Jim's argument is that materialist morality is neither objective, logical,
or consistent. I don't disagree with the first point, since morality by
definition is something that cannot be objective. However, I have let the
last two slip when I could have dealt with them. So let me do so. First of
all, let me reiterate that I don't deny there are aspects of my morality which
are subjective. However, there are also many aspects that are logical and
consistent. I will explain how.
To start with, let me explain again the basis of my morality. I am what
appears to
be a conscious being with emotions and feelings. That is, I experience things
which seem to me to be consciousness, emotions and feelings. Are these things
the result of an immaterial spirit, or entirely naturalistic phenomena? I don't
know for sure, but I do know that they are just as real to me either way.
Now, I also know that other human beings (as well as certain other species of
animals) exhibit behaviors that are overwhelmingly indicative that they, also,
possess consciousness, feelings, and emotions like (or at least very similar
to) myself. Do I know this with absolute certainty? No, I don't know anything
with absolute certainty. But it is about as compelling as anything can possibly
be, so I can safely treat it as a fact. I could be the only conscious being
alive. Perhaps everyone else is just a robot or a dumb animal. Or, for that
matter, perhaps all of life is just one grand hallucination that I alone am
experiencing. But these are far-fetched notions, and so logic compels me to
accept that other people are also conscious, self-aware, and emotional beings.
Now, I know what it feels like to be hurt. I don't like it. Again, I don't know
what this emotion really *is* in a physical sense, but I know what it feels
like.
Jim may call this subjective and therefore irrelevant, but he and I both know
that nothing is more compelling than one's own feelings. So I cannot deny
that there
is a thing called "hurt" that I don't like to have inflicted on me. And, since I
know that other people appear in every way to have feelings much like myself, I
know that to inflict hurt on them would be to do the same thing to them as
is done
to me when I am hurt. And, since I know without a shadow of a doubt what
*that* feels
like, I don't want to do it to another person.
Now, what about those who will argue that others do not really have feelings? Is
this a logically compelling argument? Of course not, because, as I have pointed
out, all of the external evidence of human behavior indicates that they *do*. So
the most rational and moral course of action for me is to behave in a way that,
shall we say, maximizes the amount of happiness in the universe.
There we go. The smallest details are laid out for everyone to see. No
"moral capital"
has been borrowed from any other belief system. And, more importantly, it works.
_____________________________________________________________
| Russell Stewart |
| http://www.rt66.com/diamond/ |
|_____________________________________________________________|
| Albuquerque, New Mexico | diamond@rt66.com |
|_____________________________|_______________________________|
2 + 2 = 5, for very large values of 2.