On Tue, 30 Jun 1998 14:58:04 -0700, Mike Hardie wrote:
[continued]
>SJ>MN has proved to date a failure in explaining the orign of life
>>from non-living chemicals. As Francis Crick, co-discover of the
>>structure of DNA, and avowed atheist, states: ><snip>
MH>Well, I'm not a scientist, so I'm not going to be able to say much
>of value as to whether science really has succeeded yet in creating a
>viable theory of abiogenesis.
I'm not a "scientist" either but I try to keep up with the scientific
issues by reading scientific journals and books. Your lack of
knowledge of what science *actually does* as opposed to what you
think it *should do* is the cause of much of the differences between
us.
MH>I simply thought you were saying that MN couldn't even
>theoretically address the question, which is why I brought
>abiogenesis up.
Clearly "MN" can "theoretically address the question" of
"abiogenesis". But to date it has been an almost total failure.
>>MH>I think what he is saying is that, within the context of science,
>>>MN is best able to approach the issues. I'd even go one step
>>>further with that, and say that MN *is* the scientific approach to
>>>all issues.
>SJ>Even though MN has failed in: 1) origins and 2) Christianity? On
>>what basis do you make your assertion?
MH>When you say MN has failed in origins, what do you mean
>exactly? That it has not yet produced any correct conclusions, or
>that it is not even theoretically adequate to address the issue? The
>former would be irrelevant. The latter, if true, would simply mean
>that origins is not a question science can address. (I'm not personally
>convinced that's the case, though.)
I mean exactly what I said. "MN has failed in: 1) origins...", inclusing
the origin of life. Scientists using MN have come up against a brick
wall in every area of origins. That's why there was such a flurry to
discover life on Mars. They have no real idea how life began on
Earth. They have been trying since 1959 (and even before) with total
failure. The obvious conclusion that should be drawn is that life
required an Intelligent Designer to get started:
"One characteristic feature of the above critique needs to be
emphasized. We have not simply picked out a number of details
within chemical evolution theory that are weak, or without adequate
explanation for the moment. For the most part this critique is based
on crucial weaknesses intrinsic to the theory itself. Often it is
contended that criticism focuses on present ignorance "Give us more
time to solve the problems," is the plea. After all, the pursuit of
abiogenesis is young as a scientific enterprise. It will be claimed that
many of these problems are mere state-of-the-art gaps. And, surely
some of them are. Notice, however, that the sharp edge of this
critique is not what we do not know, but what we do know. Many
facts have come to light in the past three decades of experimental
inquiry into life's beginning. With each passing year the criticism has
gotten stronger. The advance of science itself is what is challenging
the nation that life arose on earth by spontaneous (in a
thermodynamic sense) chemical reactions. Over the years a slowly
emerging line or boundary has appeared which shows observationally
the limits of what can be expected from matter and energy left to
themselves, and what can be accomplished only through what
Michael Polanyi has called "a profoundly informative intervention.".
When it is acknowledged that most so-called prebiotic simulation
experiments actually owe their success to the crucial but illegitimate
role of the investigator, a new and fresh phase of the experimental
approach to life's origin can then be entered. Until then however, the
literature of chemical evolution will probably continue to be
dominated by reports of experiments in which the investigator, like a
metabolizing Maxwell Demon, will have performed work on the
system through intelligent, exogenous intervention. Such work
establishes experimental boundary conditions, and imposes intelligent
influence/control over a supposedly "prebiotic" earth. As long as this
informative interference of the investigator is ignored, the illusion of
prebiotic simulation will be fostered. We would predict that this
practice will prove to be a barrier to solving the mystery of life's
origin." (Thaxton C.B., Bradley W.L. & Olsen R.L., "The Mystery of
Life's Origin," 1992, p185)
MH>As for MN failing in Christianity... what? Questions of religious
>truth are *obviously* a matter for philosophy, not science. Science
>is purely empirical, and religious questions are not the sort of thing
>you can play with in a lab or dig out of the ground.
No. Christianity uniquely of all the world's religions claims to be
rooted in empirical fact-the fact of God coming into this world in
human form in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It claims He
performed many supernatural acts, culminating in His death by
crucifixion and subsequent resurrection after three days in a tomb.
Scholars employing MN have tried to explain away these historical
facts for centuries but have failed. This failure, like that in the case of
origin of life, calls into question the basic premises of MN, that God
should never be part of any scientific explanation.
After all, that basic premise of MN could only be true if God really
had no active part in any of the things that science seeks to explain.
[...]
>>MH>I'm not sure that's necessarily indicative of great respect.
>SJ>If Johnson is regarded by a Nobel Prize-winning physicist as
>>"the most respectable academic critic of evolution", yet you say
>>that even that is not "necessarily indicative of great respect", then
>>what you are saying is that *no* "academic critic of evolution" can
>>be respected.
MH>Actually, I was just throwing in a snide comment. Put it down
>to too much caffeine. :)
Sorry, but I can't help thinking that you really meant it, but are now
trying to wriggle out of it.
>SJ>If true, this confirms my point that *in practice*
>>Methodological Naturalism is just a applied Metaphysical
>>Naturalism.
>MN is entirely a practice. Metaphysical Naturalism, on the other
>hand, is *not* a practice (i.e., I'm not sure what you mean by
>"applied").
See above.
[...]
>SJ>I live in Australia, so I am not aware of any Canadian "statistics,
>>news reports, etc".
MH>Well... where did you get this information that "Intelligent
>Design is gaining ground in universities across USA and Canada,
>both among students and faculty members (including scientists)"?
I already told you. From corresponding with the "Intelligent Design
theorists":
----------------------------------------------------------
On Tue, 09 Jun 1998 21:00:21 +0800, Stephen Jones wrote:
SJ>I correspond with leading Intelligent Design theorists and the
>news is that Intelligent Design is gaining ground in universities
>across USA and Canada, both among students and faculty members
>(including >scientists).
----------------------------------------------------------
>>MH>That's not really correct. Remember, the study of ultimate
>>>reality is metaphysics, which is philosophy. Science is another
>>>thing altogether, and deals solely with empirical data and
>>>inferences from it.
>SJ>And why should those "inferences" rule out the possibility of
>>God's acting supernaturally, e.g. in the case of the origin of the
>>universe and the origin of life?
MH>>Because the existence of God is a metaphysical issue, and not
>subject to empirical inquiry.
This is just begging the question. Even if God was "a metaphysical
issue", if He has acted in the history of life, then that will have real-
world consequences which are "subject to empirical inquiry", as are
other historical sciences:
"...some people think that I have denied scientific character to the
historical sciences, such as palaeontology, or the history of the
evolution of life on Earth; or to say, the history of literature, or of
technology, or of science. This is a mistake, and I here wish to affirm
that these and other historical sciences have in my opinion scientific
character: their hypotheses can in many cases be tested. It appears as
if some people would think that the historical sciences are untestable
because they describe unique events. However the description of
unique events can very often be tested by deriving from them testable
predictions or retrodictions." (Popper K., "Evolution," Letters, New
Scientist 21 August 1980, p611)
One major "testable predictions or retrodictions" of Intelligent Deisgn
theory is that the origin of: 1) life; and 2) life's complex designs; will
resist all purely naturalistic explanations:
"William Paley showed that we can recognize attributes of a
watchmaker by examining a watch In the same way, we can deduce
attributes of life's designer The designer pursued a consistent and
credible goal. The designer employed logic, reason, intellect, purpose,
intent, technology, and craft. The designer understood empirically
based thinking (that we call Science). The designer could mentally
project into various potential situations to envision how other
observers might misperceive. The designer then constructed a vital
message resistant to all other interpretations. The designer has shown
a desire and capacity to communicate." (ReMine W.J., "The Biotic
Message," 1993, p469)
[...]
>SJ>I have no problem with some "truths which are not accessible by
>>scientific methods". But I do have a problem in the assumption
>>that *no* "truths" about God are "accessible by scientific
methods".
MH>Easy. God = metaphysics.
Too "easy". God also may have acted in the real world by creating
the universe, life and life's complex designs. Since science studies "the
universe, life and life's complex designs", God's actions then become
accessible to scientific study. If the origin of the universe, life and
life's complex designs resists all naturalistic exlanations then a science
that is *really* interested in truth should have no problem concluding
Intelligent Design:
>SJ>If an Intelligent Designer really did create the universe and
>>life, I can see no reason why science can study that up to the
>>point of actual creation, and acknowledge that it was the work
>>of an Intelligent Designer.
MH>You are forgetting again that science is a limited kind of inquiry.
I am not "forgetting" anything. I *disagree* with your question-
begging claim that science is somehow "limited" to not considering
"the work of an Intelligent Designer."
MH>Whether or not something is really the case has no direct
>bearing on whether or not science can study it. Intelligent design,
>whether true or not, is a necessarily philosophical issue."
No its not. Science already studies Intelligent Design:
"Now, some branches of science, including SETI, archaeology,
forensic science, psychology and sociology, use personal agency and
various internal states of agents (desires, willings, intentions,
awarenesses, thoughts, beliefs) as part of their description of the
causal entities, processes, events or actions cited as explanations for
certain phenomenal. For example, Richard De-Charms claims that "a
scientific concept of self that does not encompass personal causation
is inadequate." Thus there is nothing nonscientific about appealing to
personal agency and the like in a scientific explanation, and it is this
insight that creationists express in their view of theistic science."
(Moreland J.P., "Theistic Science & Methodological Naturalism," in
Moreland J.P. ed., "The Creation Hypothesis," 1994, pp55-56)
MH>Not only does it hinge on positing a deity (a metaphysical
>claim)
So what. Science is *based* on a number of "metaphysical claims".
Not "positing a deity" is also "a metaphysical claim."
MH>, but it works with the idea of "design", which is far too loose
>a term to be even theoretically useful in science. (Basically, science
>would have no non-question-begging way of establishing criteria
>for "designedness". For that matter, philosophy may have no way
>of establishing such criteria either.)
See above. That "design" may be *difficult* to formulate, does not
make it impossible. Most (if not all science) works with concepts that
may not be 100% rigorous. Archaeology, SETI, etc, already use
criteria that distinguish intelligent design from purely natural causes.
The real problem is that Metaphysical Naturalists don't *wan't* there
to be Intelligent Design, because that would imply personal
accountability to the Designer:
"I had motives for not wanting the world to have a meaning;
consequently assumed that it had none, and was able without any
difficulty to find satisfying reasons for this assumption. The
philosopher who finds no meaning in the world is not concerned
exclusively with a problem in pure metaphysics, he is also concerned
to prove that there is no valid reason why he personally should not do
as he wants to do...For myself, the philosophy of meaninglessness
was essentially an instrument of liberation..." (Huxley A., "Ends and
Means," 1946, p273, in McDowell J., "Evidence That Demands A
Verdict," 1988, Vol. I, p11)
[...]
>>MH>That seems a bit uncharitable. Should I conclude from the
>>>fact that you get fallacy names wrong that you don't know what
>>fallacies are?
>SJ>You would be entirely within your rights to assume so, and I
>>would not regard it as "uncharitable". I would much appreciate
>>you correcting me, where I am wrong.
MH>My point is, getting the name of something wrong obviously is
>not the same as not understanding the thing in question. If it *were*
>the same, then your minor labelling errors would mean *you* didn't
>understand fallacies. Do you agree that you didn't (or don't)
>understand fallacies? I doubt it. Hence, you cannot use that principle
>to suppose that he doesn't understand TR.
I did not even say that "he doesn't understand TR." I said that his
getting the name of TR wrong "does not inspire confidence" in his
"understanding of TR."
>>MH>(For example, in this same post, you misuse the term "special
>>pleading"
>SJ>Please explain where, with reasons. Thanks.
MH>Earlier in the post to which I responded, you said that
>somebody (I think it was John Rylander) was committing the special
>pleading fallacy. The issue was, I think, whether or not Philip
>Johnson should be taken seriously regarding evolution, when his
>primary training is in rhetoric. (I don't think that was actually the
>issue John had in mind exactly, but that's what you were addressing,
>anyhow.) Whatever the case, even if John said that, and even if it
>was fallacious, it is not special pleading.
Well I am not going to `plead guilty' when the `prosecution' can't
even remember what the alleged `crime' was!
MH>Special pleading is the fallacy of suggesting that a conclusion
>ought to be accepted or disregarded because of certain practical
>circumstances.
My book on logic says it is citing only the evidence that supports
one's view and leaving out evidence that doesn't:
"Special Pleading. This is yet another way to make certain the
opposing view doesn't get a fair shake. Here only the evidence that
supports one view is cited, and the rest is left out." (Geisler N.L. &
Brooks R.M, "Come, Let Us Reason: An Introduction to Logical
Thinking," 1990, p102)
MH>Examples of special pleading:
>
>"We can't accept the conclusion that God exists, because then all the
>atheists would be so irritated that they'd start a nuclear war." "We
>can't accept the conclusion that God doesn't exist, because that
>would make all the theists really sad."
I think that maybe *you* don't know what "special pleading" is? It
doesn't sound anything like what Geisler says. There is nothing left
out of the above arguments.
MH> (a specialized kind of special pleading called "argumentum ad
>misericordiam")
I don't think this is special pleading either. Geisler includes it under
the heading of "Inappropriate Authorities":
"Some fallacies lead us to think that we should believe something
other than the reasoning that is presented in the argument. They ask
us to look at our emotions, evaluate our own ignorance before
passing judgment, believe a famous name, or reverence new ideas.
These use our sense of being subject to authority to derail our
thinking. Usually, such appeals have nothing to do with the argument
at hand....Argumentum ad Misericordiam (appeal to pity). Here is a
classic emotional appeal: "If this man is given the death sentence,
who will take care of his wife and children?"...This kind of argument
says, "Accept this because you should feel pity (or sympathy) for the
one involved..." (Geisler N.L. & Brooks R.M, 1990, p96)
MH> "You have to accept that the existence of God is unknowable,
>because if you don't, I'm going to break your kneecaps." (another
>specialized version, "argumentum ad baculum").
Similiarly, I doubt this is special pleading. Geisler has it under the
heading of "Fallacies of Relevance: Errors that Don't Address the
Issues":
"There are many ways to bring irrelevant matters into a discussion,
and this list is not intended to be complete. These fallacies show that
people will go to any length to win an argument, even if they can't
prove their point....They might attack not your argument, but
you!...These are all just games to avoid the real issues. They are
irrelevant, and that's why they are wrong...Argument ad Baculum
(appeal to force). This type of argument does not even attempt to be
relevant. It simply says, "Accept this argument, or I'll beat you up!" It
seeks to persuade by force. It is a threat, reasoning through
blackmail, argument by intimidation. It assumes that might makes
right. What does that have to do with logic?" (Geisler N.L. & Brooks
R.M, 1990, p93)
>>MH>and in the past you have misapplied "ad hominem".
>SJ>I don't wan't to rake up old coals on this one, but I disagree with
>>your assessment that I "misapplied `ad hominem'"
MH>Just for reference, argumentum ad hominem is the formal fallacy
>of saying that a person's position is right/wrong because of their
>personal characteristics, when said characteristics actually aren't
>relevant to the strength of the position at all.
Geisler lists this under "Informal fallacies":
"Argumentum ad Hominem (abusive). This is argument by character
assassination. "Reject whatever he says because he is a bad person."
Literally, the fallacy's name means "argument against the man." It is
not an attack on the proposition, but against the person." (Geisler
N.L. & Brooks R.M, 1990, pp93-94)
MH> The examples you have in the past supplied of "ad hominems"
>did not actually exemplify the ad hominem fallacy at all.
This is just your unsuppoerted opinion. I disagee with you. And since
I was the person the ad hominems were directed against, I prefer my
opinion on this to your.
MH>What does actually verge on an example of "ad hominem" are
>your posts attempting to negate Glenn Morton's criticism of Ross
>and Johnson on the basis of his Christian credentials. Ironically
>enough.
Therse were not "ad hominems". Glenn claims to be a Christian yet
makes persistent destructive criticisms of leading Christian apologists.
He couples this with claims of having high standards (eg. "My
Utmost for His Highest", etc), which he applies to others, with the
implication they are ethically and morally deficient. My questions
were directed at ascertaining exactly what was his Christian `bona
fides' to make those judgements against his fellow Christians. Glenn's
attempts to evade the questions and his eventual blustering answers
were very revealing.
[...]
>SJ>Burgy has said, and I have accepted that he made an "error".
>>But at the time I I took his words at face value.
MH>My point was simply that, even "taken at face value", minor
>errors in labelling cannot be taken to denote ignorance of the
>subject.
You still miss the point. At the time I did not know it was a "minor
error in labelling". I repeat that "I took his words at face value", ie.
that he thought "TR" mean "Theological Realism." When Burgy
admitted it was an error, I accepted it.
[...]
>SJ>I would have thought that science is the actual method of
>>understanding of reality. Metaphysics (ie. philosophy of science) is
>>the theoretical underpinning of why science is able to understand
>>reality.
MH>Philosophy of science is not the same thing as science. It's more
>like the philosophical perspective on science. Science itself is
>capable of telling us all sorts of things; whether or not we accept
>those results as actual, or as the entirety of reality, depends entirely
>on our *philosophical* conclusions *about* science. Now, most
>people certainly do believe that science, to some degree, tells us
>something about the way the universe really is. My only point is
>that, whether they realize it or not, they are there practicing
>philosophy. (And that is not by any means an attack. Despite what
>some people seem to think, "philosophy" is not just a code word for
>" superstition and fantasy".)
How is that any different from what I just said?
[...]
>SJ>How can we "make sense of empirical data" if we are not
>>"understanding reality"?
MH>Science takes in all the empirical data and gives us conclusions
>regarding it -- that is what I mean by "making sense of it". The truth
>of those conclusions is certainly important, but not something
>science itself can prove.
You have sidestepped my question. Your answer says nothing about
How we can "make sense of empirical data" if we are not
"understanding reality"?
MH>Science, like any other system, is self-consistent but cannot
>prove its own soundness. To prove the soundness of any system,
>you have to look outside the system -- in this case, to philosophy.
I agree with that. And the problem is that science has adopted the
"philosophy" of Materialistic-Naturalism. While that has brought
some success, it is not adequate to answer the really BIG questions:
"Why believe that there is a God at all? My answer is that to suppose
that there is a God explains why there is a world at all; why there are
the scientific laws there are; why animals and then human beings have
evolved; why humans have the opportunity to mould their characters
and those of their fellow humans for good or ill and to change the
environment in which we live; why we have the well-authenticated
account of Christ's life, death and resurrection; why throughout the
centuries men have had the apparent experience of being in touch
with and guided by God; and so much else. In fact, the hypothesis of
the existence of God makes sense of the whole of our experience, and
it does so better than any other explanation which can be put
forward, and that is the grounds for believing it to be true."
(Swinburne R.G., "The Justification of Theism", Truth: An
International, Inter-Disciplinary Journal of Christian Thought,
Volume 3, 1991. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth09.html)
>>MH>Whether or not that empirical data corresponds to reality, or
>>>to the entirety of reality, would be a philosophical question.
>SJ>That's what I said. You have confirmed my point.
MH>It's my point as well, so perhaps we agree on that much at least.
Good!
[...]
>>MH>I think the point is that MN *isn't* philosophy. It *is* "doing
>>>science", or rather the way to do science.
>SJ>Make up your mind. Is MN "doing science" or "the way to do
>>science"? The first is science, the second is philosophy.
MH>Okay, meticulously worded: "doing science is the act of
>applying MN. And MN is the way to do science." I.e., they mean
>exactly the same thing.
I disagree with both propositions: 1) that "doing science is the act of
applying MN"; and 2) "MN is the way to do science." That would
only be so if you knew in advance that Metaphysical Naturalism is
true. If Theism is true, then the "way to do science" would be
Methodological Theism.
[...]
>SJ>The point is that assuming a Methodological Naturalism gives
>>and enormous advantage to "metaphysical naturalism", making it
>>very difficult for Theistic Realism to make its case.
MH>*Only* with certain philosophical assumptions. If one is a
>logical positivist, or a scientific naturalist (a la Quine), then certainly
>one is going to use MN and at the same time rule out TR.
Well since most (if not all) the leaders of science are "scientific
naturalists" then their science is used to "rule out TR."
MH>Simply using MN does not in any way logically mean that you
>must be a metaphysical naturalist
I already have said that. One can be a Theist and use MN in a limited
way, ie. stopping short when it gets to Biblical miracles for example.
In my debate with John Rylander I called this "weak MN", to
distinguish it from the normal MN (which I called "strong MN")
which does not admit any limitations.
MH>though, nor does it even provide any support for metaphysical
>naturalism being true.
Why then would a "logical positivist, or a scientific naturalist...use
MN" to "rule out TR", if it does not "provide any support for
metaphysical naturalism being true"?
>SJ>This would be OK if "metaphysical naturalism" was true. But it
>>is absurd if "theistic design" (ie. Theistic Realism/Intelligent
>>Design), is true.
MN>If metaphysical naturalism is true, then MN is the only correct
>way of looking at reality.
Agreed. But if Theism is true, then "MN is" definitely not
"the...correct way of looking at reality."
MN>If metaphysical naturalism is *not* true, then MN simply deals
>with a limited part of reality (i.e., the physical universe).
Even that's not true, because "the physical universe" includes
assumptions about *origins* that "if metaphysical naturalism is *not*
true" then MN is not true. For example, if an Intelligent Designer
intervened supernaturally at strategic points in life's history, then MN
is not true. In that case Methodological Theism would be the "way to
do science".
MN> But it may be used just as consistently regardless of one's
>metaphysical stance re the supernatural.
No. MN cannot be consistently used if "one's metaphysical stance re
the supernatural" is that there is a God who intervenes supernaturally
in history. All theists stop at some point from full-blown MN. Even
Bultmann stopped short of demythologising God, as Barth pointed
out.
[...]
Thanks for your arguments. But this post has grown very long
because we are just repeating ourselves. If you respond with no new
arguments, I will probably not reply and we will just have to agree to
differ. I would love to debate these things through to the end, but this
is not the only forum I am in and my last download was 106
messages!
Steve
"Evolution is the greatest engine of atheism ever invented."
--- Dr. William Provine, Professor of History and Biology, Cornell University.
http://fp.bio.utk.edu/darwin/1998/slides_view/Slide_7.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen E (Steve) Jones ,--_|\ sejones@ibm.net
3 Hawker Avenue / Oz \ Steve.Jones@health.wa.gov.au
Warwick 6024 ->*_,--\_/ Phone +61 8 9448 7439
Perth, West Australia v "Test everything." (1Thess 5:21)
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