>
>Of course "Gould denies being...a saltationist". O.J. denies he did
>it - does that mean he didn't? Gould has always denied he is a
>saltationist, but that does not change the fact that many observers
>think that essentially he really is.
>
So, either Gould is lying or he is so confused that he doesn't even
know what his own views are. In either case he is no longer a
credible witness (to extend your legal metaphor) and cannot be
trusted when he talks about "the trade secret of paleontology".
>Nor was my statement that "Fundamentally Gould is a pre-Darwinian
>saltationist" a "flat assertion". It was a heading leading to a quote
>by Johnson. Perhaps I should have put an IMHO in front of it, but
>everything I write is IMHO! :-) It was a statement of *my opinion*
>based on the evidence conained in the quote that followed it, which
>said:
>
I'm curious why you think a quote from Johnson provides "evidence"
that Gould is a "pre-Darwinian saltationist". Isn't it better to
ask Gould? And, in the event that you don't trust his answer,
you should at least establish this from *his* writings rather than
Johnsons.
My own opinion on this is that Gould's enemies (the ultra-Darwinians)
try to put the saltationist label on him in an attempt to discredit
both him and punk eek. To borrow Phil's terminology, they are attempting
to marginalize him.
Now, given Johnson's "complaints" about theists being marginalized
by naturalists I'm sure we are all in agreement that Phil is not
trying to marginalize Gould with this saltation business, right?
>"Gould and Eldredge have consistently described punctuated equilibrium
>as a Darwinist theory, not a saltationist repudiation of Darwinism.
I am thankful that Phil included this sentence.
>On the other hand, it is easy to see how some people the impression
>that saltationism was at least being hinted, if explicitly advocated.
>Gould and Eldredge put two quotes by T.H. Huxley on the front of
>their 1977 paper, both complaints about Darwin's refusal to allow a
>little "saltus" in his theory. At about the same time, Gould
>independently endorsed a qualified saltationism and predicted
>Goldschmidt's vindication...As a scientific theory, "saltationist
>evolution" is...rubbish. Gould and Eldredge understand that, and
>so despite hints of saltationism particularly by Gould) they have
>always kept open their lines of retreat to orthodox Darwinian
>gradualism." (Johnson P.E., "Darwin on Trial", 1963, pp61-62).
>
[...]
>BH>And if the self-organizationalists are successful? What will
>>you conclude? That God wasn't involved? Actually, while they
>>have a long way to go, I think they have had enough success in
>>explaining the emergence of organized complexity to make you
>>squirm a little ;-).
>
SJ:=======
>Sadly, you seem to misjudge me. I will not "squirm" if the
>self-organizationalists" succeed in explaining the emergence of
>organized complexity, for "Love...rejoices with the truth" (1Cor
>13:6).
OK, OK, I admit it was a cheap shot :-). Please accept my most humble
apology.
SJ:=======
>I don't know much about the "the self-organizationalists", so
>I can't discuss their position in detail. But Johnson does not feel
>it is much of a threat to theism:
>
Here you go again, Stephen ;-). Of course its not a threat
to theism.
I have had many nice surprises during my search through the
complexity/self-org literature. I suppose this shouldn't be
too surprising since John Casti refers to this field as
"the science of surprise" ;-).
One surprise was the bluntness with which these scientists
voice their opposition to the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Another
surpise was how many of these individuals are strongly religious.
I recently received two books from inter-library loan:
<Chaos and Complexity: Discovering the Surprising Patterns
of Science and Technology>, Brian Kaye, VCH, 1993.
<Chaos and Order: The Complex Structure of Living Systems>,
Friedrich Cramer, VCH, 1993.
Both books I ordered based solely on the titles, knowing
nothing of the authors. I haven't read much of the first book yet,
but did find the following in the biographical sketch of Kaye:
The philosophical side of science has always interested
him and has been complimented by his activities as a
methodist local preacher in the Sudbury region of Ontario,
Canada. He is just as likely to he found holding a service
in a protestant church as he is to he lecturing on fractal
geometry and chaos theory at the University.
I've read a bit more from the second book, following is a quote
from a section entitled, believe it or not ;-), "God's Creation"
Religion is thus in accord with a "reasonable" theory of
evolution. But what does reasonable mean? In my opinion, it
can only mean that a theory of evolution cannot contain any
_hidden_ metaphysical elements disguising its origin.
I think that, in my discussion of self-organization, I have
discovered and named the actual metaphysical element in a
scientific theory of evolution. There can be no physics
without metaphysical foundations, but it is extremely important
that the boundary where the two meet is clearly defined in
order to avoid confusions in terminology. In the theory of
evolution, the concept of self-organization represents the
boundary separating theory and metatheory. In the final
analysis, then, the concept of matter so prevalent in the
natural sciences has to be "sacrificed". And why not? It
was sacrificed in particle physics long ago, although things
there are so abstract that they have not yet become a part
of our general awareness. Evolution could lie in God's will.
It could be God's creation.
-- Friedrich Cramer, <Chaos and Order: The Complex Structure
of Living Systems>, VCH, 1993, p. 180.
In the final section of the book, Cramer quotes from the
New Testament:
'For now we see through a glass, darkly;
but then face to face: now I know in
part; but then shall I know even as also
I am known'
I had not heard of Cramer before. Ilya Prigogine has some nice
things to say in the forward to the book:
"Chaos and Order" is the work of a man who rejects a fragmented
view of the universe, who refuses to be a prisoner of
preconceived doctrines. There is a feeling of excitement, a
feeling that we are living at a unique moment in the history
of science. The world appears to us at the same time as more
strange, but also more connected and more harmonious, than to
any of the generations which have preceded us. I can only hope
that Cramer's book will inspire many readers and will receive
the internetional acclaim it fully deserves.
-- Ilya Prigogine, from the forward to <Chaos and Order>
SJ quoting Johnson:=================
>"The reference to "high-tech" damage-control mechanisms is to the
>school represented by Stuart Kauffman's Origins of Order (1993). I
>assume this is what Gould had in mind when he referred to "the
>self-organizing properties of molecules and other physical systems."
>If the rulers of science really mean to jump into this lifeboat, I
>will be happy to participate in the ensuing discussion, but I think
>that after assessing the prospects they will elect to stay on the
>sinking ship and keep trying to plug the holes." (Johnson P.E.,
>"Darwin on Trial", InterVarsity Press: Downers Grove Ill., Second
>Edition, 1993, p213).
I have found much to like in Johnson's books DoT and RitB, but also
much to dislike, this quote being a good example of the latter.
Note that Johnson doesn't actually discuss self-organization, there
is just a lot of rhetoric "rulers of science", "damage control
mechanisms" "sinking ship".
I think Johnson misses an opportunity to put things on a positive
rather than a negative note. There are many positives to come out
of the "emerging science of complexity" and, in fact, the goals
of many in this group are very close to some of Phil's goals. Here
are another couple of quotes from self-org types. Particularly
note the second quote from Dyke. Apart from a few stray sentences
here and there it would not be too hard to imagine that these
words came from Phil...
It is nonetheless useful to note that Dawkins's defense of
genic reductionism is less explicitly tied up with the
individualism of capitalist economics than with attempts
to use reductionist materialism as a weapon against Christian
spiritualism. Dawkins systematically invests his metaphors
with disturbing semantic reverberations that harken hack to
Enlightenment themes and turn his theory into a direct
competitor of Christian creationism. Only radical materialist
reductionism, it seems, can block religious dogmatism, even
if the cost is making us pawns of our genes rather than of
a tyrannical Calvinist God.
-- David Depew and Bruce Weber, <Darwinism Evolving>, MIT Press,
1995, p. 375
========================================================================
Reductionism assumes that the progress of science is detachable
from the process of science. That is, it assumes that claims
to scientific truth can be certified within the internal canons
of science itself, but that the resulting certification commands
standing in intellectual life as a whole. This is the
megalomaniacal claim to which otherwise cautious, modest,
responsible scientists are forced when they are dragged out
of their labs to participate in the dialectic of legitimation
taking place in the intellectual community at large.
In this light, science's defense of its activity in the public
forum can be looked at as an incidental activity only by
accepting science's claim to autonomy a priori. Otherwise it
must he considered an integral part of scientific activity
seen as one among many activities practiced in and for a
society which has the right of intelligent review. A society
is ill-served by a science that seals itself off totally,
just as science is ill-served hy a society that won't allow
it enough autonomy to pursue research.
We are fortunate to have a very recent example to consider.
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, matching scientists
against creationists, was most interesting in showing up
the current dynamic of science and society. Science has to
defend its authority, its command of our belief, its
command of a large share of our resources. It has to do
so in a society under the sway of an ideal of religious
truth, an ideal that retains its legitimacy for reasons
science cannot touch. Given this background, intellectual
authority is gained by those who successfully claim to be
the source of truth. Scientists testified in _McLean_ as
authorities. That is, despite themselves, they testified
as sources of truth. Yet there is the other, liberal
democratic base that the sciences have to touch. The
ideology of science demands that it be perceived as a
community of open-minded equals engaged in a quest in
in which each success is provisional and revisable in light
of successes at later stages of the quest. But then any
successes are vulnerable to the criticism of the absolutists.
These critics must somehow be delegitimized. Somehow science
must be made immune to all but criticism from within the
scientific community itself.
So it turned out that scientists attempting to legitimize
their authority while insisting on their fallibility proved
to be a fascinating spectacle in Arkansas. In fact, the
only way science managed to make ends meet (provisionally)
was to get Judge Overton to buy into the doctrine of
falsifiability, and a self-serving interpretation of how
that doctrine ought to be applied. It was a lucky break.
But the fault is not so much that of science itself, but
rather that of the society which demands that its science
compete for authority on the basis of religious criteria
of legitimatization. We all complain of the religious
excesses of scientific reductionism. We seldom notice the
social and ideological pressures that give rise to them.
Science's conception of itself is that it has both won the
authority of truth and risen above the social context of
debate. Neither is true. That is a simple empirical fact.
When this becomes obvious, as in _McLean_, the lofty
strategies adopted by scientists become dangerously
dysfunctional. They are not likely to get as lucky again
as they were with Judge Overton.
-- C. Dyke, "Complexity and Closure", <Evolution at a
Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy
of Science>, Editors D.J. Depew and B.H. Weber,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, pp. 97-131.
SJ:================
>
>However, if the self-organizationalists are successful in explaining
>the emergence of organized complexity, I will first examine their
>evidence to see if it indicates whether or not God was involved. If
>the self-organizationalists (or anyone else) are successful in
>explaining the emergence of organized complexity 100%
>naturalistically, then I will have to re-think my entire position. If
>life, the universe and everything can be explained 100%
>naturalistically, then maybe the intellectually honest thing to do is
>for me to become an atheist again?
>
IMHO, no. If the self-orgs are successful then we will have a new
anthropic principle (we can call it the BAP "biological anthropic
principle"). Self-organization is the antithesis of the Blind
Watchmaker thesis that Dawkins needs in order to be "an intellectually
fulfilled atheist".
======================================
========================
Brian Harper |
Associate Professor | "It is not certain that all is uncertain,
Applied Mechanics | to the glory of skepticism" -- Pascal
Ohio State University |
========================