From: Brian D Harper <bharper@postbox.acs.ohio-state.edu>
>At 01:53 AM 5/5/00 +0100, Richard wrote:
>
>>From: Brian D Harper <bharper@postbox.acs.ohio-state.edu>
>>
>>Hello Brian,
>>
>> >At 11:49 PM 5/2/00 +0100, Richard wrote:
>>
>> >>On the other hand, I don't agree that science must reject ideas like
>>demonic
>> >>spirits and omnipotent creators out of hand. It should reject them
because
>> >>they are poor explanations (they explain very little), and science is
>>about
>> >>find the best (most explanatory) explanations which are consistent with
>>the
>> >>facts.
>> >
>> >I disagree here. It is not that science rejects these ideas, science
simply
>> >cannot address them at all. It is impossible to evaluate them as good or
>> >poor.
>
>RW:==
>
>>Why can't science address them (in principle)?
First of all, I should admit that I was being lazy in simply asking this
rhetorical question, without making a clear point of my own. But I hope my
point will become clear in a minute. ;-)
>Answering this question will land me in trouble because, to do so, I
>would first have to answer Steve's question "What is science". I've
>read enough philosophy of science to appreciate how difficult that
>question is :).
>
>Basically, I'm a Methodological Naturalist (MN) who tends to be prejudiced
>towards the experimental side of things. As far as definitions go, I like
>Phil's the best:
>
>MN: "... the principle that science can study only the things that
>are accessible to its instruments and techniques." PJ
>
>Phil later said he would no longer express the idea this way. I don't
>want to get into all that. The point here is that this is a great summary
>of my own position.
But Phil's definition is circular: science can study only the things that
are accessible to the techniques of science!
And, even if we can agree on what techniques those are, that doesn't really
answer my question, which I could rephrase as: how do you know that demonic
spirits and omnipotent creators are not accessible to the instruments and
techniques of science?
Or do you mean only that that science hasn't been able to detect them *yet*?
This is why I added the words "in principle", to indicate that I wasn't just
concerned with the present state of science.
>I take MN to be a recognition of the limitations of science, rather than
>the limitations of reality. I consider it foolish, for example, to say that
>all physical reality is accessible to the "instruments and techniques"
>of science. How could one ever know this (from the instruments and
>techniques of science)?
Agreed.
>So, if we have no guarantee
>that science can even study all of physical reality, how can we possibly
>hope to say anything about demonic spirits and omnipotent creators?
But this begs the question of whether demonic spirits and omnipotent
creators are physically real (whatever that means).
>More specifically though, the problem one generally encounters with
>Design is that sooner or later, if you want design to make a unique
>contribution, you have to formulate hypotheses about the intentions,
>purposes, motivations of the designer. These hypotheses cannot be
>evaluated by the instruments and techniques of science.
Can't they? Let me give you a hypothetical example.
Suppose that every time I think "God, please make a gold coin appear on the
table in front of me", a gold coin appears. But when I think the same thing
with out the word "please", no coin appears. I think we should deduce that
there is some kind of being capable of acting outside physical laws (as we
know them), and that that being is motivated by the word "please".
We could tighten up this experiment, for example by writing my requests on
pieces of paper, selecting one randomly without reading it, and offering it
up to God in some way. We could enclose the table in a sealed container to
ensure no tricks, etc. We could make a variety of requests for all sorts of
"impossible" things, and let's suppose that they are all fulfilled.
Now, what do *you* think scientists should deduce from the above experiment?
My main problem with your position is that you haven't defined what
methodological naturalism is. In what sense is a god not natural (if it
exists)? Is telekinesis "natural" (if it exists)?
My position is that there is no clear distinction between "natural" and
"non-natural" or "supernatural". So I don't rule out god theories on the
grounds of methodological naturalism (which is undefined). I reject them on
the grounds that they are poor explanations of the phenomena that we
observe. If, however, I observed phenomena of the type I described in my
hypothetical experiment, then I might conclude that some sort of god theory
was a good explanation of those phenomena. (I believe I've already given
some idea, though not a precise definition, of what I mean by a good
explanation.)
In practice, of course, scientists don't observe the sort of phenomena which
would demand the consideration of a god theory, so there's no reason why
they should think about gods in their work. My point is though, that it
would be wrong to rule out such a possibility in principle. I think that
doing so plays into the hands of creationist pseudoscientists, who can claim
that mainstream science is unjustified in ruling out their theories.
>"I will gladly pay you Tuesday,
>for a hamburger today."
This sounds like an alternative (and more pleasant) way of expressing
Keynes's dictum: "In the long run, we're all dead" (quoting from memory).
;-)
Richard Wein (Tich)
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