OK, so now I'm wondering why you brought it up. Would you say that
Phil Johnson does not have a strong _a priori_ commitment to
theism? Well, I obviously cannot speak for Phil but I can say
that *I* have a strong _a priori_ commitment to theism and an even
stronger _a priori_ commitment to Christianity. I also believe
that methodological naturalism is the way to do science. If you
are correct, then apparently I cannot do science. Well, needless
to say, I hope your wrong ;-).
Let me try to illustrate how I believe MN would work wrt strong _a priori_
commitments. Suppose I have a strong _a priori_ commitment to
Naturalism (Nature is all there is). If I am also a MN then I
will recognize that the instruments and methods of science will
never show that nature is all there is. Now suppose that I
have a strong _a priori_ commitment to the idea that God exists.
Once again, if I am a methodological naturalist (as well as a theist)
then I will recognize that the instruments and methods of science
cannot show that God exists.
>Hi Brian:
>
>Everyone is responsible for modifying their individual religion, world view
>or philosophy to be compatible with reality as they see it. Some Theists
>have apparently even successfully adapted to Darwinian Fundamentalism; others
>can't. For several centuries we have trusted science to define reality.
>What if people stopped trusting science?
You seem to have a strong _a priori_ commitment to the idea that
science defines reality. ;-)
Just kidding, my general advice, though, is that people should stop
trusting science to define reality as soon as possible. :)
But I think I'm starting to see where you're coming from.
At first this seems to put a kink in the logic behind my
statements above regarding the interface between strong _a priori_
commitments and MN. To illustrate, let's suppose that I'm a MN and
also have a commitment to the idea that science defines reality.
As a MN I believe that science can study only those things
accessible to its instruments and methods. I find that there
are no instruments and methods of science whereby I can
measure Purpose. Since I believe science defines reality I
have to conclude that there is no Purpose. To use your words
above, this would be my responsibility :).
OK, but the flaw here is that in my argument above there is
a point of unification between people with various _a priori_
commitments, namely that they accept MN as their idea of what
science is. But in my analysis above leading to the conclusion
of no Purpose there is a different notion of what science is
that is incompatible with MN, i.e. to apply my Purpose argument
one would have to simultaneously hold two different views of
what science is.
Bertvan:
>It was only recently that some
>official science organization deleted from their definition of evolution:
>
>"Evolution is a contingent, random process--without plan, meaning or purpose."
>
Yes, and it is very encouraging that they did this. Wouldn't you
agree? They realized that their former statement was not in
keeping with the principle of MN.
Bertvan:
>Some materialists expressed indignation at the deletion. However, no one can
>possibly know whether ANYTHING in nature is "random, without plan, meaning or
>purpose".
Yes, exactly. But this is a conclusion which comes as a direct
consequence of MN.
>If scientists make dogmatic statements about things they can't
>know, people might lose trust in them. Personally, I am suspicious of any
>biologist who offers an emotional defense of Darwinism (whatever Darwinism
>means). Some people claim they don't give a damn what the public
>thinks--those apparently more eager to "defeat" creationists, rather than
>find common ground for coexistence. You were disappointed that common ground
>wasn't a definition of methodological naturalism.
Of course it is not a definition of MN, nevertheless, many can and
actually have found common ground here. But, I'm becoming more
and more curious as to why you brought this up. I believe you
offered it originally as a principle that you would accept and
that Phil Johnson would accept. The implication to me was that you
were offering this as a common ground, i.e. that you were implying
that there would be a lot less arguing if scientists accepted it
also.
Bertvan:
>I'm disappointed it isn't
>"design". No one can possibly know whether the universe was designed.
>Nevertheless, many defenders of Darwinism seem to regard "design" as another
>form of creationism--something to be attacked and stamped out.
>
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Applied Mechanics
The Ohio State University
"All kinds of private metaphysics and theology have
grown like weeds in the garden of thermodynamics"
-- E. H. Hiebert