>I've enjoyed this exchange with Tim very much, and from the mail, it looks as
>if others have, too. I also appreciate the fact that Tim has been a skilled
>adversary in this debate, and that things have remained on the high road.
Heck, I'm no adversary. While I think that point/counter-point modes
of debate are helpful in emphasizing differences, I really feel that
non-adversarial modes of conversation provide the greatest depth.
I think we have been going around on two possibly separate issues.
The first is whether naturalism (eg. science) can provide a moral
system or tell us what we "ought" to do. I don't think it can.
As I see it, science describes things as they are -- It addresses
questions like "How?" pretty well in many cases. "How does that
operate?" or "How does it rain?" are questions open to science.
"How did we come about?" is also fair game. Basically, I think science
might help to let us know what is, and how things come about, but
not why things are or how they should be.
When we say that science or materialism cannot tells us what we
"ought" to do, this only means that things such as "purpose" and
"meaning" are _undefined_ in their context -- It does not mean that these
things do not or cannot exist. This is a crucial distinction. It is
like trying to use a screwdriver to remove a nut -- it is the wrong tool
(science) for the job (explaining the meaning of things). This is not
a new idea. I've found it in the writings of A.J. Ayer and numerous
scientists such as P.B. Medawar; all of whom directly admit that the
results of science cannot tell us how we should live our lives.
At best, science (or logic) can evaluate moral systems for efficacy.
Provide it with a set of givens and a criteria for evaluating outcomes,
and it can return a result. Of course, interpretation of that result
presumes a pre-existing set of moral codes, so there is some circularity.
AJ Ayer writes (typing errors all mine):
This is not to say that science can supply us with our values. We have
to distinguish the question how moral principles are formed, and how
they can be implemented, from the question of their justification. To
the question of justification, the correct answer, in my view, is that
moral principles cannot be justified in terms of anything other than
themselves. We have already seen that they cannot be founded on
authority, and I believe that it can also be shown that they cannot
logically be derived from statements about matters of fact. That is
to say, I do not think that any conclusions about the way things ought
to be can be logically deduced from a set of premisses which merely
report the way things are. [TPI note: This is also suggested in Jitse's
manuscript] Of course, this does not mean that we cannot appeal to
matters of fact in support of some moral decision: it is only that
when we take the facts as justifying the decision, the acceptance
of some moral standpoint will be presupposed. For instance, in very
many cases, a sufficient reason for concluding that one ought not to
pursue a certain course of action is that is will cause suffering to
other people: but the reason is sufficient only against a moral
background in which it is assumed that, other things being equal,
suffering is evil and that one has the duty to consider the
interests of others besides oneself. These are assumptions from
which very few people would dissent, at least in theory, but they
are not susceptible to proof, or, for that matter, of disproof.
If they are to be criticized, it can only be on the basis of a
different moral outlook, which will equally operate as judge in its
own cause. This is not ground for scepticism, still less for moral
nihilism. It is just that when it comes to the conduct of life,
each one of us as to decide what ends he thinks it right to pursue
and what principles he is prepared to stand by. I should add that
there is no escaping this responsibility. Even those who surrender
their independence of judgment, or those who merely go be current
fashion, are tacitly making a fundamental moral choice."
[_The meaning of life_ 1990, Charles Scribner's Sons, NY pp174-175]
Now, the second issue that we've been going around is the justification
of morality. Here we've got a problem about attribution. From Ayer...
In maintaining that one cannot look to religion to supply a
logical foundation for any code of morality, they [rationalists]
were demonstrably right. The decisive argument in their favor is
that no moral system can rest soley on authority. It can never be
sufficient justification for performing any action that someone wishes
or commands it. Not only has it first to be established that the person
in question has a legitimate claim on one's allegiance, but even when
that has been established, it still doesn't necessarily follow that what
he commands is right. Neither does it make any difference to the
argument whether the authority is taken to be human or divine. No doubt
the premiss that what God wills is right is one that religious believers
take for granted. The fact remains that even if they are justified in
making this assumption, it implies that they have a standard of morality
which is independent of their belief in God. The proof of this is that
when they say that God is good of that he wills what is right, they
surely do not mean merely to express the tautology that he is what he
is or that he wills what he wills. If they did mean no more than this,
they would be landed with the absurd consequence that even if the actions
of the deity were such as, in any other person, we should characterize
as those of a malignant demon, they would still, by definition, be
right. But the fact is that believers in God think of the goodness
which they attribute to him as something for which we ought to be
gratefull. Now this would make no sense at all if the diety's
volition set the standard of value: for in that case, no matter
what he was understood to will, we should still be oblige to think
him good.
It is no answer to this argument to say that the possibility of God's
being anything other than good is excluded by his nature. There is,
indeed, no logical objection to building goodness into the definition
of God so long as it is compatible with the other attributes which
go into making up the concept. The drawback is only that it adds
to the difficulty of supposing that the concept is satisfied. But
so far from this proving that God's nature can serve to define goodness,
it proves just the opposite. If one did not know what one understood
by goodness, independently of ascribing it to God, its inclusion in
the definition would not be intelligible.
[ibid. pp 173-174]
Basically, the idea that God provides morality is massively self-
referential. Moreover, also kicks the problem of "where does morality
come from" up a notch -- it does not eliminate it. If the universe
requires God to give it a purpose or meaning, from where did God's
purpose or meaning derive (From a higher God? --- infinite regression
is not impossible, BTW)
What follows are comments that time has permitted...
>My comments:
>
><<Clearly things that were once accepted as moral absolutes in one
>period can later vanish.>>
>
>And can re-appear, or be created out of whole cloth. Majoritarian "morality"
>is malleable. That's its problem.
I was suggesting that religious morality was malleable as well. Not
in theory of course, but certainly in practice.
[...]
><<In a world where murder is repaid in kind, my goal should be to be the
>best murderer I can be.>>
>
>Tim replied:
>
><<Another alternative is to not murder in the first place.>>
>
>Sure, that's an alternative. But it is not a compelling one. In a moral
>system with absolutes like "thou shalt not murder," there are no
>"alternatives." In a naturalist system, you can try to get people to
>accept your alternative, but you have no moral force, only power, to
>make them do so.
Given that moral absolutes defy proof, one can only exercise "moral force"
if someone believes what you say. This is the crux of the issue. The
Hammas suicide bombers are religious. They believe in God, they believe
that the morals standards they use come straight from God, and thus they
are convinced that they are doing the right thing. How can your moral
force counter theirs? Saying that one's mandate comes from God is not
compelling without first providing a convincing argument that one's
beliefs about God (or the existence of specific moral codes) are correct
(beliefs in God and the belief in specific moral codes could be
independent).
>
>I wrote:
>
><<Re: Russell. It is interesting to chart his moral course. Paul Johnson
>does this in -Intellectuals-, a wonderful book about many of the leading
>"lights" who rejected objective morality. Russell spent his dotage
>chasing young skirts, deflowering chambermaids, and generally making a
>pest of himself. So much for moral feelings.>>
>
>Tim replied:
>
><<Let me state clearly that I do not address ad hominem remarks.>>
>
>Yes, on the surface this may seem ad hominem. But what Johnson was doing in
>the book was examining how the IDEAS of the intellecutals actually played out
>in their LIVES. I think this is a valid method of examination. It's not like
>saying Russell was not a good philosopher because he was a jerk. Rather, the
>book examines curious outcomes in the lives of those who thought they knew the
>way the rest of mankind should live.
I don't think this is always productive. For instance, I could
point to religious leaders, say in the British royal family (heads
of the church of England) or many popes, as an indicator of how
well Christian morality operates. But I think this is an ultimately
fruitless and antagonizing direction to take. The question is not
how well a moral system works or how many people accept it, but how
it is ultimately justified. At best, the "efficacy" argument
for morality only suggests that a belief in God is helpful -- It
does nothing to support the existence of God (belief and existence
being two distinct things).
[...]
>><< Any set of beliefs, whether they are supernaturally
>>derived or developed ad hoc can be examined for logical consistency.
>>The theist can say "These standards came from God so we've got to
>>accept them" and the relativist can say "These standards came from
>>observations or trial & error, and I think they work well, so I'll
>>accept them even if I can't prove them."
>
>I don't see this as germane. You had proposed actual instances where
>moral causes were championed by atheists/agnostics, and the theists
>followed. This is an astounding claim, in my view. I'd like an example
>of one of these moral causes.
I will try to pull up one or two with regard to women's rights or
the abolition of the Jim Crow laws (You might also find a few
in the early labor unions). I am not suggesting that agnostics
or atheists needed to be first, just that many were there before general
acceptance of the ideas by the population as a whole. If you accept
that some atheists/agnostics may embrace "moral issues" before the
general (& religious) public, you could save me the bother of looking
them up ;^)
[...]
><< You suggest that because
>you can claim that your standards are absolute, you can also
>claim to say that Jewish extermination is wrong. But you cannot
>make this statement until you can confirm the source and the veracity
>of the moral standards.>>
>
>That is another argument, and can be undertaken at any time. What is really
>going on here is the examination, by reason, of world views. Part of that
>inquiry is into the logical consequences of the competing paradigms. Right
>now we're looking at the consequences, in the realm of axiology, of one
>view--naturalism. We need to stop and remember that this is only one part
>of the entire inquiry.
Actually, I believe that this is the center of the second issue.
The first issue -- that of whether science provides moral standards --
was finished long ago in this thread.
[...]
><< It's possible that you'd only accept an universal absolute.
>You can say "so what?" forever.>>
>
>Yes, this is the argument of "the Grand Sez Who?" It's annoying, isn't
>it? But that's what the naturalist inherits, like it or not.
I also pointed out that one can say "sez who" to religious belief just
as easily. That is what makes agreement so difficult.
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)