Re: the "image of God"

From: John W. Burgeson (johnburgeson@juno.com)
Date: Wed Feb 16 2000 - 21:39:48 EST

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    The following email is forwarded to the ASA LISTSERV
    by request of the author. Dave has some very pertinent (IMHO)
    points to be made.

           Burgy
    --------- Begin forwarded message ----------
    From: dfsiemensjr@juno.com
    To: johnburgeson@juno.com
    Subject: Re: the "image of God"
    Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 14:47:06 -0700

    On Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:50:01 -0700 "John W. Burgeson"
    <johnburgeson@juno.com> writes:
    > Adrian wrote: " the theologian Berkouwer explained that there are at
    > least two
    > other ways of understanding the imago dei: as an
    > office/responsibility/function, and as a relationship in conformity
    > to
    > God."
    >
    > That's all very well and good -- perhaps even true. But I see no
    > way to approach it scientifically. Such a definition must remain, I
    > think,
    > in the realm of religious philosophy; untestable.
    >
    >
    > Like most origins arguments -- what constitutes imago dei seems not
    > capable of being answered definitively. Or at least with substantive
    > agreement.
    >
    > Burgy
    >
    > ________________________________________________________________

    I think, Burgy, that you have the correct answer to the problem. A
    scientist works with descriptions. I note, from time to time, a reference
    to a new species, which consists in a list of characteristics that one
    can check off. Sometimes there is a note of a difference from a similar
    species. This attitude is found in Newton's famous _Hypothesis non
    fingo._ He was not declaring that he eschewed what we call hypotheses, a
    guess to be tested. He was talking about the old sense, an underlying
    philosophical basis. He was not explaining _why_ mass and gravity were as
    they were, but describing _how_ they interacted, essentially totally
    contained in formulas. The whole is tied to observations which can be
    made, either directly or indirectly.

    Philosophers, in contrast, normally deal with definitions and reasons
    why. Aristotle's declaration that the celestial bodies had to move in
    circles because circular motion is perfect and the quintessence of which
    they are made is perfect, is an example. It did run afoul of observable
    facts, but only after Tycho had refined the positions well beyond
    anything previously available and Kepler had 21 unsuccessful tries at
    providing circular orbits, with epicycles and deferents. One does not
    have to subscribe to Aristotle's dicta concerning definitions, which held
    sway beyond the Middle Ages, to recognize the relevance of definitions in
    these areas. Definitions do not have to be checkable by means of
    observations. _Imago dei_ is at least more definitional than descriptive.

    Faced with an entity, I do not ask whether it really is a "rational
    mortal animal," or if it exemplifies the _imago dei_. I conclude it is a
    person if it looks like a person and sounds like a person. If I don't
    know about audioanimatronics, I could be thoroughly fooled by the Lincoln
    display at Disneyland. Not having visual contact, it may take me a little
    while to determine whether a person is on the phone or I'm being treated
    to a recording. I understand that when some aborigines were presented
    with recordings in their own language, they decided that it must be
    truthful because it always said the same thing. We may be more
    sophisticated, but we live with limitations all the same.

    There is a further problem because descriptions apply only generally. For
    example, _Sus scrofa_ is a quadruped with split hoofs. But I recall a
    picture of a two-legged pig, because the hind quarters had not developed,
    and there are mule-footed pigs. With human beings, we "solve" the
    problems of the standard description by ascribing humanity to all those
    who had a function or organ but lost it. This covers amputees and those
    brain dead through trauma or disease, for example. For other matters, we
    recognize as human anything that has human parents. This covers
    thalidomide and anencephalic babies, as well as other congenital
    disabilities and deformities. Of course, we usually do not feel the need
    to know the parents. If it looks close enough, it's in (except among
    those with damnable prejudices). Tragically, those with such prejudices
    do not recognize them as such, for they "know" it as the truth.

    I hope this helps to clarify the issue rather than confuse matters
    further.

    Dave
    --------- End forwarded message ----------

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