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Hi Paul;
You wrote on the notion of proof:
> The recent discussion has brought up once again the question
> of 'verification' or 'proof' of a scientific theory. The disputants
> have invoked the positivists and Popper in this discussion.
>
> It is helpful to recognize that our concepts of proof require
> philosophical justification. Most of the time this has not been
> recognized, and people plow ahead in a polemical style,
> using words like 'proof' and 'fact' without recognizing their
> philosophical ambiguities.
>
> As a general rule in writing, I think that if one uses the words
> proof, or verification, or fact, or confirmation, or corroboration,
> or falsification, or justification, or any other word that has
> epistemological intent, then he or she should define the
> terms and specify what philosophical position is being
> assumed. In our postmodern context, If this is not done, I would
> have to conclude that the writer is either naive or is trying to
> put something over on innocent people. (For example, it's
> ok to be a naive realist, if you say so, but it's naive not to
> recognize that there are options.)
>
> However, unfortunately the philosophical language in common
> use here is out of date, its problems having been revealed
> in numerous subsequent books and articles. Popper's work
> is about 50 years old, and the Vienna Circle's is much older.
> Even Kuhn is finally becoming passe.
>
> In some ways I miss the old days of positivism, when as in the
> Cold War there was one clearly-defined enemy. That enemy
> collapsed upon itself. We are now faced with a new
> and more complex set of questions. It would be well for us to
> brush up on recent philosophy, because that is really where the
> battle is, not geology or biology, as Schaeffer emphasized.
> These philosophical issues are fundamental, so "fundamentalism"
> in the sense of getting to the bottom of issues should be our goal.
>
> We are living in the postmodern age. Words do not mean
> what they seem. Clear definitions are more important than ever.
>
> Paul Arveson
While I do not disagree with what you state, I still want to maintain a
"common sense" view of empirical data or "facts". When I measure a
current, it is a current--as properly defined freshman physics
texts--that I measure; whose value (quantification, when reported in an
accepted unit system) is really "real" and not up to philosophical
debate. Questions about what is a current simply are begged to concepts
of charge and time--both of which are also physical measurables, i.e.
posses being prior to quantification.
What I am most concerned about in modern philosophical discourse is an
"overburdening" of empirical data with the notion of "theory
ladeness." Are there not facts that are demonstable to some level
beyond refute? The power of the scientific method, as I believe the
positivists correctly pointed out, is in its ability to settle the
discussion by pointing to sense data; at some level of experience that
all--or even most-- rational people can share.
In light of the democratic process in the funding of scientific
enterprise, perhaps the common sense meaning of words is more important
to maintain as opposed to the complexities entailed in philosophical
discourse. It would appear to me, that a critical realist position is
most tenable in today's world--at least as I understand critical
realism.
Thanks for the new thread.
George A.
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Hi Paul;
You wrote on the notion of proof:
The recent discussion has brought up once again the question
of 'verification' or 'proof' of a scientific theory. The disputants
have invoked the positivists and Popper in this discussion.It is helpful to recognize that our concepts of proof require
philosophical justification. Most of the time this has not been
recognized, and people plow ahead in a polemical style,
using words like 'proof' and 'fact' without recognizing their
philosophical ambiguities.As a general rule in writing, I think that if one uses the words
proof, or verification, or fact, or confirmation, or corroboration,
or falsification, or justification, or any other word that has
epistemological intent, then he or she should define the
terms and specify what philosophical position is being
assumed. In our postmodern context, If this is not done, I would
have to conclude that the writer is either naive or is trying to
put something over on innocent people. (For example, it's
ok to be a naive realist, if you say so, but it's naive not to
recognize that there are options.)However, unfortunately the philosophical language in common
use here is out of date, its problems having been revealed
in numerous subsequent books and articles. Popper's work
is about 50 years old, and the Vienna Circle's is much older.
Even Kuhn is finally becoming passe.In some ways I miss the old days of positivism, when as in the
Cold War there was one clearly-defined enemy. That enemy
collapsed upon itself. We are now faced with a new
and more complex set of questions. It would be well for us to
brush up on recent philosophy, because that is really where the
battle is, not geology or biology, as Schaeffer emphasized.
These philosophical issues are fundamental, so "fundamentalism"
in the sense of getting to the bottom of issues should be our goal.We are living in the postmodern age. Words do not mean
what they seem. Clear definitions are more important than ever.Paul Arveson
While I do not disagree with what you state, I still want to maintain
a "common sense" view of empirical data or "facts". When I
measure a current, it is a current--as properly defined freshman physics
texts--that I measure; whose value (quantification, when reported in an
accepted unit system) is really "real" and not up to philosophical debate.
Questions about what is a current simply are begged to concepts of charge
and time--both of which are also physical measurables, i.e. posses being
prior to quantification.
What I am most concerned about in modern philosophical discourse is an "overburdening" of empirical data with the notion of "theory ladeness." Are there not facts that are demonstable to some level beyond refute? The power of the scientific method, as I believe the positivists correctly pointed out, is in its ability to settle the discussion by pointing to sense data; at some level of experience that all--or even most-- rational people can share.
In light of the democratic process in the funding of scientific enterprise, perhaps the common sense meaning of words is more important to maintain as opposed to the complexities entailed in philosophical discourse. It would appear to me, that a critical realist position is most tenable in today's world--at least as I understand critical realism.
Thanks for the new thread.
George A.
--------------EE1E51D4CCA7D7B049302373-- --------------35FC17F4EF06ED0CDE25903D Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="gandrews.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for George Andrews Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="gandrews.vcf" begin:vcard n:Andrews Jr.;George tel;home:757 565 2890 x-mozilla-html:TRUE org:College of William & Mary;Department of Applied Sciences adr:;;;Williamsburg;VA;23188;USA version:2.1 email;internet:gandrews@as.wm.edu title:Graduate Student fn:George A. Andrews Jr. end:vcard --------------35FC17F4EF06ED0CDE25903D--