<<To start with, let me explain again the basis of my morality. I am what
appears to be a conscious being with emotions and feelings. That is, I
experience things which seem to me to be consciousness, emotions and feelings.
Are these things the result of an immaterial spirit, or entirely naturalistic
phenomena? I don't know for sure, but I do know that they are just as real to
me either way.>>
So far so good. But before we move on let's consider this question of whether
your moral feelings can be natural in origin. Here I urge you to read the
first part of C.S. Lewis's "Mere Christianity." It begins with the moral
argument and deals with it in plain, understandable language. Since it goes to
the very heart of your "basis," spend a little time considering all of the
implications. A more formalized outline of the moral argument comes from
Meithe and Habermas and goes like this:
1. An objective moral code exists.
a. Such a rule is the basis for disputes and moral discussions.
b. There is an amazing amount of agreement withing different
nations and cultures over major crimes of force (e.g., murder,
rape, etc.)
c. Moral judgment has been passed on certain cultures from the
outside, as when much of the civilized world condemend Hitler.
2. To give reasons for denying the existence of moral absolutes and/or hold
that others ought to do the same is self-refuting.
3. The moral code cannot be explained by natural or human means.
a. The code is not a law of nature, for nature makes no ethical
judgments, nor distinguish between inanimate objects and life.
b. The code was not created by a human being or by society as a whole
for it cannot:
(1) answer 1-2, above, (esp. 1c and 2)
(2) explain why we sometimes decide on options that are NOT
in our best interests, or which may NOT preserve our lives
(3) do the best job of explaining why, individually and
corporately, we usually realize we have failed to fulfill
this moral code.
4. The creator of the moral code must be a personal moral Legislator beyond
man.
a. Neither man nor society is the creator of the code.
b. Moral laws have no meaning apart from minds.
c. Only personal beings appreciate, originate, and enforce morality,
or relate morally to other beings.
All of these points are developed in detail in various books (but see Lewis
first), which provides a rational basis for believing in objective moral
reality rooted in an objective moral legislator.
<<Now, I also know that other human beings (as well as certain other species
of animals) exhibit behaviors that are overwhelmingly indicative that they,
also, possess consciousness, feelings, and emotions like (or at least very
similar to) myself. Do I know this with absolute certainty? No, I don't know
anything with absolute certainty. But it is about as compelling as anything
can possibly be, so I can safely treat it as a fact.>>
So far so good.
<<So I cannot deny that there is a thing called "hurt" that I don't like to
have inflicted on me. And, since I know that other people appear in every way
to have feelings much like myself, I know that to inflict hurt on them would
be to do the same thing to them as is done to me when I am hurt. And, since I
know without a shadow of a doubt what *that* feels like, I don't want to do it
to another person.>>
Well, now we have established that you have feelings called "empathy" or
"sympathy" which you CHOOSE to honor. And that's wonderful. It makes you safe
to be around.
HOWEVER, that does not prove that anyone else SHOULD act this way. Someone
might just as easily CHOOSE to INFLICT hurt because he CHOOSES NOT to honor
sympathy. And as your argument stands now, you are powerless to tell him he is
wrong. Imagine the criminal with the shotgun about to blow away the 7-11 guy.
Don't do it! we might yell. It would "hurt" the poor guy. Kill him in fact.
But the guy with the gun looks at us and says, "So?" And if he went to any
current, fashionable college he might continue, "Life is material only. I'm
not accountable to anybody. We all die, and that's it. So I don't care what
you or anybody else 'feels.' I'm gonna blow away this guy because I can get
the money, and that will make ME feel good. And that's all I care about."
<<Now, what about those who will argue that others do not really have
feelings? Is this a logically compelling argument? Of course not, because, as
I have pointed out, all of the external evidence of human behavior indicates
that they *do*. So the most rational and moral course of action for me is to
behave in a way that, shall we say, maximizes the amount of happiness in the
universe.>>
This is a non-sequitur. Here's why. You at first claim a basis for moral law
in FEELINGS. But your last statement is a statement of moral ACTION. And
there is NOTHING you have said that tells my why I should ACT in concert with
my FEELINGS. Indeed, a convinced materialist may say that his INTELLECT
overrides his feelings, and tells him that an action which "hurts" another
might be perfectly fine.
That is really what is going on in the head of our 7-11 robber. He may at one
time have had empathy, but somewhere along the line he became convinced
(intellect) that empathy means nothing in this world. Since there is no
accountability (so long as one can avoid the law) I can inflict "hurt" for any
reason I CHOOSE.
Isn't that the story of the Unabomber? For 17 years he maimed and killed
people, and justified it all with a rambling treatise that was printed in the
papers.
As a fellow materialist, you are powerless to point to any objective standard
that would render his acts "wrong." All you can say is, "Hey, you have
feelings just like I do."
The Unabomber answers: "So?"
You might answer, "So you shouldn't inflict pain on other people just like
you."
Unabomber: "Sez who?"
You: "Sez me."
Unabomber: "You are irrelevant to me."
You: "But you're not maximizing happiness in the world."
Unabomber: "So? I don't care about maximizing happiness. I care about killing
enough people to get my point across."
And what about Adolf?
You: "Don't inflict pain on other people."
Adolf: "Pain is good sometimes. So is death. It makes for a better race of
people."
You: "But you're not maximizing happiness in the world."
Adolf: "Sure I am. Everyone will be happier when the Jews are gone."
You: "But Jews have feelings just like we do."
Adolf: "So?"
Etc., etc., around and around we go.
<<There we go. The smallest details are laid out for everyone to see. No
"moral capital" has been borrowed from any other belief system. And, more
importantly, it works.>>
It DOES work, because you choose to act in accordance with it. It DOESN'T work
for those who reject feelings as a basis for action.
Again, I appreciate your effort. But your materialist ethics still run into
the stark wall of non-objectivity. What you believe is right others are free
to reject. And you cannot mount an argument to stop them.
One philosopher calls this The Grand Sez Who. You can talk till you're blue in
the face about your feelings, but every time you tell someone an action is
WRONG, that person can say: Sez Who?
The theist knows the answer to that question. You can argue about the theist's
own basis for belief, but that's another story. What we have shown here is
that materialist morality is not logically consistent, while theistic morality
is.
Jim