<<Dawkins and Sagan fail to make these distinctions between physics and
metaphysics--but so do Johnson and Bell.>>
I am flattered to be mentioned in the same sentence! But at the same time, I
don't think Phil or I "fail" in this regard. Indeed, it is Phil who explains
in RITB how science falls into metaphysical naturalism, while not admitting
it.
<<But science IS naturalism--empiricism is what distinguishes science from
other forms of philosophy.>>
I don't have a problem with this, although what is meant by "empiricism"
should be discussed. When it is used as a delimiter, I cry foul. My point is
this. When you look at a datum and ask "How did this happen?" it is a false
constriction to say the only answer must be naturalistic. If we observe a
natural mechanism that explains, fine. But if we observe only complex
information which looks like other things which are designed, then FINE as
well. Let's let the data lead us where it will.
But some say the latter admits of no predictive power. I say, So what? That's
not what the project is about. The project is about explanations. To limit
everything in science to prediction is to commit a category mistake, to
confuse laws and causality. We're not trying to stop a virus; we're trying to
find out what actually happened.
Jim