>Michael farley wrote on 19th April:
>
>> It is the inherent uncertainty and lack of predictability of an
>> omnipotent, omniscient Mind or Will that makes appeals to intelligent
>> causation by God difficult to test or incorporate in a scientific framework.
>
>My science is founded on a belief in the faithfulness and consistency
>of God: by his providence, he upholds/sustains the cosmos. The
>expectation that his government can be described in terms of "laws"
>is rooted in a knowledge of God's character. This, according to my
>reading of history, was a key element in the thinking of many of the
>pioneers of science. Now - if intelligent causation is a real
>element in our studies of origins, God does not suddenly become
>arbitary in his behaviour. This gives me confidence that intelligent
>causation can be handled in a rational way (although with humility on
>our part - as God's ways are higher than our ways).
>
As usual, I find your ideas thoughtful and interesting.
BTW, as an aside I thought I would mention what I hope people
would understand anyway. My differences with Steve Jones are
just that and do not apply to intelligent designers in general.
I have a great respect for (to name just a few) Paul Nelson,
Mike Behe, Bill Dembski, Walter Bradley etc. I think they're
trying to do the impossible but at least they're going about
it in the right way and I certainly believe they deserve a
chance to take their shot.
Now, back to your point. I actually agree very much with what
Michael wrote. Your reply is that you do not expect God's
interventions to be arbitrary or random or without pattern.
I agree that this would most likely be true in many cases.
This being the case, how could one tell the difference between
between these actions of God and physical law? This is after
all what physical laws are, recognized patterns in the way
physical systems behave.
[...]
DT:===
>Whilst TEs may adopt MN pragmatically as a
>"prudent assumption", they would be unwise to argue that MN is THE
>way to do science. This is where I have to side with Meyer and
>Johnson: I think that MN can only be defended philosophically by
>adopting the premisses of metaphysical naturalism.
>
I disagree, MN is more than a prudent assumption, it is a
recognition of the limits science places on itself. If we
remove these limits we no longer have science, even though
we might call it by be same name.
Disciplines such as chemistry, physics biology etc. are often
called the physical sciences and for good reason. These
disciplines concern themselves with the study of physical
objects, atoms molecules etc. and their interactions. But
to say that the physical description of a system is the
only description or even the "best" or to say that physical
reality is all there is is to slip from science to scientism.
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Brian Harper | "I can't take my guesses back
Associate Professor | That I based on almost facts
Applied Mechanics | That ain't necessarily so"
Ohio State University | -- Willie Nelson
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