On Tue, 30 Jun 1998 14:58:04 -0700, Mike Hardie wrote:
[...]
MH>Also, I'm not going to respond to the last "destructive criticism"
>post. I've made all the arguments I can really make on the subject. I
>think that the mature and rational thing to do is avoid all the
>character reference and concentrate *solely* on the issues.
The point is that Glenn's destructive criticism of Christian apologists
*is* an "issue".
>>MH>What would it mean for Methodological Naturalism to be
>>>"true", exactly? It's a methodology, not a metaphysical system.
>SJ>Disagree. MN seamlessly becomes "a metaphysical system", ie.
>>metaphysical naturalism, when it is ceases to be a limitation on
>>science and becomes a limitation on reality. This is most obvious
>>when it is applied to origins and Christianity.
MH>Well, but it *isn't* a limitation on reality. It's a methodology --
>the way to do science. Whether or not the conclusions of the MN
>approach correspond to reality, or the entirety of reality, is where
>the separate metaphysical question comes in.
First, you just ignore my point that "MN...seamlessly becomes...
metaphysical naturalism ...when it is applied to origins and
Christianity."
Second, you just beg the question when you say that MN is "the way
to do science." This tacitly assumes that Metaphysical Naturalism is
true. If there really *is* a Creator who intervened in His creation at
strategic points, eg. the origin of life, the origin of higher taxa, the
origin of human beings, Christianity, etc, then in those areas at least,
MN would *not* be "the way to do science":
"If there are no gaps in the fabric of natural causation, then obviously
appeal to divine activity will get us off track. On the other hand, if
there are such gaps, refusing on principle to recognize them within
science will equally get us off track. We should perhaps be wary of
both ways of going wrong. If in our intellectual endeav- ors we are
attempting to get at truth as best we can, then if we have rational
reason-from whatever source-to believe that God has taken a hand in
the origin or ongoing operation of the cosmos, arbitrarily excluding
that belief needs some justification. (Ratzsch D.L., "The Battle of
Beginnings:," 1996, pp193-194)
[...]
>>MH>But Methodological Naturalism would deny things like God
>>>*only for the purposes of the methodology*, not in any general
>>>or ultimate sense.
>SJ>If there really is a God, why deny Him "for the purposes of the
>>methodology"? This makes sense only if there really is no God, ie.
>>if metaphysical naturalism is true. To clam that there really is a
>>God but the best way to study His creation is to assume there
>>there really isn't a God is absurd.
MH>I think it makes perfect sense when you consider that science is
>concerned only with empirical data.
This is an old-fashioned view of science, which was never what really
happens, and certainly is not what happens today. But especially
science *in the area of origins* is not "concerned only with empirical
data," but is heavily theory laden.. For starters, science*in the area of
origins* assumes apriori that there is no God and tries to find the best
naturalistic theory that fits the facts. But if there is in fact a God, then
science is wrong on its first principle.
MH> God, even if one exists, is never going to be empirically
>testable or verifiable.
Thank you. This is effectively Metaphysical Naturalism! You rule out
apriori any possibility that God could have acted in ways that could
be "empirically testable or verifiable." How do you *know* that
"God...is never going to be empirically testable or verifiable?
MH> A scientist certainly can believe, as a personal philosophy, that
>God is ultimately behind all the phenomena he observes; he can
>certainly think to himself that nature manifests God's design. But
>he cannot consider that *for the purposes of science*.
Why? If there really is a God, who "is ultimately behind all the
phenomena" observed and responsible for the "design" of "nature"
why "cannot" a "scientist" "consider that for the purposes of
science"?
This is really just the applied "personal philosophy" of the majority of
scientists who happen to be Metaphysical Naturalists.
MH> Very simply: the existence, nature, and workings of God are
>all inherently metaphysical questions, and once we delve into
>metaphysics, we are practicing philosophy rather than science.
It is likewise "practicing rather than science" to assume that *even if
God exists*, He should be ignored. And it is *absurd* "philosophy"
at that!
MH>Science, for its part, deals only with one very limited kind of
>inquiry: empirical/naturalistic..
But since it applies that *very limited kind of inquiry:
empirical/naturalistic" to *everything*, e.g. origins, Christianity, it
effectively is applied Metaphysical Naturalism.
>SJ>Do you really think that the God of the Bible is pleased with
>>denying Him for *any* purpose? Jesus (who was God) said: "But
>>whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before
>>my Father which is in heaven." (Mt 10:33).
BH>But *scientists* do not necessarily deny God, the methodology
>does. That is, scientists need not disbelieve in God, they must simply
>realize that science is a context to which claims of religious truth are
>irrelevant.
That is prejudging that *all* "claims of religious truth" (including
those of Christianity) "are irrelevant." It is *in effect* denying the
Christian God.
>>MH>Science does not, and *cannot*, address metaphysical claims,
so >>>it has to eliminate any metaphysical questions (like the
>>>existence of God) simply for its own purposes.
>SJ>The very claim that "Science does not, and *cannot*, address
>>metaphysical claims" is itself a metaphysical claim!
MH>No, it's an epistemological claim. I am talking about the nature
of the methodology, not the nature of reality.
An "epistemological claim" *is* a "metaphysical claim":
"metaphysics ..., n. 1 that branch of philosophy which treats of first
principles, including the sciences of being (ontology) and of the origin
and structure of the universe (cosmology). IT IS ALWAYS
INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH A THEORY OF KNOW
LEDGE (EPISTEMOLOGY). 2. philosophy, esp. in its more
abstruse branches...." (Delbridge A., et al., eds., "The Macquarie
Encyclopedic Dictionary", 1991, p590)
And what's more it is *based* on the "metaphysical claim" of either
Materialism (ie. all is matter = there is no God) or Naturalism (ie.
nature is a closed system of cause and effect = even if there was a
God, He would not (or could not) intervene in nature).
>SJ>To eliminate any metaphysical questions (like the existence of
>>God)" is to come down on the side of a "metaphysical question",
>>ie. atheism, "the" *non-"existence of God"!
MH>Not at all. Analogy: do you think that, say, the practice of
>effective gardening hinges on whether or not the Trinity doctrine is
>correct? Probably not. There is no sense in which the supposed
>consubstantiality of three divine persons is going to directly affect
>whether to plant petunias or azaleas. So, when you're out there
>gardening, it's unlikely that you're factoring the doctrine of the
>Trinity into your gardening equations. (Indeed, if you were, you'd
>have to employ some pretty twisted logic, and would get some
>strange results!) Does this mean that you *deny* the doctrine of
>the Trinity? Of course not. It just means that you recognize that
>gardening is not a practice to which the Trinity is relevant.
You are shifting ground. We were discussing the *existence* of God
as Creator (ie. in respect of origins), not the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity.
And the issue is not whether God intervenes supernaturally in the
ongoing operations of the cosmos (ie. "gardening") but whether He
intervenes supernaturally in *origins*:
"...it is far from clear that God is being used as a supernatural concept
in any way inappropriate to science. In this regard, Norman L. Geisler
and J. Kerby Anderson have distinguished between operation science
and origin science. They argue that appealing to God as a personal
first cause is legitimate in the latter but not the former. Operation
science is an empirical approach to the world that focuses on
repeatable, regularly recurring events or patterns in nature (e.g.,
chemical reactions or the relationship between current, voltage, and
resistance in a circuit). Operation science tests theories against these
recurring patterns of events and, theologically speaking, secondary
causes are the only focus. Secondary causation refers to God's acting
mediately (i.e., through the instrumentality of natural laws); primary
causation refers to God's acting immediately (i.e., directly, such that
discontinuities obtain in the world).
In contrast to operation science, origin science focuses on past
singularities that are not repeatable (e.g., the origins of the universe,
life, various life forms, and mankind). Such singularities can have a
personal first cause, and it is within the domain of origin science to
look for such causes. God, as a term in origin science, means,
roughly, a first cause of some discontinuity or singularity who acts
with intentionality in light of knowledge and purpose."
(Moreland J.P., "Christianity and the Nature of Science," Baker:
Grand Rapids, 1989, p225)
MH>Similarly, I think scientists realize that God, however important
>to them personally, and however integral to their personal view of
>reality, simply is not relevant to the practice of science.
This implicitly assumes that "God" is really only a figment of such
"scientists" imaginations and has no objective reality, and shows how
Methodological Naturalism is really applied Metaphysical
Naturalism.. If God really existed and took an active part in creating
and sustaining the universe and all life in it, then He would be
"relevant to the practice of science", whether scientists are willing to
admit it or not.
>>MH>This is not to say that science disbelieves in God, but merely
>>>that God is a question science cannot address.
>SJ>Why not? Books on popular science are addressing the question
>>of God all the time:
MH>I would suggest that, when a science book starts addressing
>metaphysical questions, it belies having crossed the line between
>science and philosophy. (Granted, in some areas of science -- e.g.,
>quantum physics -- that line may be pretty subtle in the first place!)
When it deals with *origins*, every "science book" I have ever read
"starts addressing metaphysical questions."
And if this is not science, where is the criticism of such scientists who
do it? In fact such scientists who "address..metaphysical questions"
are rewarded by the rulers of science:
"Richard Dawkins..has achieved enormous acclaim for presenting
orthodox neo-Darwinism persuasively...In 1990 Dawkins received the
Michael Faraday Award from the British Royal Society as "the
scientist who has done the most to further the public understanding of
science "...I mention these accolades to dispel any illusion that
Dawkins's explicitly naturalistic presentation of Darwinism amounts
to a mere personal philosophy. He certainly is promoting
metaphysical naturalism, but, like his American counterpart Carl
Sagan (who received the Public Welfare Medal in 1994 from the
National Academy of Sciences for his contributions to public
education), he does so with the wholehearted support of the scientific
establishment of his nation." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the Balance,"
1995, p76).
Since then Dawkins whose science books *all* address metaphysical
questions has been made Professor of the Public Understanding of
Science at Oxford. And another scientists who writes science books
that address metaphysical questions is Stephen Jay Gould. And he is
the new President of your National Academy of Sciences!
>SJ>"It was barely tenable as a philosophical position as long as the
>>leading scientists believed, or pretended to believe, that science is a
>>limited research activity which does not aspire to occupy the entire
>>realm of knowledge.
MH>But the idea of science occupying the entire realm of knowledge
>is a *philosophical* statement. It's certainly a philosophical
>statement a great many scientists probably accept, but it is not an
>idea intrinsic to the practice of science itself.
Why not? Why shouldn't science aspire to understand "the entire
realm of knowledge"? Who is to stop them? The fact is that
Metaphysical Naturalists who dominate science, see no reason to stop
anywhere:
"But of course the naturalists do not leave theistic enclaves alone nor
should they. A naturalistic government that regulates everything else
does not hesitate to reward theistic educational institutions with their
own tax money if they agree to accept "diversity" standards. Secular
academic societies understandably withhold their approval from
faculties that do not meet secular standards of rationality....Granted
the metaphysical assumptions, none of this is in any way
reprehensible. People who think they have truth on their side naturally
want to share the truth with others and to bring enlightenment to
private enclaves of superstition." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the
Balance," 1995, p203)
>SJ>Today many of the world's most famous physicists are
>>proclaiming the imminent prospect of a "theory of everything"-
>>and they do mean everything. It may be that these physicists-
>>and the evolutionary biologists who talk just like them- are no
>>longer practicing "science" and have become metaphysicians.
>>What is important is that they mix metaphysics and science
>>together and present the whole package to the public with all the
>>awe- inspiring authority of science. I have read that 500 million
>>persons have seen Carl Sagan's Cosmos series, many of them in the
>>public schools, and very few of them were warned that "What you
>>are about to see is metaphysics, not science." The Time cover
>>story for December 28, 1992 says it all: the title asks "What Does
>>Science Tell Us About God?" The answer is plenty, and more all
>>the time." (Johnson P.E., in Van Till H.J. & Johnson P.E., "God
>>and Evolution: An Exchange", First Things, 34, June/July 1993,
>>pp32-41.
MH>But this only supports what I'm saying. Suggesting that
>scientific enquiry tells us all we need to know about reality is
>"mixing metaphysics and science together".
The point is that even if it were true that scientists shouldn't mix
"metaphysics and science together", the fact ist that they *are*.
Modern science *as it is presented to the public* is applied
Metaphysical Naturalism.
The point is that if leading scientists like Dawkins and Gould, whose
personal philosophy is Metaphysical Naturalism, are "mixing
metaphysics and science together" (which you now seem to concede),
then why shouldn't scientists whose personal philosophy is Theistic
Realism also "mix..." *their "metaphysics and science together"?
>>MH>Basically, then, I don't see any necessary connection between
>>>Methodological Naturalism (used by science) and Metaphysical
>>>Naturalism (used by some philosophers).
>SJ>I don't claim that there is a "necessary connection between
>>Methodological Naturalism...and Metaphysical Naturalism",
>>because clearly Methodological Naturalism can be practiced by
>>people who are not Metaphysical Naturalists.
MH>This is precisely my point. What I find puzzling is where you say
>things like "if MN is carried out consistently it becomes
>Metaphysical Naturalism". That is the same as saying there is a
>necessary connection between MN and Metaphysical Naturalism.
It's not "puzzling". See below. The key word is "consistently."
Theists who practice Methodological Naturalism don't apply it
consistently in the areas of origins and Christianity. If they did, they
would not remain Christians or even theists.
>SJ>But in*in practice* there is a connection, because if MN is
>>carried out consistently it becomes Metaphysical Naturalism
>>when it gets to origins and Christianity.
MH>But I think this is exactly where you're not understanding the
>distinction between methodology and metaphysics. Methodology
>*only* denotes "in practice". Metaphysics *only* denotes "in
>reality".
My point is that if carried out *consistently*, there is no "distinction
between methodology and metaphysics" in the case of
Methodological Naturalism.
MH> It makes no sense to suggest that a methodology, carried out
>consistently, makes metaphysical claims.
We are not talking about *any* "methodology". We are talking about
Methodological *Naturalism*. which also called Methodological
*Atheism*:
"In the late twentieth century, the most important presuppositions in
intellectual circles are that science has preeminent authority to
describe reality and that science is based on naturalism-or
methodological atheism, as it is sometimes called. This starting point
necessarily implies, whether everyone understands the implication or
not, that room for God exists only in the world of the imagination, or
perhaps somewhere back in a "big bang singularity" at the ultimate
beginning of time." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the Balance," 1995,
p196)
MH> What *would* be accurate is to say that, *if* someone believes
>that a methodology really is the only correct way of finding out
>reality, *then* one may derive metaphysical claims via the
>methodology. But -- and this is the vital point -- that claim that a
>methodology is the only correct way of finding out reality is a
>*philosophical* statement not intrinsic to the methodology itself.
If such a "methodology" denies that God can have any place in it,
then it is implicitly asserting that it "is the only correct way of finding
out reality."
>SJ>The first is seen by MN's postulation of mutliple universes to
>>avoid admitting that God may have created the universe. When
>>this is denied (explicitly or implicitly) it becomes Metaphysical
>>Naturalism.
MH>I don't think MN can directly "postulate" anything. It is only a
>kind of framework, which guides inquiry. I think of it as the
>microscope (or telescope) through which science looks at the world.
>Whether or not the results of the process are really *true* is a
>philosophical question not directly related to MN.
The first thing that "MN...postulates" is that to to do science one
must ignore God. And Methodological Naturalists *in practice* think
and act as though it is "true".
>SJ>The second is seen in so-called "Critical Scholarship" of
>>Christianity. Following MN, it is assumed in advance that there
>>must be a naturalistic explanation of the Biblical miracles and
>>therefore Jesus becomes just another religious leader.
MH>If you want the scientific analysis of Biblical events, then *of
>course* everything is going to be reduced to naturalistic claims. But
>since when do Christians suppose that science is the best way to
>interpret scripture...?
I just mentioned those "Christians" who "suppose that science is the
best way to interpret scripture", namely "Critical Scholarship", ie. the
so-called "Higher Criticism". This has been the dominant position in
most leading theological seminaries in Europe in particular, and
involves a total rejection of anything in supernatural in the Bible.
[...]
>>MH>That really does not follow at all. MN *should* not address
>>>metaphysical questions. That does not make it necessarily a
>>>subset of "TR", or anything else for that matter. It simply means
>>>that MN and metaphysics/philosophy are two different things.
>SJ>Disagree. See above.
MH>I don't see anything above which shows that methodological
>naturalism is a subset of TR, nor that it is the same as
>metaphysics/philosophy.
Then see above again. If you still can't see it, then we will have to
agree to differ.
[...]
[continued]
Steve
"Evolution is the greatest engine of atheism ever invented."
--- Dr. William Provine, Professor of History and Biology, Cornell University.
http://fp.bio.utk.edu/darwin/1998/slides_view/Slide_7.html
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3 Hawker Avenue / Oz \ Steve.Jones@health.wa.gov.au
Warwick 6024 ->*_,--\_/ Phone +61 8 9448 7439
Perth, West Australia v "Test everything." (1Thess 5:21)
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