Bill Hamilton said it well:
> I see no reason for keeping philosophical arguments out of the science
> curriculum, and many for including them. However, philosophy should be
> clearly labelled as philosophy. I would go so far as to say that I'd favor
> requiring all degree candidates in science fields to take a sequence of
> courses in philosophy of science.
I completely agree.
I would very much like to see some philosophy of science taught in the
high schools, perhaps a week or three of it in the upper level science
classes. (That means SOMEONE should write a good, short, high-school
level textbook. Say, Del....)
I do not believe in a naive separation/demarcation between philosophy and
"empirical science," either in science practice or in science education.
It would be a mistake to let high school students leave the classroom
still holding such naive views of science. My post clearly gave a
different impression! Mea culpa, mea cupla.
But let's remember an important point here, folks. We should be very
careful HOW we raise, in the public high school classroom, those
"philosophical issues" _when_discussing_macroevolution_. That is my
primary concern here. If we raise these issues in the wrong way, it is
going to be very polarizing and only serve to confuse students about the
subtle interplay between science and philosophy. We need to be really,
really, really careful.
For example, if we start our discussion of evolution by FRIST talking
about "philosophical bias" (giving a few extreme examples of bias
affecting interpretation), and THEN move on to discussing microevolution,
fossils, and macroevolutionary theory, we will be taking things in the
wrong order, unnecessarily polarizing the issue, and confusing the
students!
IMO, the RIGHT way to do this is to first teach a very general section on
philosophy of science, then several weeks or months later, when discussing
evolution, START with a discussion of known facts (microevolution,
fossils), THEN move on to explanatory paradigms (macroevolution) along
with a discussion of its "weak areas," and FINALLY discussing how
philosophical ideas can affect expectations and interpretation (with
examples).
Here it is in greater detail:
-------------
Let us assume, for the time being, that we have taught a good (albeit
somewhat short) philosophy-of-science unit to our high school students.
Several months later, we start teaching biological evolution. How should
we approach it?
I suggest we try to break down the issues into these four categories:
1. Well-established empirical facts and empirical theories. (e.g.
microevolution; known fossils; genetic comparisons of species; biological
complexity.)
I think these can be included in the public school science curriculum
straightforwardly.
2. More speculative theories which are only loosely empirical
("back-of-the-envelope" calculations which everyone agrees are
over-simplifications), but which are useful paradigms for correlating
facts from various branches of science and for suggesting new research.
(e.g. common descent by modification; speculated transitional forms;
speculated development of complexity; abiogenesis beyond simple
molecules.)
These should definitely be included in the public school science
curriculum. Teachers should point out that these are much less
well-established and more speculative. "Loosely empirical"
counter-arguments should also be mentioned (e.g. the difficulties found in
abiogenesis research; can descent by modification produce irreducible
complexity? how quickly can descent by modification produce new taxa?), as
well as the speculative answers to these counter-arguments. (As we've
already seen, some of these counter-arguments to traditional neo-Darwinism
come from people who believe in macroevolution, some come from those who
do not.)
3. Philosophical considerations which cannot be made empirical in any
meaningful sense, but which can seriously affect the way scientists view
data, make theories, and propose research. (e.g. argument for design by
analogy with mand-made objects; methodological naturalism; arguments from
"flawed design;" fine-tuning arguments.)
IMO, these should be included in the science/evolution curriculum, but
they should be clearly identified for what they are. It is here where
teachers can discuss how a scientist's philosophical expectations can
affect the way she interprets the data and analyzes theory. The teacher
could point out that anyone who believes that everything _must_ have a
purely "natural" explanations will, of course, expect the "speculative
areas" of macroevolution to eventually have natural explanations;
alternatively, someone who is convinced by the design-by-analogy argument
might expect that there will _never_ be a "natural" explanation for the
development of complexity. It is here where I believe it is possible,
even in the atmosphere of strong church/state separation, for the teacher
to say that some people believe God acted supernaturally in those
"speculative areas" of macroevolution (origin of complexity, etc.).
Several different perspectives would need to be presented. (That doesn't
mean they all have to be accepted as equally valid. They can be analyzed
somewhat. For example, the "flawed design" argument is a very good
argument against a specific _type_ of design, but it is a very poor
argument against design in general.) Of course, this would have to be
handled carefully; but if it was, I believe it would benefit the students'
science education.
4. Metaphysical and religious conclusions drawn in part from the
scientific theories but which are decidedly extra-scientific. (e.g. God
did it; God doesn't exist; evolution is undirected; human existence has no
purpose; human intelligence could not have evolved.)
Perhaps these should be discussed in an entirely different class.
Obviously, if they are discussed in the science class, they should be
clearly identified as conclusions which rely on ideas well beyond the
scientific data. Again, several points of view would need to be
presented.
(Caveat: There is bound to be some debate over into which category a few
"borderline" ideas fall.)
-----------------------------------------------
Terry Gray wrote:
> I'd say that to suggest that philosophy doesn't belong in the science
> classroom is already a philosophical position that will only perpetuate
> the simplistic Baconianism that is presently taught in most elementary
> and secondary school science texts.
Good point. If we can stamp out the "naive" (Baconian, positivist, or
falsifiationist) ideas of science in high school --- without going too far
in the ultra-Kuhnian direction --- so much the better. Anyone want to
write a textbook?
> I'm not at all convinced that philosophy (of science, especially) doesn't
> belong in the science classroom. While I'm not necessarily sympathetic
> with using DOT or Pandas in the classroom, I'm not at all ready to
> dismiss them because they are too philosophical. Discussing underlying
> philosophical systems may be more important in educating our general public
> than teaching them the "facts" of science. The "facts" are important for
> people going into advanced study in the sciences, but are just trivia for
> most people. Interestingly, when I teach my non-majors chemistry course at
> Calvin (admittedly not a public school), I spend over one-fourth of my
> time on philosophy and theology of science.
That's true. It's also true that high school science classes are also
college-prep classes, so there has to be a lot of "facts." But some
amount of "learning to think like a scientist" --- which includes a
well-measured does of philosophy --- is appropriate.
-------------
Jim Bell wrote:
> But further, design arguments are not necessarily purely philosophical.
> There are two aspects of science here, laws and explanations. The mistake
> is limiting the science classroom only to the former. Inductive science
> looks at regularities; historical science at explanations. Archeaologists
> finding stones that happen to be shaped like arrowheads make
> explanatory-design judgments.
This is a good point, and should be included in an initial
philosophy-of-science discussion, and then mentioned again when studying
astronomy, and then brought up again during the "category 3" discussions
on evolution.
> The goal of inductive science is to find out how the natural world
> works, regularly, in the absence of any supernatural intervention. But in
> explanatory science that restriction need not apply (absent a severe bias,
> which is the point of DOT). Thus, the hypothesis of intelligent design
> should be included as the evidence dictates.
Any discussion of "bias" should be, IMO, handled under "category 3."
You might, or might not, disagree with me that categories 2 and 3 should
be separated and handled somewhat differently. You might or might not
disagree with me that "design by analogy" is category 3. I'm still willing
to stick to those points! But I do agree with you (and Terry, and Bill,
and others) that design-by-analogy can be covered in a science class,
with the proper caveats and counter-perspectives.
-----------------
Paul Durham wrote:
> >3. Finally, arguments about the presumed philosophical bias of scientists
> >are themselves philosophical. They should not be part of the science
> >curriculum. (Though they could be part of a "philosophical" unit with
> >several viewpoints included.)
> Why not teach this as part of how the modern scientific method can
> still, no matter under how good the intentions, produce biased results
> or explanations? For example, if a scientist proceeds from a false
> assumption based on a philosophical bias he could conceivably exclude
> contradictory data, results, or explanations.
O.k., I'm always VERY hesitant to talk about "bias," philisophical or
otherwise. High school students understand bias, but (simply from lack of
life-experience) they lack some subtlety and sophistication. (I remember
something of the way I am my friends thought/argued in high school.)
IMO, discussion of philosophical bias should be covered in a
philosophy-of-science unit. If it is brought up again in a discussion on
evolution, it would need to be handled very carefully:
Wrong way: First give some extreme examples of philosphical bias
affecting scientific reasoning, then talk about "category 2" theories and
arguments.
Right way: First discuss category 2 arguments and counter-arguments with
whatever empirical data and back-of-the-envelope calculations are
available; then discuss how philosophical ideas can affect the way you
expect these "uncertain areas" to be resolved; then and only then discuss
how philosophical bais might affect interpretation of data, results, and
explanations.
If it is handled IN THIS ORDER, I agree with you that it should be
included in discussion of evolution.
I want to avoid giving students an over-simplified picture of scientific
thinking. Everything does not simply break down into EITHER "empirical
data" OR "philosophical bais." There is a vast middle ground of
weakly-empirical theories/arguments (which overlaps with what I called
"scientific intuition" in an earlier post). If "philosophical bias" is
discussed in the wrong way, it could give students the wrong impression
and unnecessarily polarize discussion.
> As an alternative, why not introduce the students to the medieval
> synthesis/approach of science (which leaned heavily on the Roman
> Church's claim to be the arbiter of revelation and interpretation), and
> the modern synthesis/approach (which generally precludes anything of a
> religious or supernatural nature), how the two differ, and the
> shortcomings of each? In essence, what and why and not give weight or
> preference either way, as in a comparative religions class.
This would be _excellent_ to include in a preliminary
philosophy-of-science unit.
--------------------------------
David Tyler wrote:
> Loren's post of 7th May had a very cautious approach to the inclusion
> of philosophy in science education. It seems to me this stems from
> an adoption of the "two book approach" to knowledge. Science is
> deemed autonomous and objective - a sure path to discovering reality.
> It is my view that this view of science is so widespread
> and so controversial that it is vital to make some attempt to address
> this in educational programmes.
I hope I've corrected that perception. :-)
> But how can this be part of school-based education? The objection
> can be made that these areas are too demanding for such young minds.
> Tim Ikeda made some suggestions as to what might be reasonably
> included, and I would like to pick up on these:
>
> TI> Instead, I think there are examples
> > of other competing scientific models for students to investigate which
> > are less religious-oriented and less likely to draw heated debate. For
> > geology, one could examine the emergence of plate tectonics. In physics
> > and astronomy, one could compare the problems of an earth-centered solar
> > system vs. a heliocentric one. In biology, students could read about
> > how nucleic acids came to be recognized as carriers of inheritance.
>
> 1. The emergence of plate tectonics. For years there had been an
> intellectual struggle regarding the "dynamic earth" and "mobility".
> The problem was that the rocks suggested a far more dynamic history
> of the earth than the theoretical models allowed. These theoretical
> models were deeply influenced by Lyell's version of uniformitarianism
> - which was not very good at bringing dynamic behaviour into earth
> history. The "fixist" - "mobilist" controversies were presupposition
> dependent.
>
> 2. Geocentrism - heliocentrism. This change is of such importance in
> the history of ideas that every educated person ought to have an
> understanding of it. However, the "science vs religion"
> interpretation is a myth. The conflict was between Aristotelian
> philosophy (which had been adopted by the Church via Aquinas) and an
> emerging non-deductive philosophy which led to the scientific
> revolution. Here, presuppositions are very prominent.
>
> 3. Nucleic acids as carriers of inheritance. Genetics is so
> important today that it can justifiably be part of general education.
> The problem I see here is that there is a very vocal group of
> biologists who say that DNA carries ALL the information. They are
> extreme reductionists in philosophy - as their central thesis has
> never been proved. Biology provides as many examples of
> presuppositional thinking as any other discipline.
These are all excellent ideas, and would be a useful part of a general
philosophy of science unit.
But for reasons I stated above, we should be careful how we use them in a
discussion of evolution. IMO, it would give quite the wrong impression to
start with the three discussions you outline above, and then proceed to
discuss descent by modification, origin of taxa, and abiogenesis. Rather,
I think the right approach is to first discuss decent by modifcation,
origin of taxa, and abiogenesis as hypotheses, with as much empirical pro-
and con- arguments as possible, and THEN haul out the issue of
philosophical expectations and how this can color perception of data.
------------------------------
In response to Tim Ikeda, Paul wrote:
> Why not show students that evidence can often be contradictory
> (example: with different dating methods) or that it can contribute to
> different conclusions. A discussion on young-earth vs. old-earth claims
> could accomplish this. This can still be done from a strictly
> scientific perspective.
This may be a case of "be careful what you wish for."
Given the current state of young-earth arguments (every one I've ever
encountered has been shot down), I'm afraid that --- as a scientist and as
a Christian, --- if I were teaching this material (in a public or a
Christian school), I'd have to demonstrate this "shooting down" with many
examples. The only thing students would learn from this (aside from the
weakness of young-earth "evidence") is that determined philosophical bias
can produce some very shoddy work. Since I want to be more charitable
than that to my YEC bretheren, I suggested the short, optional unit in
which students who wish could read both YEC material and
counter-arguments, to let the material "stand or fall on its own."
The more complicated issues of how philosophy can affect science could
better be taught with examples OTHER than young-earth vs. old earth.
------------------------------
Paul again, in response to Tim:
> I think that there is some confusion developing early in this
> discussion, I may or may not have contributed, but to keep us on the
> right track I believe that Loren's original post simply dealt with
> teaching origins in science classes in schools.
>
> thus..
>
> > But I also wouldn't want to spend much time on highly
> >questionable ones when I can find other, less controversial ones
> >that better illustrate a point. For example, in biology we've got
> >topics such as EM effects on living tissue, pollutants that mimic
> >sex hormones, prions, a whole host of epidemiological debates
> >& etc. from which to choose.
>
> strays from the original intent... what to present regarding origins
> and how to present it. Besides, the teaching of origins by its very
> nature is controversial.
Yes, very perceptive and exactly right. Tim's ideas are excellent ones
for inclusion in the science curriculum, but we're still left with the
question of how to teach evolution, how to deal with scientific and
philosophical arguments against macroevolution, and what to do with YEC.
> The teaching of origins should be complete and comprehensive, or it
> smacks of indoctrination and not education. It should include...
>
> - free and open presentation and discussion on the wide range of
> theories in the scientific community regarding origins
> - a thorough discussion on the modern scientific method and how it has
> evolved throughout history
> - discuss the historic development of the various theories and the
> philosophical bases that contributed to them
> - integrate the teaching with other disciplines, such as mathematics,
> history, philosophy, etc..
>
> As a result the educational process is not merely the presentation of
> information but contributes to meaning and understanding.
>
> The subject of origins speaks to the heart and soul of man, of his
> destiny and of his beginnings. It must be relevant to the student to
> have worth. Yes, this will be controversial, and yes, inevitably lead
> to questions of religion and faith. It deserves nothing short of a
> complete presentation. Anything less paints only an incomplete picture.
> Thus, I can find no reason why one would want to simply dismiss
> out-of-hand a presentation or discussion on young-earth evidence .
Very well said. In fact, it's the best summary of the best aspect of YEC
I think I've ever seen. These are excellent points which we should all
strive to remember.
I am worried, though, that if we simply leave it with what you said, we
will encourage schools to teach _all_ competing origins ideas or theories
"equally." Schools should not treat all origins ideas or theories equally
because, as I'm sure we agree, they're not all equally valuable.
Not all empirical data/theories are equal. Young-earth evidence and
theories are far inferior to the standard pictures of cosmology and
geology, so they do not merit equal discussion _in_a_science_class_.
(They COULD be discussed "on an equal footing" in a comparative
philosophy/religion class.) This is why I've suggested the "short,
optional unit" of young-earth/old-earth readings for the science class.
Not all loosely-empirical paradigms are equal. Macroevolution makes more
correlations between different brances of science, and more predictions,
than any interventionist-type competitors currently on the market.
Not all philosophical considerations are equal. Methodological naturalism
and design theory are reasonably clear and well-developed philosophies for
interpretting data and suggesting research programs, while "flawed-design"
arguments and fine-tuning arguments are much less so.
In each of these categories, schools justifiably spend most of their time
teaching and discussing the better ones, but they should not _completely_
shut out dissenting views (as so many of them do today).
Keep writing, Paul. I like what you say!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like maxims that don't |
encourage behavior modification." | Loren Haarsma
--Calvin (_Calvin_and_Hobbes_) | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu