At 02:37 PM 5/7/00 +0100, Richard wrote:
[...]
> >RW:==
> >
> >>Why can't science address them (in principle)?
>
>First of all, I should admit that I was being lazy in simply asking this
>rhetorical question, without making a clear point of my own. But I hope my
>point will become clear in a minute. ;-)
>
> >Answering this question will land me in trouble because, to do so, I
> >would first have to answer Steve's question "What is science". I've
> >read enough philosophy of science to appreciate how difficult that
> >question is :).
> >
> >Basically, I'm a Methodological Naturalist (MN) who tends to be prejudiced
> >towards the experimental side of things. As far as definitions go, I like
> >Phil's the best:
> >
> >MN: "... the principle that science can study only the things that
> >are accessible to its instruments and techniques." PJ
> >
> >Phil later said he would no longer express the idea this way. I don't
> >want to get into all that. The point here is that this is a great summary
> >of my own position.
>
>But Phil's definition is circular: science can study only the things that
>are accessible to the techniques of science!
I guess I would rather say its a tautology, but basically you are right.
To my way of thinking, it comes about as a direct consequence of a
certain way of looking at science. It is not meant to be an argument
or an explanation, merely an observation. I guess I would agree that
it doesn't really define precisely what MN is, but from this statement
I think one should have a pretty good idea.
The basic point is that science is intimately tied to observation. But not
just any type of observation, the Aristoteleans were also good at observation.
What distinguished them from Galileo? The Aristoteleans basically observed
Nature as they found her. Galileo manipulated Nature through controlled
experiments in such a way as test specific hypotheses. This is where the
instruments and techniques come in.
One point of possible confusion in the above is "techniques". I'm not sure
what Phil had in mind, but for me this means experimental techniques.
This is not to say that all of science is experimental, but that it needs to
be tied there in some way.
So, basically, my view of MN is physical explanations for physical phenomena
in a way intimately tied to a controlled observation of Nature.
Another way of comparing with the Aristoteleans (and also the Cartesians to
some extent) is by noting that these two relied heavily on logic and
philosophy.
"Nature abhors a vacuum" according to Descartes. Pascal had a lot of fun
ridiculing this notion in <Pensees>. Its a useless statement. Better to just
go and look rather than speculate.
Feynman summarized nicely what I'm trying to say here when he wrote:
"... we have learned from much experience that all
philosophical intuitions about what nature is going
to do fail." -- Richard Feynman
Burgy once complained about this statement (I used to have it in my sig).
I have a feeling Feynman was exaggerating to make a point. Not *all*
philosophical intuitions fail, but as a rule they are not trustworthy. If you
want to know how Nature behaves, you have to go and look.
>And, even if we can agree on what techniques those are, that doesn't really
>answer my question, which I could rephrase as: how do you know that demonic
>spirits and omnipotent creators are not accessible to the instruments and
>techniques of science?
>
>Or do you mean only that that science hasn't been able to detect them *yet*?
>This is why I added the words "in principle", to indicate that I wasn't just
>concerned with the present state of science.
I think "yet" would probably be appropriate.
> >I take MN to be a recognition of the limitations of science, rather than
> >the limitations of reality. I consider it foolish, for example, to say that
> >all physical reality is accessible to the "instruments and techniques"
> >of science. How could one ever know this (from the instruments and
> >techniques of science)?
>
>Agreed.
>
> >So, if we have no guarantee
> >that science can even study all of physical reality, how can we possibly
> >hope to say anything about demonic spirits and omnipotent creators?
>
>But this begs the question of whether demonic spirits and omnipotent
>creators are physically real (whatever that means).
True. I take it as part of the definition of a demonic spirit or omnipotent
creator.
> >More specifically though, the problem one generally encounters with
> >Design is that sooner or later, if you want design to make a unique
> >contribution, you have to formulate hypotheses about the intentions,
> >purposes, motivations of the designer. These hypotheses cannot be
> >evaluated by the instruments and techniques of science.
>
>Can't they? Let me give you a hypothetical example.
>
>Suppose that every time I think "God, please make a gold coin appear on the
>table in front of me", a gold coin appears. But when I think the same thing
>with out the word "please", no coin appears. I think we should deduce that
>there is some kind of being capable of acting outside physical laws (as we
>know them), and that that being is motivated by the word "please".
Actually, I don't think we would have a clue about motivations.
>We could tighten up this experiment, for example by writing my requests on
>pieces of paper, selecting one randomly without reading it, and offering it
>up to God in some way. We could enclose the table in a sealed container to
>ensure no tricks, etc. We could make a variety of requests for all sorts of
>"impossible" things, and let's suppose that they are all fulfilled.
>Now, what do *you* think scientists should deduce from the above experiment?
That we have been totally and completely wrong about the nature of the physical
world. Personally, I would have little confidence in any notion of physical law
and would undoubtedly abandon MN. Perhaps I would shave my head and sell
flowers at the airport :).
But the long term view of this might be quite different from the initial
reaction.
Perhaps we would come to view this as a new law with the causal element
residing in man rather than a god. Why would we need to introduce vague
ideas about god when it can be clearly seen and experimentally verified that
there is a connection between certain words and what happens in Nature.
>My main problem with your position is that you haven't defined what
>methodological naturalism is. In what sense is a god not natural (if it
>exists)? Is telekinesis "natural" (if it exists)?
>
>My position is that there is no clear distinction between "natural" and
>"non-natural" or "supernatural". So I don't rule out god theories on the
>grounds of methodological naturalism (which is undefined). I reject them on
>the grounds that they are poor explanations of the phenomena that we
>observe. If, however, I observed phenomena of the type I described in my
>hypothetical experiment, then I might conclude that some sort of god theory
>was a good explanation of those phenomena. (I believe I've already given
>some idea, though not a precise definition, of what I mean by a good
>explanation.)
>
>In practice, of course, scientists don't observe the sort of phenomena which
>would demand the consideration of a god theory, so there's no reason why
>they should think about gods in their work.
OK, this might be a place to clarify our differences. Would you say that this
provides any evidence for the non existence of a god or gods?
As a Christian, I have a particular model of God in mind. The God who is.
A God who does not respond as a puppet on a string. A God who is free,
who's actions are not reducible to a formula. MN makes a great deal of
sense to me if indeed we have a God like this. I would dare not pretend
to know the mind of God, his motivations, intentions.
"For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are
your ways my ways, says the LORD." Isaiah 55:8
The best way to know about his physical creation is to go and look.
From what I wrote here, I think I can modify my original statement.
There may be some theories about gods and demons that can be
assessed scientifically. I certainly could not rule out this possibility
from the instruments and techniques of science themselves. What
I have in mind is a particular view of God. This God is not accessible
to controlled manipulation by the instruments and techniques of
science. In short, I have no interest in any gods that can be measured
with instruments. A personal preference, of course. If someone wishes
to look in such a direction, then far be it from me to restrain them.
>My point is though, that it
>would be wrong to rule out such a possibility in principle. I think that
>doing so plays into the hands of creationist pseudoscientists, who can claim
>that mainstream science is unjustified in ruling out their theories.
OK, this is a case I really hadn't considered. Some creationists make
specific hypothesis not tied directly to the motivations, will etc of the
Creator. For example, the Earth is less than 50,000 years old. Claims
such as this can be evaluated scientifically, of course.
So, the question might be whether the failure of such specific claims
says anything about the existence of a transcendent, supernatural
God? I would say no. Instead it reflects an inability on the part of a
human being to reduce such a God formulas and predictions about
what that God might do and how he would do it.
> >"I will gladly pay you Tuesday,
> >for a hamburger today."
I guess I should have given proper credit for that quote to Wimpy
(remember Popeye?)
Thanks for the challenging questions. It was fun thinking, hope I
won't have to do it too often :).
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Mechanical Engineering
The Ohio State University
"One never knows, do one?"
-- Fats Waller
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