Chris
My original challenge was to specify what would have to be different about
the Universe *if* there were no designer. I'm responding here to David
Bowman's indirect response to that challenge.
<snip>
David
> I suggest that the absence of a designer/maintainer/creator/sustainer is
> incomprehensible. Without such a presence I see no reason for why
> anything or any laws of nature should exist one way or another in any
> particular form. Without such an enforcer/realizer of the laws of nature,
> what criteria ought we use in evaluating how things would/could be
> different? Anything goes and nothing goes. It seems to me that such a
> presence is a prerequisite for the actualization of any concept of nature
> at all. Just because our formulations of the laws which describe the
> workings of the physical/natural world make no *explicit* reference to
> such a presence, that is no reason to think such laws would also obtain
> and continue to be upheld and enforced in the absense of such a presence.
> Neither is it a reason to suppose that there would be any natural world to
> so describe anyway.
Chris
Well, as your words "I see no reason" suggest, this is about as perfect an
argument from ignorance as one can get.
I was tempted to say, "I see no reason" why anyone should take your argument
seriously, since it effectively begins with an admission that you simply
fail to see any reason why there should be laws of nature.
But, I will, anyway.
Given your obviously Platonic view of the laws of nature, I can see why you
hold such a view. You are clearly thinking of the laws of nature as things
in their own right, not as merely reflections of how things behave because
of what they *are*. Apparently, in a non-designer universe, you would expect
square objects to behave like spherical ones, and spherical objects to
behave like needles, and asbestos to burst into flame.
But, that's now how things work, designer or no designer. The only thing
that's required is that there be some basic substance (if there isn't,
nothing exists anyway, so the question would be moot).
To ensure that this and related points are made clearly, I'll go through
your points piecemeal:
David
> Without such an enforcer/realizer of the laws of nature,
> what criteria ought we use in evaluating how things would/could be
> different?
Logic, silly. The principle that what a thing is, *IS* what it is.
> Anything goes and nothing goes.
Only if we presuppose that logic does not apply, in which case you have no
logical basis for this claim.
> It seems to me that such a
> presence is a prerequisite for the actualization of any concept of nature
> at all.
Where did you get the ludicrous idea that someone is actualizing a concept
of nature? Nature just *is*.
Chris
> Just because our formulations of the laws which describe the
> workings of the physical/natural world make no *explicit* reference to
> such a presence, that is no reason to think such laws would also obtain
> and continue to be upheld and enforced in the absense of such a presence.
Why do you think the laws of nature are "upheld and enforced"? Do you think
there is something "upholding and enforcing" the fact that different parts
of the perimeter of a square are different distances from the center of the
square? If so, why? Why do you think that there has to be something ensuring
that the corners of a square are further from the center of the square than
the midpoints of the side are? Do you think that there must be some designer
"upholding and enforcing" the "law" to the effect that half of a distance is
shorter than the whole distance? If so, *why*?
I note also that here again, you are merely arguing from ignorance (this
time posing as knowledge), when you say, "there is no reason to think that
such laws would obtain. . . ." It would be more accurate merely to say that
*you* see no reason, unless you have a positive proof that there *is* no
such reason (*do* you?).
> Neither is it a reason to suppose that there would be any natural world to
> so describe anyway.
Is this your attempt to revive the long-entombed argument from contingency?
Obviously, it is. But, there is a good reason why it was entombed in the
first place. It's main premise was unsupportable. The main premise had to be
derived by a crude and invalid inductive argument or by an equally crude and
invalid *circular* argument. The inductive argument confused substance with
entities made of that substance, and circular arguments are always invalid.
- - - - - -
But, even if we assume that there was/is a designer, we have not really
resolved the problem, because, now, by exactly the same argument that you
pose, the *designer* must have a designer, a designer that keeps *it* in
existence, and keeps *it* functioning according to whatever causal laws are
"upheld and enforced" in its own substance, in its own nature.
Then, *that* designer must *also* have a designer, and that designer's
designer, and so on, in an infinitely-escalating hierarchy of designers.
If you try to evade this by saying that the designer is "special," so it
*doesn't* need a designer, I will simply say that the *universe* is equally
"special" and doesn't need a designer (which it clearly doesn't, anyway). It
is not even logically possible that there could be grounds for claiming that
the designer could be ultimately "special" in this way while a universe
could not be. Please don't annoy me into proving it; I'd *much* rather have
you think it through on your own, though I'll give you a hint: What would
the *designer* be made of?