> LH>Note, however, that science _qua_ science DOES play a vital role in
> >deciding whether an event falls into category 2 (extrapolation of known
> >mechanisms) or category 3 (no known mechanism). I would also argue that
> >philosophical and religious arguments can properly play some role in this
> >debate. This is the realm where scientific data, scientific intuitions,
> >and philosophical/religious expectations meet in the same arena. For
> >example, strongly materialistic scientists will work hard to push all
> >events into category 1 or 2. This effort might lead them to uncover new
> >natural mechanisms sooner than scientists who don't share their
> >materialistic philosophy. Alternatively, scientists with strong religious
> >or philosophical reasons for believing that certain events are
> >supernatural can marshal scientific arguments to show that those events
> >belong in category 3 rather than category 2. This effort might lead them
> >to uncover flaws in proposed naturalistic scenarios sooner than scientists
> >who don't share their religious beliefs. (*2*)
>
> Why only "*scientists* with strong religious or philosophical reasons
> for believing that certain events are supernatural"?
Good point. I'll change that in v3.
------------------------
> LH>What _can_ science do? It can try to determine, to
> >the best of its abilities,
> >
> > --what the conditions were before the event,
> > --what the conditions were after the event, and
> > --what effect known natural mechanisms could have had during the event.
>
> Agreed. But this is just what ordinary people do according to common
> sense.
I firmly believe that the "scientific method" is little more than a
special branch of common sense, and that "philosophy of science" gets into
trouble whenever it forgets this. :-)
----------------------------------
> Note that just "accounting for the event" by "sound empirical models"
> does not prove it happened that way. This is the difference between
> historical and empirical science. The latter can repeatedly test its
> causal hypotheses in the present, but the former has only unique,
> unrepeatable events in the past.
This is a good point. I'll add it as (another) footnote.
(I chose my wording carefully. I deliberately said "natural mechanisms
... can account for the event" rather than "... caused the event.")
--------------
> BTW, I am interested that you seem to embrace the "false alternative"
> that Brian accuses me of? If "no known natural mechanisms could
> account for this event", ie. "there are empirically sound reasons for
> ruling out all known natural mechanisms", you seem to see this as
> evidence for a "supernatural" origin?
Yes, if I am pretty sure that "no known natural mechanisms could account
for [an] event," I see this as evidence for a SUPERnatural event (or I
MIGHT prefer "unknown natural mechanism," depending heavily on the type of
"event" and several theological factors --- I could give you an historical
example of this if you are interested).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If it was so, it might be; |
and if it were so, it would be; | Loren Haarsma
but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic." | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu
-- Tweedledee (Lewis Carroll) |