My comments:
<<Clearly things that were once accepted as moral absolutes in one
period can later vanish.>>
And can re-appear, or be created out of whole cloth. Majoritarian "morality"
is malleable. That's its problem.
I wrote:
<<In a world where murder is repaid in kind, my goal should be to be the best
murderer I can be.>>
Tim replied:
<<Another alternative is to not murder in the first place.>>
Sure, that's an alternative. But it is not a compelling one. In a moral system
with absolutes like "thou shalt not murder," there are no "alternatives." In a
naturalist system, you can try to get people to accept your alternative, but
you have no moral force, only power, to make them do so.
I wrote:
<<Re: Russell. It is interesting to chart his moral course. Paul Johnson
does this in -Intellectuals-, a wonderful book about many of the leading
"lights" who rejected objective morality. Russell spent his dotage
chasing young skirts, deflowering chambermaids, and generally making a
pest of himself. So much for moral feelings.>>
Tim replied:
<<Let me state clearly that I do not address ad hominem remarks.>>
Yes, on the surface this may seem ad hominem. But what Johnson was doing in
the book was examining how the IDEAS of the intellecutals actually played out
in their LIVES. I think this is a valid method of examination. It's not like
saying Russell was not a good philosopher because he was a jerk. Rather, the
book examines curious outcomes in the lives of those who thought they knew the
way the rest of mankind should live.
For example, Rousseau taught there was no sin in man. He abandoned five
children in his life. Tolstoy made numerous moral prounouncements in his long
life, while ruining the lives of his wife and daughters. And Russell, who
professed to "feel" what was right and wrong, exploited young women the closer
he got to death.
These are "exhibits" from the laboratory of real life as we test moral ideas.
I wrote:
<<What do you mean by "better"?>>
Tim replied:
<<Increased productivity, decreased "friction" between group members
& etc. There are things which groups can provide that individuals
cannot. Many of these could be quantifiable.>>
But what if I like friction? What if I hate productivity (like the Luddites)?
What if I see that the threat to society is from those groups trying to do
exactly what you recommend? I might say that friction is BETTER because it
leads to the social survival of the fittest (such arguments were routinely
made around the turn of the century). Not only is Naturalism unable to counter
my "better" argument, it has provided me with the tools to make that argument
in the first place!
Tim wrote:
<<There are certainly instances where atheists and agnostics lead and
supported various "moral" causes before many of the theists followed.>>
I asked:
<<For example?>>
Tim pasted this:
><< Any set of beliefs, whether they are supernaturally
>derived or developed ad hoc can be examined for logical consistency.
>The theist can say "These standards came from God so we've got to
>accept them" and the relativist can say "These standards came from
>observations or trial & error, and I think they work well, so I'll
>accept them even if I can't prove them."
I don't see this as germane. You had proposed actual instances where moral
causes were championed by atheists/agnostics, and the theists followed. This
is an astounding claim, in my view. I'd like an example of one of these moral
causes.
I asked you to explain why killing Jews was a "bad" thing. And you gave, I
think, a very good, naturalistic attempt at an answer. However, I return to
the central point of this entire discussion: if naturalism is true, there can
be no condemnation for one who chooses other ends.
Tim says, "I have the belief that advocating murder diminishes the "contracts"
between individuals in society." That's fine, but other may not care about
contracts.
Tim: "Further, it pains me to see others hurt and actually,
I derive much pleasure from being able to help others."
William Bonin derived pleasure from being able to hurt others. Terrorist
groups derive pleasure in killing the innocent. Whole countries can derive
pleasure in overpowering a neighbor. And so it goes.
Tim wrote:
<< You suggest that because
you can claim that your standards are absolute, you can also
claim to say that Jewish extermination is wrong. But you cannot
make this statement until you can confirm the source and the veracity
of the moral standards.>>
That is another argument, and can be undertaken at any time. What is really
going on here is the examination, by reason, of world views. Part of that
inquiry is into the logical consequences of the competing paradigms. Right now
we're looking at the consequences, in the realm of axiology, of one
view--naturalism. We need to stop and remember that this is only one part of
the entire inquiry.
<<I have long since admitted that I cannot give you absolute justification
for moral axioms. And we have agreed that all standards are accepted
on the basis of personal belief.>>
And I would argue that some "beliefs" are more rational than others. Vis-a-vis
morality, I've been trying to show that naturalism is irrational. One point,
you agree, is that there can be no absolute justification for the naturalist.
But this is a rather large point indeed.
<<"Source" is argument by authority. It is not sufficient justification
to performing an action simply because someone or something commands it.
For example it does not follow that the source is necessarily correct.>>
If the source is God, however, it is correct. How do we know the source is God
(and what kind of God He is)? That's another line of argument.
<<Then again, if "moral sense" is so universal, how is it that we can
lose it in a generation? If it is self-evident, is it not possible
that much of it arises out the common requirements for social living?>>
That's a good question. I think what is lost is not the moral sense, but moral
accountability. The difference is key. If I have the sense that lying is bad,
yet know there is nothing to hold me accountable, I would be able to convince
myself (quite easily, I think) that there is no reason not to lie in a given
situation. Sure, you might tell me this is bad for social contracts or
something like that, but my personal desire might overtake your common sense.
This is what I see being lost, especially in our schools.
<<Oh no! The moral argument for a creator rises again! >>
As well it should! It is a robust little guy.
<<However, in some cultures, adultery (or swapping) is encouraged and so
I'd suspect that this particular issue would be a borderline case
(Abortion as well). How would you resolve these disputes between
God-given moral standards?>>
Adultery is not a "God-given" moral standard. End of dispute.
<<Also, when is that umpire going to call foul? After all, some of
these participants have been engaged in killing each other, in part,
over religious differences. As I mentioned previously, observing
accountability happening in this lifetime would go a long
way to convincing some that moral judgments are meted out by God.>>
This is a tangent into theology, yet another subject (I love these
connections). The short answer is that God reserves the right to "call 'em as
he sees 'em," and mete out justice in this life or the next.
<<Hmm... The "slippery slope" argument (ie. "I smoked pot once; it made
me want to rape and kill").>>
Did you inhale?
Anyway, it is not slippery slopes I'm arguing here, but slippery solipsism. My
point was that Ted Bundy (a lawyer!) had equal arguments--in the natural
world--for what he did.
<< It's possible that you'd only accept an universal absolute.
You can say "so what?" forever.>>
Yes, this is the argument of "the Grand Sez Who?" It's annoying, isn't it? But
that's what the naturalist inherits, like it or not.
<<I can appreciate your frustration. We do not seem to directly
answer each other's questions sometimes.>>
What do you mean by "appreciate"? (Just kidding!)
No, you have been remarkably forthright in dealing with the issues head on,
and civil, too. Are you sure you're an agnostic? (Can an agnostic really
answer that question?)
Jim