Loren Haarsma wrote on 8th April:
LH: "When science investigates a puzzling event (either an
"origins" event long ago, or a more recent event such as an
unexpected healing), science cannot determine whether or not that
event was supernatural. What _can_ science do? It can try to
determine, to the best of its abilities,
--what the conditions were before the event,
--what the conditions were after the event, and
--what effect known natural mechanisms could have had during
the event."
The third of these points is valid, but it seems to me to be too
limited in scope. With historical science, the key issue is
CAUSATION - and none of these three points address this directly.
Also, by specifying "natural mechanisms", the possibility of
intelligent causation is not addressed. So, for example, the
axe-like artefacts recovered at some archaeological sites need
to be examined not only in terms of natural mechanisms (the
effects of frosts, rock movements, etc) but also intelligent
causes (the role of man in forming the shape of the artefact).
LH: "As scientists study the initial conditions, final
conditions, and known natural mechanisms, they could reach three
possible conclusions:
1) Sound empirical models predict that known natural mechanisms
can account for the event. (*1*)
2) We do not have sound empirical models, but we believe that
known natural mechanisms can account for the event, and future
improvements in empirical knowledge, elegant models, and
computing power will eventually allow us to prove this.
3) No known natural mechanisms could account for this event.
(There are empirically sound reasons for ruling out all known
natural mechanisms.)"
Because the emphasis is on "known natural mechanisms", there is
a danger that scientists working with presuppositions that
exclude intelligent causation will not recognise it. They will
either shoehorn data into (2) or admit (3) grudgingly.
LH: "What do scientists do with events in the third category?
Individual scientists could reach (at least) five different
conclusions:
A) A supernatural event occurred.
B) Super-human technology brought about the event.
C) An unknown natural mechanism is responsible for the event.
D) A very unlikely (natural) event occurred.
E) A very unlikely (natural) event occurred, but there are many
different causally disconnected universes.
Science _qua_ science cannot distinguish between these
possibilities. Historical, philosophical, and religious
arguments are the decisive factors in each scientist's
conclusion."
This is a fair-enough comment, given the premises. I also agree
with the subsequent paragraph - with one qualification:
LH: "Alternatively, scientists with strong religious or
philosophical reasons for believing that certain events are
supernatural can marshal scientific arguments to show that those
events belong in category 3 rather than category 2."
This makes intelligent causation an avenue which can only "win
by default" - not a very satisfying intellectual pursuit. It is
also one which is analogous to a bud which never opens into
flower - because scientific knowledge of past events is always
limited and imperfect.
We _need_ a coherent philosophy of historical science and
clarification of how it relates to empirical science. These are
some elements which commend themselves to me (reworked from
Meyer).
(a) Historical science is concerned primarily with causation:
sequences of past events, and explanatory links based on
causation.
Empirical science is concerned with natural laws and the way
nature operates, with explanations expressed primarily in terms
of natural law.
(b) Historical science uses a methodology of abductive inference
(analogous to detective work).
Empirical science uses a methodology of induction and
generalisation: inferring natural laws from observational data.
(c) Historical science works with incomplete data with the
scientist having relatively little control over the degree of
completeness.
Empirical science works with data that is under the control of
the investigator - who designs the experimental programme to
ensure the data desired are obtained.
(d) Historical science invokes unobservable entities in
explanations.
Empirical science invokes observable entities in explanations.
(e) Historical science tests explanations using indirect methods,
recognising the unique and unrepeatable character of past events.
Empirical science tests explanations using direct methods, often
utilising the repeatability of experiments.
There are two reasons for posting this:
1. A clear philosophy of historical science avoids confusion.
Advocates of naturalism and methodological naturalism generally
minimise the differences and frequently jump from the inductive
to the historical sciences in making points. The importance of
causal agents in the historical sciences is greatly under-stated
(although recognised by Darwin! He identified these
methodological principles in his "On the Origin of Species" and
used them).
2. Only when intelligent causation is recognised as having a
legitimate role in the historical sciences can it develop. In
this context, I find it helpful to consider the discipline of
archaeology - which has regularly to address the issue of
intelligent causation vs natural mechanism. Principles and
experiences in archaeology can assist us in developing a theistic
(as distinct from a naturalistic) approach to science.
Loren: I hope this feedback does not broaden the focus of your
post too much!
Best wishes,
*** From David J. Tyler, CDT Department, Hollings Faculty,
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
Telephone: 0161-247-2636 ***