Thanks for the interest, but I'm afraid that all I can offer now are
abbreviated comments. Maybe we can revisit this whole topic in March when I
get my two grants submitted.
>Let's remember the context. Phil J., Hartwig & Meyer, and indeed the new ID
>theorists, are asking a basic question. Why should ID be ruled out as a
>working hypothesis from the START? Is there anything in the philosophy of
>science which compels this?
If one is intellectually honest, there will be no reason to rule out ID. Or
at least, one will admit to a certain bias in her world-view that precludes
consideration of anything but naturalism. When I teach my graduate-level in
cell and molecular biology course, I invite my students to gather informally
in the evening over beer and chips in order to better know them and to
pursue other topics about science that we can't cover in class. Here I ask
them what is science, why do we do science, etc. (i.e., a gentle
introduction to the philosophy of science). In this context I challenge
them to consider the possibility of design and of a designer. I would like
to develop this into a more formal course for graduate-level scientists and
I would still continue to invoke the ID hypothesis as intellectually honest.
I look forward to Behe's book in anticipation of perhaps incorporating it
into such a curriculum. Now, having said all this, let me point out that I
do not fully agree with some of the philosophilcal claims of some folks who
favor ID.
>Steve writes:
>
><<The fact that no paper has been published to describe the details of the
>natural formation of complex things may be true. But I suspect the same can
>be said about intelligent design.>>
JB
>On the contrary, arent' we surrounded by the complex results of intelligent
>design? This computer,
Ok. But I didn't know we were talking about computers.
Here Jim and other ID folks use extrapolation as evidence, a practive which
is fraught with problem. I have no problem with the following construct:
because we know that humanly designed things have the characteristic of
being irreducibly complex, it is reasonable to consider that things of
nature that are also complex may also be designed. Such an analogy is the
stuff that hypotheses are made from, but such analogies do not constitute
empirical evidence. Thus, from this groundwork of analogy --> hypothesis,
one must then build with evidence, but one cannot build a legitimate
groundwork from analogy = evidence.
><< Who proved that there is not a naturalistic
>explanation for origins? Or to put it differently, at what stage do we KNOW
>that there is not a naturalistic explanation for any phenomena? I have
>asked this question several times and those who claim that we have
>eliminated naturalistic explanations do not answer.>>
>
>Some call this "naturalism of the gaps". In other words, whenever we come up
>against a "don't know," science awaits an as yet undiscovered, non-directed
>process. This is Phil's point--why that scenario only, and not the other?
Why make any decision? Why is it an either-or situation? Why not both?
This is where the "theistic realism" that Phil propounds falls short. It
claims to be open to all possibilities, but then recognizes that the
possibilities are only mutually exclusive and not potentially inclusive.
Shalom,
Steve
__________________________________________________________________________
Steven S. Clark, Ph.D. Phone: (608) 263-9137
Associate Professor FAX: (608) 263-4226
Dept. of Human Oncology and email: ssclark@facstaff.wisc.edu
UW Comprehensive Cancer Ctr
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53792
"It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, but the glory of kings
to search out a matter." Proverbs
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