Stephen Jones wrote: [...]
>Johnson continues with a reductio ad absurdum of Crick's reductionism:
>
>"The conflict with common sense would become apparent if Crick had
>presented his hypothesis in the first-person singular. Imagine the
>reaction of his publisher if Crick had proposed to begin his book by
>announcing that "I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and
>even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than
>the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated
>molecules." Few browsers would be likely to read further. The
>plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit
>exception be made for the theorist."[...]
Stephen later comments: [...]
>The point is that if Dawkins is just dancing to the music of *his*
>DNA, why should we take what he says seriously? What makes his
>DNA better than mine? [...]
The assumption Johnson seems to hold is that networks of nerve cells
and etc. are incapable of doing "significant" work or processing by
themselves and need a "special spark" to produce "meaningful" results.
In a sense, I see it as revisiting the old "moral argument for a creator"
-- that one needs an external source for some "vital" substance. How
can we judge whether something is a "better", "worse" or "meaningful"
conclusion? The answer is that better and worse are operationally
defined, and not universals per se. Are some people's "neural nets"
better at converging on answers than other's? Certainly; the many
different computer algorithms we devise to search for solutions each
have their strengths and weaknesses as well.
Algorithms can exhibit "direction" and they can be optimized for
different problems (or classes of problems). They can even
experience mutation and selection (as is the case in "genetic
algorithms). Why would I value Crick's comments if he were
just a bag of cytoplasm? Because I know that bag's track record
and because I can analyze that bag's arguments by myself.
As I see it, the bigger question is not so much whether physical systems
can exhibit computing power or apparent direction without a vitalist
"spark" but whether they can arise naturally.
[Dawkins quote removed...]
>The point is that if Dawkins is just dancing to the music of *his*
>DNA, why should we take what he says seriously? What makes his
>DNA better than mine?
>
>JB>Naturalistic smuggling is even more evident in axiology, the realm
>>of values, not only in aesthetics, but especially in ethics....
>>Naturalists claim they use only the scientific method; they exclude
>>other kinds of truth. Yet when you come to ethics you can't establish
>>OUGHT from IS.
>
>A consistent naturalist can only believe that the "ought" is simply
>that which has survival value.
No. "Ought" can be as we individually define it. There is no
guarantee that what we _think_ we "ought" to do will necessarily
increase our survival. But, that's life. There is a short book
you may wish to pick up by the geneticist, Richard C. Lewontin
(_Biology as ideology: the doctrine of DNA_ NY, NY : HarperPerennial
1992). Richard discusses biological determinism and human choices.
Granted, there are some things you "ought" to do if you wish to survive
and procreate, but you don't "have to" do them. Besides, given the
enormous number of factors involved in any decision, it is probably
very difficult to determine the best option, or even a good one. Thus
in many cases, what we ought to do can be ambiguous. In those instances
we may have fall back on tested, if imperfect, formulas (which could
include codified behaviors -- eg. morality).
> Yet, all men esteem self-sacrifice as the highest value of all,
[...]
Within limits and possibly not in all men...
As you may be aware from your reading of evolutionary theory, altruism
and natural selection are not always at odds.
Is a universe without absolute moral accountability or absolute
value "unimaginably terrible"? I can't say; I don't see it as
such. At least for me, it seems better than no universe at all,
but YMMV. My question is whether "fear of the terrible" is a valid
reason to reject naturalistic explanations or to cease looking for
them.
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)