations against their opponents.)
How justified are such accusations? Historically, the "scientific
majority" has, in the face of data, altered its philosophical commitments
quite a few times. I think it would be instructive to make a list of
such incidents.
A few weeks ago, Brian Harper mentioned one example of science
"changing its philosophy": acceptance of the Principle of Least
Action. (I've copied the relevant portion of Brian's post at the end
of this one.)
I'm interested in expanding the following list. I would also like to add
interesting/important historical details to the items on this list.
A) Sometimes scientists alter their whole philosophy of science, their
understanding of how science "ought to be done" (reminiscent of current
debates over methodological naturalism).
A1) Acceptance of Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation.
Newton was criticized for proposing gravity as a "spooky action at a
distance." Newton did not offer a formal hypothesis for the mechanism
of gravitational attraction. Some scientists objected that this was
bad science. Good science, they claimed, required hypotheses about
mechanism. Good science, they claimed, only proposed effects of one
object on another when those objects were in contact (or had some
obvious medium for exchanging the force). Newton's Law of Universal
Gravitation violated those widely-held convictions about how science
ought to be done. But Newton's law was so successful at explaining the
data that it was quickly accepted by nearly all scientists.
A2) Acceptance of the indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics.
Before Quantum Mechanics, almost any scientist or philosopher would
tell you that one of the hallmarks of good science is Determinism. The
majority rapidly changed what philosophical commitment with the success
of Quantum Mechanics at explaining the data.
A3) Acceptance of the Principle of Least Action, as worked out by
Maupertuis and Euler (described below).
B) Sometimes scientists modify a deeply held philosophical/worldview
belief.
B1) Acceptance of Big Bang Cosmology.
Before the success of Big Bang Cosmology, nearly all cosmologists
shared a strong philosophical preference for Steady State Cosmology ---
the view that the history of the cosmos should stretch infinitely far
backwards in time. In fact, it's probably fair to say that many
modern-day cosmologists still have a philosophical preference for
steady-state cosmology. Nevertheless, they believe Big Bang cosmology
because of the evidence.
B2) Rejection of Vitalism in biology.
Before a certain time in history, most scientists assumed that some of
the fundamental principles governing biology where different from those
in the physical sciences. It was even widely believed that chemicals
and substances obtained from living organisms could NOT be synthesized
by physical means (since substances made by physical means would lack
some "vital element").
C) Sometimes scientists modify deeply held scientific beliefs which
border on being philosophical beliefs.
C1) Acceptance of Plate Tectonics in geology.
C2) Rejection of the theory of Spontaneous Generation in biology.
It was once widely believed that certain simple life forms could
"spontaneously generate" out of mud, decaying food, etc.
C3) Acceptance of the idea that no mechanical medium ("ether") is
required for the transmission of electromagnetic waves.
----------
That's enough of a list for now.
----------
Loren Haarsma
Physics Dept.
Calvin College
----------
> From: Brian Harper
>
> Here is an interesting historical example. One of the greatest, some
> say *the* greatest principles of science is the principle of least
> action, a teleological principle. The principle was developed by
> Maupertuis in the mid to early 1700's, if I remember correctly. It is
> commonly thought that teleological principles were acceptable at this
> time. Nothing could be further from the truth. Maupertuis was
> ridiculed by almost all of the scientific community. His only defender
> (among well known scientists, as far as I'm aware) was Euler, who later
> took Maupertuis idea and shaped into the calculus of variations. A
> similar principle, the principle of least time, was proposed by Fermat
> at about the same time (a little before), and met with similar ridicule
> and scorn.
>
> To make matters worse, Maupertuis heaped his own abuse and ridicule
> upon the traditional argument from design (ala Paley). So, the poor guy
> was caught in the middle, being hammered from both sides. But in the
> end, Maupertuis and Fermat won, because their principles worked.
>
> The point is that principles that scientists might find objectionable
> from a philosophical point of view are nevertheless accepted, provided
> they work. Another example of this is the idea that the universe had a
> beginning.
>
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