Re: Cambridge Publishes Neo-Creationism

Mike Hardie (hardie@globalserve.net)
Thu, 15 Oct 1998 09:58:48 -0700

David Tyler wrote:
>The concern I have is that whilst I think the methodological approach
>to recognising design is defensible, is can be interpreted as reviving
>the "god of the gaps" concept. That is: if all other avenues fail,
>and we can't think of any other ways of explaining the data, we
>conclude intelligent design. I find a tension between this and what I
>consider to be a healthy Christian perspective: that design is
>pervasive. What is the link between universal design and Dembski's
>"design inference"?

I agree that this is essentially "God of the Gaps". We could, after all,
just as easily posit that life comes from the 4th dimension (as Petersen
does with loess); or we could say that invisible space aliens from Sirius
designed life. All of those theories have something in common with the
idea of an "extra-natural designer": they are unscientific, in that they
posit entities not even theoretically addressable by science. They are
also unfalsifiable, at least through scientific methods.

This is not to say that God did *not* design life. It simply makes the
point that Dembski's argument is better seen as a variation on the
theological argument from design rather than as a scientific theory per se.
This is in fact the problem I have with the entire idea of "intelligent
design theory". It presents as science something which, quite obviously,
belongs in the realm of *metaphysical* inquiry. Again, this is not to say
that it isn't *true*, just that it belongs in the realm of philosophy /
theology.

What are everyone's thoughts on this? Does anyone believe that things like
extra-natural designers (or, for that matter, 4th dimensions and invisible
aliens), regardless of their truth, can properly be considered science?
Harold Kincaid, in the context of arguing for laws in the social sciences,
properly notes that "the science / nonscience distinction is a continuum"
(as opposed to a strict line). But all the same, doesn't any theory
proposing things outside of empirical naturalistic inquiry necessarily fall
well into the "nonscience" side? Indeed, if *not*, then is there
*anything* that could be consistently called nonscience?

Regards,

Mike Hardie
<hardie@globalserve.net>
http://www.globalserve.net/~hardie/dv/