From: Steve Petermann (steve@spetermann.org)
Date: Mon Sep 08 2003 - 14:11:22 EDT
Tom,
> The first is that this position essentially contends that evil is really
> good. Since we cannot discern goodness, it is alleged, without the foil
of
> evil, evil is necessary for goodness to exist, thereby making evil a good
> thing.
&
> These two issues reinforce each other. If evil is a *necessary* feature
of
> human existence, it suggests that God could not eliminate evil in order to
> produce good. We then have a "logical problem of good" that parallels the
> traditional "logical problem of evil" that has been largely put to rest by
> Alvin Plantinga. But this "logical problem of good" is not so easily
> dispelled. For instance, if evil is simply a contingent feature of human
> existence -- if evil just happens to show up at regular intervals in our
> life -- then we could reasonably ask why God doesn't just remove this
> annoyance. But if evil is a necessary aspect of our existence, then it
> appears God could not have done otherwise but to weave evil into the
fabric
> of creation; God had no choice, since evil is a logical necessity. In
this
> case, evil becomes a "necessary good." But that means God is impotent to
> craft his creation as he might see fit; God's will is constrained by
> logical necessity.
I think there is a subtle but important difference in what I am saying. I
did not say that *evil* was necessary to discern good or even that evil is
*necessary* for there to be good. What I said was that in order for there
to be what we value as good, there seems a necessity for a structure of life
where there is a *potential* for evil. Most people go through life enjoying
eating without having to face starvation, but the structure of hunger is
such that there is a potential for starvation(evil). One could stipulate a
world that God created that had the eternal potential for evil but evil
never happened. Is this what is meant by heaven?
> The second problem is that this position
> significantly reduces omnipotence as an attribute of God.
Not unless one rejects the idea of kenosis. What if a structure of life
with a *potential* for evil is a good thing? If God chooses to create such
a world(which God obviously did) then no omnipotence is lost and the
structure of life is affirmed.
> why would God set up a system that
> requires genuine evil in order to grasp the good?
Reasonable question except for my point about "the potential for evil".
Following that question I think a reasonable request would be to ask for a
counterexample, some theory of a structure of existence that we would call
good without the potential for evil.
Regards,
Steve Petermann
----- Original Message -----
From: "Tom Pearson" <pearson@panam.edu>
To: "ASA" <asa@lists.calvin.edu>
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 11:52 AM
Subject: Re: The Problem of Good
> At 06:32 PM 9/7/2003 -0500, Steve Petermann wrote:
>
> >I suggest that the very reason we love those
> >things in life is because the *structure* of life is such that evil is
> >possible. While, of course, evil itself is to be loathed and challenged
> >wherever it is met, life would not be what we want if the potential for
evil
> >were not possible.
>
> This is a familiar argument, whose roots are in Augustine. There are at
> least two substantial problems with this argument.
>
> The first is that this position essentially contends that evil is really
> good. Since we cannot discern goodness, it is alleged, without the foil
of
> evil, evil is necessary for goodness to exist, thereby making evil a good
> thing. (Leave aside the difficulty that this argument confuses epistemic
> concerns with ontological ones). The second problem is that this position
> significantly reduces omnipotence as an attribute of God.
>
> These two issues reinforce each other. If evil is a *necessary* feature
of
> human existence, it suggests that God could not eliminate evil in order to
> produce good. We then have a "logical problem of good" that parallels the
> traditional "logical problem of evil" that has been largely put to rest by
> Alvin Plantinga. But this "logical problem of good" is not so easily
> dispelled. For instance, if evil is simply a contingent feature of human
> existence -- if evil just happens to show up at regular intervals in our
> life -- then we could reasonably ask why God doesn't just remove this
> annoyance. But if evil is a necessary aspect of our existence, then it
> appears God could not have done otherwise but to weave evil into the
fabric
> of creation; God had no choice, since evil is a logical necessity. In
this
> case, evil becomes a "necessary good." But that means God is impotent to
> craft his creation as he might see fit; God's will is constrained by
> logical necessity. Leibniz and some contemporary philosophers would love
> this, but Christians can't go there.
>
> It seems to me that to say evil is really good is to deny the reality of
> evil, no matter how often we say evil is to be loathed and
> challenged. However, if evil is indeed real, then even if it allows us to
> recognize and appreciate the good, it is still *evil*, and the original
> problem of evil is not quenched: why would God set up a system that
> requires genuine evil in order to grasp the good? If the answer to that
> question is, "God had to do it that way," then we have eclipsed
omnipotence
> as a meaningful attribute of God. That way lies disaster for the
Christian
> Gospel.
>
> Tom Pearson
>
____________________________________________________________________________
>
____________________________________________________________________________
>
> Thomas D. Pearson
> Department of History & Philosophy
> The University of Texas-Pan American
> Edinburg, Texas
> e-mail: pearson@panam.edu
>
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