From: Howard J. Van Till (hvantill@chartermi.net)
Date: Sat Aug 23 2003 - 09:39:22 EDT
>From: "Steve Bishop" <stevebishop_uk@hotmail.com>
> Does anyone know whent he term "methodological naturalism" was first used?
Steve,
No. I don't know when this term got into the vocabulary. Al Plantinga has
employed it for quite a while. Perhaps he could shed some light on its
introduction. I'm quite sure it precedes Ruse's presentation at the 1993
AAAS symposium (at which I also gave a presentation).
Your asking the question about 'when' also raises the question about
definitions of the variant strains of "naturalism" that need to be
recognized and distinguished from one another. Here's something that works
for me.
First, a definition:
Methodological naturalism. When formulating theories about objects, systems
and phenomena within the physical universe, the natural sciences shall
include only natural causes arising from the actions of, or interactions
among, members of the physical universe. Actions of non-natural agents that
are not members of the physical universe are not categorically denied either
existence or effect, but such actions are excluded from scientific
theorizing because of science's inability to investigate them empirically.
Comments:
(a) This is a statement about the limited competence of the sciences, not a
statement about the ultimate nature of reality. It does not exclude the
existence of God; it does not even exclude supernatural (coercive, God
overpowering nature) action categorically.
(b) Methodological naturalism does, however, exclude the empirical
detectability of divine action of any sort and is for that reason rejected
by advocates of ID.
Second, an excerpt from my review of No Free Lunch:
> The many faces of naturalism
>
> In large part, the ID movement is a reaction to its leaders¹ perception
> that the worldview of naturalism has effectively dominated the worlds of
> higher education and professional science, and that it is now providing the
> religious framework for the K-12 public educational system as well. The ID
> movement is committed to the defeat of naturalism. But naturalism comes in
> many different versions that must, I believe, be carefully distinguished
> from one another. I find the following distinctions to be essential.
>
> (1) I use the term maximal naturalism (or ontological naturalism) to denote
> the comprehensive worldview built on the premise that Nature is all there
> is‹there is no other form of being, no God or gods‹and that there is no
> ultimate purpose in its existence, character, or historical development.
> This point of view could also be identified by such labels as materialism
> (the material/physical world is all there is) or atheism (there is no
> transcendent God as envisioned by any of the theistic religions).
>
> (2) I use the term minimal naturalism (it could also be called metaphysical
> naturalism, but that name has additional connotations) to denote the family
> of worldviews that reject the idea of supernatural action by any deity. All
> actions (processes and events) in the universe are presumed to fall
> entirely in the category of natural actions‹actions performed by members of
> the natural world in ways that are wholly consistent with their own
> character and capabilities. Although the existence of God, or gods, or
> purpose is neither affirmed nor denied by minimal naturalism, the idea that
> any divine being would act supernaturally‹that is, coercively overpowering
> or superceding the natural actions of members of the universe, thereby
> interrupting the flow of natural phenomena‹is rejected. .....
>
> (3) The term methodological naturalism is often employed to denote the idea
> that the natural sciences have the competence to investigate natural
> actions alone and must remain agnostic with regard to any form of divine
action.
>
> (4) Naturalistic theism builds its worldview on the premise that there is a
> God who acts purposefully and effectively in the world, but this divine
> action is always persuasive and never coercive. In contrast to the several
> forms of supernaturalistic theism, naturalistic theism rejects coercive
> supernatural intervention as something that would violate the essential
> natures of God, the world, and the God-world relationship.
>
> The ID movement, we noted, is committed to the defeat of "naturalism." But
> toward which form of naturalism does it aim its rhetorical guns? There may
> be some variation in the ID literature, but the consensus seems to be that
> it doesn¹t really matter very much. In the judgment of most ID proponents,
> the distinctions outlined above are effectively meaningless because all of
> these versions of naturalism agree on the key proposition to which the ID
> movement takes exception‹that there is no way to detect divine action
> empirically. The distinctions noted above are judged by ID spokespersons to
> be hollow rhetorical distinctions without an empirically discernable
difference.
Howard Van Till
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