Ah but the fact that the most successful cosmology also predicts
multiverses makes the concept quite a bit more interesting than a 'x
did it' ad hoc explanation. And while x may remain undetectable
forever, there are ways that at least the multiverses can be
disproven, theoretically at this moment but nevertheless, it can spur
real research and science to attempt this. By being able to make
predictions which can in principle be disproven, multiverses follow
the good traditions of science. Of course, until science knows more
multiverses remain a theoretical possibility at best, consistent with
what we know so far.
Some may speculate the meaning of mulitverses to other areas of
science, philosophy or theology.
Much better than 'x did it', to for instance explain the orbit of planets :-)
On 9/8/07, David Heddle <heddle@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> PvM,
>
>
>
> Yes multiverses are consistent with various cosmologies, but since we can
> only test what those cosmologies have to say about this universe, that is
> sort of irrelevant. Successful theories often fail spectacularly. Everyone
> would agree that classical E&M is successful, but it predicts that atoms are
> unstable. As long as it remains impossible to detect another universe, the
> multiverse conjecture is as unscientific as the God hypothesis. At least
> until now, no theory ever got credit for predictions that cannot be tested.
>
>
>
> Phil,
>
>
>
> I would argue stronger than that. Cosmological ID has nothing to do
> whatsoever with improbability--or if anything it is hurt by improbability.
> It has to do with the sensitivity of habitability to the values of the
> constants. Those concepts seem to be correlated but they are not. In fact,
> the strongest "ID scenario" is a single universe with a fundamental theory
> that predicts the constants--which then are not improbable at all but
> inevitable. Given that life would still be sensitive to the values, all but
> the most recalcitrant naysayers would have to admit that, in that case,
> habitability has been built into the fabric of space-time. You could make no
> stronger ID prima facie case.
>
>
>
> If ID rests on the improbability of the constants, then the multiverse
> arguments are preferred--for they (some of them) predict that the constants
> will never have an explanation and will always look as if they came from a
> random draw.
>
> David Heddle
> Associate Professor of Physics
> Christopher Newport University &
> The Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility
>
>
> On 9/8/07, PvM <pvm.pandas@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > I mostly agree with your perspective on ID but I find your comments
> > about multiverses a bit puzzling. As I understand it, multiverses are
> > a logical prediction from big bang cosmology, so in other words, they
> > are not invoked in an ad hoc manner.
> > Also, multiverses are constrained, not all of them will be equally
> > successful, some will collapse, some will remain void of stars and
> > planets. In other words, they are constrained by natural law and
> > initial conditions.
> > Also since we don't really understand the mind of God, we cannot say
> > that he would or would not do something.
> >
> >
> > On 9/7/07, philtill@aol.com <philtill@aol.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Iain,
> > >
> > > I completely agree with Johnston that this paper overthrows the claims
> of
> > > the ID movement. I've been saying this for many years, that the ID
> movement
> > > can never be correct the way it is formulated because it is impossible
> to
> > > prove intelligent design when all you have to work with is "cosmic
> > > improbability" (CI). They should have called it the CI movement and
> made no
> > > claims about intelligence and then it would have been a defensible or at
> > > least scientifically meaningful position.
> > >
> > > I also completely agree with you that appealing to MWI is equivalent to
> > > appealing to God, when we are dealing with the limited set of data
> contained
> > > in physics (i.e., leaving out revelation). But note: it is amazing to
> > > consider how far atheism has come toward the Biblical worldview.
> Whereas
> > > once it claimed that nothing exists except the observable cosmos, which
> is
> > > purely random and has existed forever, now they agree that there must be
> > > something outside that cosmos, that is bigger than the cosmos, to
> explain
> > > the fine tuning and beginning of the cosmos. Functionally this fills
> the
> > > same role as God with the exception that it is not a Being (it is not
> > > Intelligent) and so it must create infinite universes in order to get
> one
> > > good one. Dealing with the question: which is more plausible, this
> "stupid
> > > god" of MWI, or biblical God who is a person? I like to note that
> > > consciousness certainly exists within the universe, so it does not seem
> impl
> > > ausible to me that whatever exists outside the universe might also
> possess
> > > consciousness. From there I think we have to leave science and embrace
> > > revelation, which the ID movement is unwilling to do and hence it must
> > > always remain a failure.
> > >
> > > I also find this very interesting: atheists claim that belief in God
> is a
> > > "science killer," since God can do anything and therefore if you profess
> > > belief in God you already have a sufficient explanation for everything.
> > > They claim that will cause us to give up as scientists and stop looking
> for
> > > answers. But notice that MWI is more effective than even God is, when
> it
> > > comes to being a sufficient explanation or everything. God **can** do
> > > anything, but he **won't** do everything. He can choose. MWI on the
> other
> > > hand is unintelligent and cannot choose. It cannot help but do
> everything.
> > > Therefore, MWI is the ultimate science-killer. Atheists are using a
> blatant
> > > double-standard when they claim that faith in God is a science killer.
> I
> > > think this is the most important observation we can make about
> Johnston's
> > > and others views when they include multiverses or MWI.
> > >
> > > Finally, I just don't "get" these quantum suicide arguments. The odds
> that
> > > the physicist will not be killed are the same in MWI as they are in any
> > > non-MWI interpretation of QM. The physicist might amazingly survive
> even if
> > > MWI is not true, and since he knows that mathematically then his
> survival
> > > will not convince him that MWI is true. He also knows that if he plays
> the
> > > game again time then he will almost certainly be killed the second time,
> > > regardless whether MWI is true or not.
> > >
> > > Also, the physicist's consciousness does not miraculously vanish in the
> > > universes where he is killed and then continue onward only in the rare
> > > universe where he survives. To the contrary, in the vast number of
> cases
> > > where he is being killed, he will actually feel the pain of the bullet
> > > ripping into his body as he dies and he will know that he is dying. It
> is
> > > only when WE (not he) choose to restrict our attention to the rare cases
> > > where he survives that the odds seem unusual to us. But that is because
> we
> > > are choosing to ignore the most common outcomes and to focus only on the
> one
> > > where he survives.
> > >
> > > We could play that game with any form of chance, not just with quantum
> > > suicide. We could flip a coin 10 times in a row to see if we get heads
> > > every time. In most universes we won't see that outcome, but in some
> rare
> > > universes we will. We don't need to claim that our consciousness ends
> in
> > > the common universes in order to play this game. The role of ending the
> > > physicist's consciousness in this game is just a trick to get us to
> focus on
> > > the unusual outcome, because we can't imagine the dead physicist
> measuring
> > > the ordinary case and so we think he can only measure the unusual case.
> But
> > > consider his wife. 99.999% of the time she will end up measuring a dead
> > > husband, regardless of whether MWI is true or not.
> > >
> > > So no matter how we look at it there is absolutely no way to
> distinguish
> > > between MWI or any other QM interpretation in these kinds of
> experiments,
> > > regardless of our faith or disbelief in God.
> > >
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Iain Strachan <igd.strachan@gmail.com>
> > > To: AmericanScientificAffiliation <asa@calvin.edu>
> > > Sent: Fri, 7 Sep 2007 3:26 pm
> > > Subject: [asa] The Multiverse - Physics or Metaphysics?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Lawrence Johnston posted a link to a paper by Eugene Koonin about the
> > > transition from chance to biological evolution in the history of life:
> > >
> > > http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
> > >
> > > These thoughts were prompted by reading this paper (and also having
> > > recently taken delivery of Martin Rees's book "Just six numbers"
> concerning
> > > the fine tuning of the universe). Both Koonin's paper and Rees's book
> > > invoke the idea of a multiverse to sidestep the problems without
> recourse to
> > > an Intelligent Designer, or Creator.
> > >
> > > The essence of Koonin's paper, as I understand it is that in order for
> > > biological evolution to get started, a primitive replication/translation
> > > system had to emerge by chance. He performs some toy calculations to
> work
> > > out the probability that such a system could emerge by chance in our
> > > universe (given number of stars, planets, age of the universe, number of
> > > nucleotides needed for such a system etc). He arrives at this
> vanishingly
> > > small number less than 10^(-1000).
> > >
> > > His resolution to this paradox is to invoke the "Many Words from One"
> (MWO)
> > > hypothesis, which I think is essentially the same as the Many Worlds
> > > interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. This means that all possible
> Quantum
> > > outcomes actually occur in different universes at every instant in time,
> and
> > > so at each point, the universe splits into parallel versions, with the
> > > different outcomes happening in the different universes.
> > >
> > > In the MWO hypothesis, even the most incredibly unlikely things are
> bound
> > > to happen in some, very rare universes, with probability 1. A
> radioactive
> > > atom with a half life of 1 second can carry on undecayed indefinitely,
> > > because there will always be universes in which it did not decay. [ This
> > > also leads to the "Quantum Immortality" paradox that you never actually
> > > experience death, because the event that causes your death will not
> happen
> > > in some universes, and it is these universes in which your consciousness
> > > continues to exist].
> > >
> > > Hence the emergence of the primitive replication/translation system is
> > > bound to occur in some versions of the universe, and those universes are
> the
> > > ones in which eventually people evolve to ask the question about how it
> all
> > > started up. Koonin calls this "anthropic selection" - ie our universe
> is
> > > one where this incredibly unlikely event occurred because we are here
> (the
> > > anthropic principle).
> > >
> > > The final sentence in Koonin's paper is telling:
> > >
> > > A final comment on "irreducible complexity" and "intelligent design".
> By
> > > showing that highly complex systems, actually, can emerge by chance and,
> > > moreover, are inevitable, if extremely rare, in the universe, the
> present
> > > model sidesteps the issue of irreducibility and leaves no room
> whatsoever
> > > for any form of intelligent design.
> > >
> > > It is my view that Koonin hasn't sidestepped the problem of intelligent
> > > design at all - in effect he has replaced one unprovable assumption
> (God)
> > > with another equally unprovable assumption (the multiverse).
> > >
> > > I wonder if people on the list would agree with me that "God did it"
> and
> > > "The multiverse did it" appear to be equivalent statements, and neither
> is
> > > satisfactory from a scientific viewpoint?
> > >
> > > God is omnipotent and can do anything. So when you can't explain
> something
> > > you could invoke God's intervention to explain something apparently
> > > miraculous.
> > >
> > > But the multiverse - where anything can happen with a finite
> probability,
> > > is also omnipotent - and can also be invoked to explain something
> apparently
> > > miraculous (such as the appearance of Koonin's first replicator).
> > >
> > > It seems to me that Koonin's paper suffers from precisely the same
> failing
> > > as Intelligent Design, namely that when you can't find a way of
> explaining
> > > something, you invoke something else that is omnipotent in order to
> explain
> > > it. To do this is to give up doing science, it seems to me.
> > >
> > > I'll finish with a humorous scenario that occurred to me.
> > >
> > > One of the bizarre paradoxes of the Many Worlds Interpretation of
> Quantum
> > > Mechanics is the so-called "Quantum Suicide" thought experiment (look it
> up
> > > on Wikipedia). It is proposed as a thought experiment that would
> > > distinguish between Many Worlds and the Copenhagen interpretations. The
> > > experiment resembles Schrodinger's cat, except that the physicist
> himself
> > > replaces the cat. A device measures the spin state of an electron, and
> > > fires a gun or not with 50% probability according to the result. The
> > > experiment is then repeated a large number of times (say 1000). At the
> end
> > > of this there will be 999 dead physicists whose consciousness is
> terminated
> > > when the gun went off, and one left alive in the universe where the spin
> > > state corresponded to "no fire" every time. If the physicist emerges at
> the
> > > end of this conscious, then he "knows" that the MWI is true.
> > >
> > > Or does he? Suppose he now goes home to his devoutly religious wife,
> and
> > > says "Honey I'm home - guess what we're going to be famous because I've
> > > proved the Many Worlds Interpretation is true". But his wife, who knows
> > > there is no chance she'll end up in the same universe as him has prayed
> to
> > > her God to intervene and save his life. She will reply "No, I've just
> > > proved that God answers prayer".
> > >
> > > What should the physicist do:
> > >
> > > (a) Divorce his religious nutter of a wife & go ahead and publish?
> > > (b) Start believing in the God his wife prayed to?
> > > (c) Go back and figure out what went wrong with the experimental
> > > apparatus?
> > >
> > > I think it should be clear which one I think is the most sensible :-)
> > >
> > > Iain
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ________________________________
> > > Email and AIM finally together. You've gotta check out free AOL Mail!
> > >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
> > "unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.
> >
>
>
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Received on Sat Sep 8 12:14:48 2007
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