Brian:
>Now I guess I'm a little confused. The reason I suggested those books
>was that it seemed to me that you were familiar only with a particularly
>narrow view of evolution sometimes referred to as ultra-Darwinism.
>But if you have read Goodwin and Eldredge you must be aware that not
>everyone takes the view that natural selection + random mutations is
>capable of explaining all of macroevolution, yet you seem to present
>this narrow view as if it is somehow representative of what scientists
>believe about evolution.
Hi Brian,
Sorry. The people with whom I've been discussing evolution considered anyone
not believing macro evolution is merely lots of micro evolution a
creationist. (An ignorant creationist pig, in one instance.) Any scientist
who suggests otherwise was labeled incompetent. I've often doubted
scientists would agree, but I don't have opportunity to talk to many
scientists. I'm convinced the public definition of evolution is "random
mutation and natural selection". Needless to say, I am delighted with the
open mindedness on this discussion list.
>Bertvan:
>> First, as long as anyone believes in
>>materialism, it isn't "dead". I've met many people who freely claim to be
>>materialists--and by my definition.
Brian:
>No doubt. But when I say dead I mean it in context of our original
>discussion. Its dead in the sense that it no longer has a hold
>on science that it once had.
Bertvan:
Maybe it takes time for new attitudes to trickle down to the public.
Bertvan:
>>Philosophical views can't be disproved by science.
Brian:
>Yes, I think I would agree. Science might address the physical
>consequences of a philosophy, but not the philosophical views
>themselves. This is what I had in mind with mechanistic materialism.
>I suppose one could view this both as a philosophical world view
>as well as a physical theory. I was talking about the physical theory
>whose main consequence is a deterministic clock-like universe.
>I think here we may find a lot of agreement. A minor correction though first.
>Claims about the power of science to unlock all secrets generally belong to
>a view more commonly called scientism.
>I've long had a "vision" that people of various views can find a common
>ground in methodological naturalism (MN). This would require self-constraint
>with for everyone with respect to mixing metaphysics with science.
>I would welcome corrections on the following: It seems to me that a
>significant majority of evolutionists on this list are methodological
>naturalists when it comes to the practice of science. Unfortunately,
>it seems there are practically no creationists who are methodological
>naturalists. The only exception I know of is Burgy, but once again I
>welcome corrections. In fact, I would be very happy to learn otherwise.
>MN has been discussed extensively on this list in the past. Unfortunately,
>things get somewhat more complicated than they seem at first. Let's take
>Phillip Johnson as an example. On page 211 of <Reason in the Balance> Phil
>defines a theistic naturalist as "a theist who thinks MN is the correct
>approach to scientific inquiry and hence to understanding (for example)
>how living things came into existence." As one reads through this section
>one will probably come to the conclusion that Phil is not a methodological
>naturalist :).
>I can remember a long time ago when Phil was still the moderator
>of this group. There was quite a discussion surrounding Phil's
>intended introduction of the term theistic naturalist (this was before
>Reason in the Balance> was published). Some one brought up something
>Phil had said in 1992, asking whether he had changed his mind. Phil's
>response, as best I remember, was very much like what he writes in
>a footnote on page 212 of RitB. Let me reproduce it here:
======begin quote (by Johnson) ================================
In a March 1992 lecture in Dallas I made the following observation:
The statement defining the agenda for this Symposium asserts
that an _a-priori_ commitment to metaphysical naturalism is
necessary to support Darwinism. I would not express the point that
way today, but any seeming inconsistency with the views stated in this
paper is semantic rather than substantive. The key question raised by
the qualifier _methodological_ is this: What is being limited--
science or reality? When "methodological naturalism" is
combined with a very strong a-priori confidence that
materialistic theories invoking only unintelligent causes
can account for such phenomena as genetic information and
human intelligence, the distinction between methodological
naturalism and metaphysical naturalism tends to collapse.
(Example: "Science can study only naturalistic mechanisms;
therefore we can be confident that life must have arisen
by a naturalistic mechanism, since science continually
advances and solves problems of this kind.") That science
has its limitations is not in doubt; the question is whether
unsound assumptions about reality have been made to permit
science to escape those limitations.
-- Phillip Johnson <Reason in the Balance> p. 212 (footnote)
=================================================================
Bertvan:
(When "methodological naturalism" is
combined with a very strong a-priori confidence that
materialistic theories invoking only unintelligent causes
can account for such phenomena as genetic information and
human intelligence,) (quote from Johnson) I don't believe it IS still
methodological naturalism; It has become philosophical naturalism. But even
more confusing than the definition of materialism, methodological naturalism
and philosophical naturalism is the definition of Darwinism. It is my
understanding that a bunch or scientists got together and defined Neo
Darwinism by something called the "modern synthesis". If that definition is
obsolete, WHAT IS DARWINISM?
Bertvan