<< How
can we judge whether something is a "better", "worse" or "meaningful"
conclusion? The answer is that better and worse are operationally
defined, and not universals per se. Are some people's "neural nets"
better at converging on answers than other's? Certainly>>
This is a subtle move to get around the naturalistic fallacy, but is not
logically compelled. Moving from value to operations is just the sort of
exercise one cannot make in this argument. No one disputes that processes can
be judged according to an agreed upon standard of outcome; but the naturalist
cannot tell us which outcomes are better than others.
Nazis became very adept, operationally, at exterminating Jews. The naturalist
is at a loss to tell us why this might be a bad thing.
The only other move left is the one Tim makes, viz., "'Ought'" can be as we
individually define it." This is, of course, the very definition of
relativism, and we can all hope that Tim chooses "oughts" which don't hurt
other people (as I'm sure he will). But Tim's "oughts" cannot logically
displace those of, say, the Hamas members currently blowing up innocent
Israelis.
Tim says, well, "that's life."
But it is only life in a naturalist's world. In the world of theistic realism,
there is ultimate moral accountability. I like that world better. I also
believe it has more compelling evidence for its existence than a world of
nothing more than chemical operations.
<< My question is whether "fear of the terrible" is a valid
reason to reject naturalistic explanations or to cease looking for
them.>>
It is certainly one of the most compelling reasons for seeking answers beyond
mere naturalism. The most important questions are metaphysical; naturalism is
of no help here. We should continue our research into natural processes for
the good of all--but we need theistic realism to tell us what that good
consists of.
Jim