> Hi Kevin,
> I think we have a difference of opinion, but I'm having trouble figuring
out
> what it is. As I've said elsewhere, I doubt either of us will convert the
> other; the most we can hope for is to understand each other.
>
My purpose never has been to try to convert you (if it happens it will be
because you convert yourself), but I do want to correct your misconceptions
so you can reason more clearly.
>
> Kevin:
> >The point is that psychologists have shown that, all else being equal, a
> >traumatic childhood does have a tendency to produce "damaged"
> >adults. The connection is not absolute, but it does exist.
>
> Bertvan:
> If the connection is not absolute, the factors which prevent it from being
> absolute are unknown, right?
>
No, it is because the factors which prevent it from being absolute ARE known
that we can say the connection is not absolute.
>
> We can not say whether or not they are
> material, measurable, consistent, the result of individual will, god --or
> anything else, can we?
>
Undoubtedly there are other factors we haven't discovered yet, but based on
previous evidence the probability is high that they would be "material,
measurable, consistent".
>
> Kevin:
> >It would be impossible to eliminate all alternative possibilities, so
> >scientists concentrate on evidence and probabilities. For example, one
> >cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that the sun will rise out of
> >the
> >west tomorrow morning, but all the evidence we have tells us that such an
> >event is highly improbable. So, is there evidence of spontaneity in the
> >actions of bacteria and protists? So far, the answer to that question is
> >no. As such, how probable is it that an anomalous experimental result
is
> >due to spontaneity and not some kind of error? For the time being, that
> >probability is considered to be insignificant.
>
> Bertvan:
> First, the sun rising in the east and the actions of bacteria and protists
> don't seem similar to me. The sun has never been observed to behave
> differently.
>
For now at least, neither have bacteria or protists; all instances of
anomalous behavior have been explained either by experimental error, the
action of a previously unknown environmental factor, or the action of a
previous unknown internal molecular/genetic factor.
>
> The behavior of bacteria and protists is always probabilistic.
>
No, that's not true; as long as the experimental conditions are highly
controlled, they are in fact quite predictable. By which I mean, as long as
no stray environmental chemical whose action cannot be predicted is allowed
to interfere with the experiment.
>
> One might say the result of an anomalous experiment is due to spontaneity
or
> error, depending upon one's philosophy.
>
One might, but if one were also a good scientist, one would also look for
evidence to support that belief. If one could find none, one would then look
for evidence of a physical cause. The same would be true if the good
scientist believed the anomally was caused by error or a physical cause; if
he could find none then he would start looking for evidence of spontaneity
even if that conflicted with his personal philosophy. The point is that a
good scientist uses evidence to explain physical phenomena, not philosophy,
and so far all the evidence supports the concept that physical phenomena have
physical causes.
>
> Whether or not it was considered
> insignificant might also depend upon the individual scientist's point of
> view, wouldn't it?
>
No, it would be based on the evidence. If previous evidence establishes that
error is a far more likely cause than spontaneity, the scientist will look
for error first, but if the current evidence demonstrates that in this case
spontaneity is a better explanation, he will pursue that course instead. It
all depends upon the evidence, not personal philosophy.
>
> Kevin:
> >...philosophical naturalism assumes that all events are physical events;
> >that is, there are no non-physical events. Methodological
> >materialism/naturalism simply acknowledges that physical events are all
> >that science can investigate, and that "direct, material, measurable,
> >predictable causes" are the only way science can explain physical events.
>
> Bertvan:
> Would that mean that science should not try to investigate such phenomena
as
> "mind" unless it can be reduced to a "direct, material, measurable"
physical
> substance?
>
The scientific method in essence states, when in doubt assume the phenomenon
is a physical one with a physical cause until the evidence deomonstrates
otherwise. So until we have evidence that the mind does not have a "
'direct, material, measurable' physical" cause, most scientists will assume
otherwise. Other scientists who do not want to assume that are free to
pursue their own line of inquiry, but they still have to produce evidence to
demonstrate that they were right.
>
> In medicine, science recognizes the "placebo effect" in spite of
> lack of understanding the mechanism by which "mind" produces changes in
the
> body.
>
Actually the mechanism is well understood. The brain produces special
neuropeptides called endorphins, enkephalins and dynorphins that are natural
painkillers. These neuropeptides are produced in response to changing
hormone levels caused by injuries or by direct stimulation by pain impulses
traveling to the brain. The placebo affect works by psychologically taking
the patient's mind off the pain, thus allowing the neuropeptides to lower the
pain enough to reinforce the psychological effect and thus calm and relax the
patient. It also works because the patient's conscious thoughts are
accompanied (if not caused) by neural impulses that trigger the production of
these neuropeptides. Even if you believe that the mind is separate from the
brain, there is no denying the evidence that shows that as people think,
different areas of their brain become active as neuronal pathways are turned
on and off. Even if these pathways do not cause the thoughts, the
neurological activity can and does trigger the production of neuropeptides.
The point is there really is no mystery.here.
>
> Kevin:
> > Even miracles have causes; even free will is a cause. The question is,
> >what kind of cause is the most probable? If a rubber ball sitting on a
> >table suddenly jumped straight up in the air, what would you say is the
> >most
> >probable cause? Some hidden mechanism? The atoms in the tabletop
hitting
> >the ball simultaneously with enough force to move it? God mischievously
> >gave it a nudge? The ball just suddenly decided on the spur of the
moment
> >to start bouncing? Most people would assume that even possibilities two
> >and three were much more probable than possibility four.
>
> >Science simply chooses to restrict itself to one narrow set of causes; in
> >doing so, it is not saying that those are the only possible causes, only
> >that from the evidence they are the most probable.
>
> Bertvan:
> I don't disagree with all that. But if all science can say is that young
> earth creationists are probably wrong, what business does the supreme
court
> have declaring it can't be discussed in front of school children. :-)
>
Because science says that the **evidence** shows that YEC is highly
improbable, even impossible in some cases. (That's actually an interesting
twist; science can never say that something is absolutely possible, but it
can determine if something is absolutely impossible.) Since the purpose of
public education is to teach children what science believes by consensus is
most likely the truth, the less likely ideas tend to be excluded, especially
if they are considered to be much less likely. However, all alternative
ideas are available in books, so if children (or their parents) want to learn
about what is not taught in school, all they have to do is get a book on the
subject. It's called the marketplace of ideas.
>
> I'm unclear whether you believe in free will. If so, whether you believe
it
> exists in only humans?--primates?--mammals? Or where you would draw the
> line. (I've read of a recent experiment suggesting plants "choose" which
> sperm they accept for fertilization.)
>
I wouldn't read too much into the use of such terms by scientists. While
they should use specific terminology, sometimes it doesn't exist, so other
words must be used to fill the void. However, since scientific terminology
must always be precise, if unusual (for science) terms are used, the
scientists always define how they are using them clearly. In this case
"choose" may simply be the way they reference the molecular system that
selects one type of sperm over another. My point is that you should read the
paper to see how the scientists define the word "choose" (assuming they
actually used that word; the press may have used that term as an attempt to
translate a more precise scientific term) rather than make your own
assumptions.
>
> Kevin:
> >Philosophical naturalism says that all events are physical events and
that
> >all physical events must have mechanistic causes. What I said was
> >**specific** physical events. I did not say that the only events were
> >physical events, nor did I say all physical events. By using the term
> >specific I was referring to the select group of events that science has
> >chosen to investigate, and I did not imply that these were the only
events
> >that existed.
>
> >...one cannot test -- let alone prove -- a hypothesis that does not
assume
> >a specific, measurable, physical cause. It is difficult enough to
> >demonstrate what motivates people; how in Hades can you demonstrate
> >a paramecium turned left because it wanted to?
>
> Bertvan:
> Precisely. However, most people are under the impression science has
ruled
> out everything but measurable, physical causes.
>
That's not my experience, but that would be like arguing who is more popular,
Ronald Reagan or William Clinton. Such a question cannot be resolved
scientifically.
>
> Kevin:
> >However, there are scientists who are not satisfied and are looking for
> >other explanations, but they are still looking for natural, mechanistic
> >explanations rather than metaphysical explanations.
>
> Bertvan:
> Those scientists who are philosophical materialists will limit the areas
> where they look for explanations.
>
They might at first, but if they are good scientists then once they discover
that where they are currently looking is unproductive, they will look
elsewhere, even if doing so contradicts their personal philosophy. Good
scientists go wherever the evidence leads them.
>
> That's fine, so long as they don't try to
> limit where scientists with other philosophical view points look.
>
No one can place limits on any scientist who won't accept them; however, all
scientists know that they must support their case with evidence. As such,
good scientists will look wherever they can find the evidence they need, even
if it conflicts with their personal philosophy, but they will not look
anywhere that won't produce any evidence at all. That is the only
restriction placed on any scientist, and all scientists take up that
restriction of their own free will (or at least the good ones do).
Kevin L. O'Brien