> Chris
> My original challenge was to specify what would have to be different about
> the Universe *if* there were no designer. I'm responding here to David
> Bowman's indirect response to that challenge.
>
> <snip>
> David
> > I suggest that the absence of a designer/maintainer/creator/sustainer is
> > incomprehensible. Without such a presence I see no reason for why
> > anything or any laws of nature should exist one way or another in any
> > particular form. Without such an enforcer/realizer of the laws of
nature,
> > what criteria ought we use in evaluating how things would/could be
> > different? Anything goes and nothing goes. It seems to me that such a
> > presence is a prerequisite for the actualization of any concept of
nature
> > at all. Just because our formulations of the laws which describe the
> > workings of the physical/natural world make no *explicit* reference to
> > such a presence, that is no reason to think such laws would also obtain
> > and continue to be upheld and enforced in the absense of such a
presence.
> > Neither is it a reason to suppose that there would be any natural world
to
> > so describe anyway.
>
> Chris
> Well, as your words "I see no reason" suggest, this is about as perfect an
> argument from ignorance as one can get.
>
> I was tempted to say, "I see no reason" why anyone should take your
argument
> seriously, since it effectively begins with an admission that you simply
> fail to see any reason why there should be laws of nature.
>
> Given your obviously Platonic view of the laws of nature, I can see why
you
> hold such a view. You are clearly thinking of the laws of nature as things
> in their own right, not as merely reflections of how things behave because
> of what they *are*. Apparently, in a non-designer universe, you would
expect
> square objects to behave like spherical ones, and spherical objects to
> behave like needles, and asbestos to burst into flame.
>
> But, that's now how things work, designer or no designer. The only thing
> that's required is that there be some basic substance (if there isn't,
> nothing exists anyway, so the question would be moot).
>
> To ensure that this and related points are made clearly, I'll go through
> your points piecemeal:
>
> David
> > Without such an enforcer/realizer of the laws of nature,
> > what criteria ought we use in evaluating how things would/could be
> > different?
>
> Chris
> Logic, silly. The principle that what a thing is, *IS* what it is.
>
> David
> > Anything goes and nothing goes.
>
> Chris
> Only if we presuppose that logic does not apply, in which case you have no
> logical basis for this claim.
>
> David
> > It seems to me that such a
> > presence is a prerequisite for the actualization of any concept of
nature
> > at all.
>
> Chris
> Where did you get the idea that someone is actualizing a concept of
nature?
> Nature just *is*.
>
> David
> > Just because our formulations of the laws which describe the
> > workings of the physical/natural world make no *explicit* reference to
> > such a presence, that is no reason to think such laws would also obtain
> > and continue to be upheld and enforced in the absense of such a
presence.
>
> Chris
> Why do you think the laws of nature are "upheld and enforced"? Do you
think
> there is something "upholding and enforcing" the fact that different parts
> of the perimeter of a square are different distances from the center of
the
> square? If so, why? Why do you think that there has to be something
ensuring
> that the corners of a square are further from the center of the square
than
> the midpoints of the side are? Do you think that there must be some
designer
> "upholding and enforcing" the "law" to the effect that half of a distance
is
> shorter than the whole distance? If so, *why*?
>
> I note also that here again, you are merely arguing from ignorance (this
> time posing as knowlege), when you say, "there is no reason to think that
> such laws would obtain. . . ." It would be more accurate merely to say
that
> *you* see no reason, unless you have a positive proof that there *is* no
> such reason (*do* you?).
>
> David
> > Neither is it a reason to suppose that there would be any natural world
to
> > so describe anyway.
>
> Chris
> Is this your attempt to revive the long-entombed argument from
contingency?
> Obviously, it is. But, there is a good reason why it was entombed in the
> first place. It's main premise was unsupportable. The main premise had to
be
> derived by a crude and invalid inductive argument or by an equally crude
and
> invalid *circular* argument. The inductive argument confused substance
with
> entities made of that substance, and circular arguments always fail to
prove
> their conclusions.
>
> - - - - - -
>
> Additional Remarks
>
> But, even if we assume that there was/is a designer, we have not really
> resolved the problem, because, now, by exactly the same argument that you
> pose, the *designer* must have a designer, a designer that keeps *it* in
> existence, and keeps *it* functioning according to whatever causal laws
are
> "upheld and enforced" in its own substance, in its own nature.
>
> Then, *that* designer must *also* have a designer, and that designer's
> designer, and so on, in an infinitely-escalating hierarchy of designers.
>
> If you try to evade this by saying that the designer is "special," so it
> *doesn't* need a designer, I will simply say that the *universe* is
equally
> "special" and doesn't need a designer (which it clearly doesn't, anyway).
It
> is not even logically possible that there could be grounds for claiming
that
> the designer could be ultimately "special" in this way while a universe
> could not be. Please don't annoy me into proving it; I'd *much* rather
have
> you think it through on your own, though I'll give you a hint: What would
> the *designer* be made of?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>