From: Iain Strachan (iain.strachan.asa@ntlworld.com)
Date: Wed Apr 30 2003 - 19:30:53 EDT
George,
A brief attempt to reply here; I've already indulged in several posts
today - quite unusual for me -, and it's gotten late, but I think this
deserves some reply.
------------------------- Context -------------------------
> >
> > > > ----------------
> > > > Roberts (p. 248) quotes a statement in Behe's book as follows: "If a
> > > > biological structure can be explained in terms of those natural laws
> > then we
> > > > cannot conclude that it was designed" (p. 203).
> > >
> > > This statement is already questionable, even without carrying the
argument
> > > farther. It's true that we can't "conclude" that such a structure is
> > designed in the
> > > sense of logical implication - but then we can't "conclude" in that
sense
> > that a
> > > structure is designed if it _can't_ be explained in terms of known
natural
> > laws.
> >
> > I honestly don't see what you're getting at here George. All
observations
> > we make are subject to error and any conclusions we draw have to be made
on
> > the basis of probability. If I toss a coin 1000 times and it comes up
heads
> > over 900 times, then it is reasonable for me to conclude that the coin
is
> > biased. But if I toss it 10 times and it comes up heads 9 times then it
is
> > not reasonable to conclude that it's biased, because it's not
sufficiently
> > unlikely; there is not enough evidence. But however low the
probability,
> > you can never absolutely rule out coincidence; as in "Hitchhiker's Guide
To
> > The Galaxy", where Douglas Adams describes an "infinite improbability
drive"
> > that could, for example cause all the molecules in the hostesse's dress
at a
> > party to move 1 meter to the left of their normal position. There is
> > clearly a finite probability of this happening, but it's so vanishingly
> > improbable that we would be reasonable to conclude that it was a miracle
(
> > Richard Dawkins gives another example in The Blind Watchmaker of a
statue
> > waving its hand at you; which again he would concede is a miracle).
> >
> > Your second statement; that we can't conclude it is designed if it can't
be
> > explained in terms of natural laws is a more rational attack on the ID
> > position, but it is not the issue that Roberts was addressing. Roberts
was
> > attacking Behe for showing proper scientific caution and not drawing a
> > conclusion (making an inference if you prefer) if there is insufficient
> > data. Furthermore he was wrongly (IMO) suggesting that Behe's lack of a
> > design inference meant that Behe was excluding God's provenance. But
> > whether God causes a coin to fall heads once, or the lot to fall on a
chosen
> > person is a theological question, and not one that is susceptible to
> > scientific analysis.
>
> Iain -
> You've omitted part of my post that, I think, makes my point clearer. To
> repeat:
-------------------------------- End context ---------------------------
Me:
Sorry, George, but nuclear Physics isn't my stront point, and so I chose not
to respond to the second part of your post, which didn't make the point much
clearer to me. Sorry for my ignorance. Let's see if I can do better having
thought about it:
>
> "OTOH, we can certainly say, from the standpont of faith (which is where
we
> ought to begin theological arguments, /fides quarens intellectum/) that
some
> structures are designed even if we have perfectly good explanations for
them in terms of
> natural processes. IDers have been reticent about answering the question
"is the
> carbon-12 nucleus intelligently designed"?" The reason is pretty clear:
They don't
> want to say "No" because that would suggest that the rather remarkable
"coincidences"
> which make the triple alpha process possible are indeed just coincidences
which God
> wasn't especially concerned to make happen. But if they say "Yes" then
they have an
> example of an intelligently designed structure which can be explained in
terms of known
> physical laws of nuclear & EM interactions. This then suggests that other
such
> structures which seem to be intelligently designed can be explained in
terms of
> secondary causes without the explicit invocation of a designer."
>
> This is a response to Behe's statement cited above (rather than a defence
of
> Michael's argument). God can "design" things in the world by acting
through natural
> processes - which is what the ideas of concurrence and governanec in
traditional
> doctrines of providence speak of. If IDers would make clear their
agreement with this
> principle to begin with then I would have fewer problems with their
arguments. But
> again, I understand why they hesitate to make a point of this. For if
they agree that
> C-12 (e.g.) is "intelligently designed," though explicable in terms of
known natural
> processes, then when some other structure which is essential for life is
encountered, it
> will be natural for a Christian to suggest that God brought it about
through natural
> processes also.
>
So from the standpoint of faith, we can say everything is "intelligently
designed". I'll agree to that, though perhaps it would be better to say
"God created everything". I accept that God is the Creator of everything
and can make things happen in whatsoever way he wishes. Whether I argue
from the general ID viewpoint, or from Behe's viewpoint, I do not know; from
my viewpoint, I accept fully that God can make things happen through
"natural causes". An example very recently. When on holiday last week, I
bought a number of new CD's on a shopping trip. One of them was Mahler's
Symphony No 10, and another was a series of "nature recordings" of
thunderstorms. I can immediately appreciate the Mahler as the creative
output of a genius; that evokes strong emotions within me. The same is true
of the thunderstorm recordings, which fill me also with a sense of awe at
the Creator who makes them possible. From a theological viewpoint, both are
"Intelligently Designed". But from a scientific/statistical viewpoint, then
I believe that a Dembski-type probabilistic framework may be able to
conclude that the Mahler is intelligently designed, while being unable to
conclude that the thunderstorm is intelligently designed. That is the hope;
that you don't get false positives; and therefore such a technique relies on
probabilistic arguments. And I also think that the concept of "Specified
Complexity" is a valid one, though I don't think yet it has been well-enough
explained. It is criticized by some as being a concept unique to Dembski,
and possibly that is because he uses his own terminology. But it's my
belief that it can all be fitted quite logically into existing statistical
frameworks (cf. my "minimum description length" thread a while back), and it
is part of my own journey, having completed my PhD in this area (Adaptive
and Neural Computation) to explore this avenue.
Best wishes,
Iain
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