Burgy,
Thanks for the clarifications re Schaferman's comments. I have a feeling
that some of that discussion could have been sharpened considerably by the
use of David Griffin's distinctions among:
(1)supernaturalism (the traditional theological perspective, which entails
divine interventionism -- the idea that God occasionally interrupts the flow
of natural processes & events and supercedes natural/creaturely action with
direct/coercive divine action); includes YEC, OEC, ID and other forms of
episodic creationism.
(2) naturalistic theism (which rejects the divine interventionism of
supernaturalism but entails a concept of effective, non-coercive and
variable divine action as essential); includes process theology.
(3) minimal naturalism (which rejects the divine interventionism of
supernaturalism, but is silent on other theological questions); a sufficient
basis for science as we know it. Says more than methodological naturalism
but considerably less than maximal naturalism.
(4) maximal naturalism (which rejects not only supernaturalism but all
concepts of divine existence or action). Includes Dawkins, Provine,
Dennett,...
Griffin argues that although (2) and (4) disagree substantially on several
ultimate questions, they should be able to agree that (3) is a sufficient
basis for the natural sciences.
Howard Van Till
PS: I just took a quick look at Schafersman's article at the site posted a
few minutes ago. I'll try to give it a more careful read to see if the
comments above (written earlier) still hold.
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