Before I start creating naturalistic theories out of SJ's non-naturalistic
theories, I'm wondering whether there is any strong arguments or attempts at
arguments against the Principle of Naturalistic Sufficiency. This is the
principle that there is, for any fact or facts capable of explanation, at
least one prospective naturalistic explanation that is better, in scientific
and Occam's Razor terms, than any equivalent *non*-naturalistic theory for
the same facts. I've argued for this principle briefly in an earlier post,
though I have by no means given my entire argument for it (i.e., one that
covers prospective objections, etc.).
The principle applies not only to the development of life on Earth, but also
to the *claims* of people that Jesus rose from the dead (I mention this
because I see from a glance at another Jones post that he is claiming the
rising of Jesus from the dead as an established fact, whereas I have serious
doubts that he existed *at all* -- I would *love* to see the epistemology
that can make the claim of his existence truly acceptable *and* that can
also *strongly* support the claim that he rose from the dead, because there
a number of fantasies that *I'd* like to prove).
--Chris C
Now is the time for all good people to come to.
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