It is helpful to recognize that our concepts of proof require
philosophical justification. Most of the time this has not been
recognized, and people plow ahead in a polemical style,
using words like 'proof' and 'fact' without recognizing their
philosophical ambiguities.
As a general rule in writing, I think that if one uses the words
proof, or verification, or fact, or confirmation, or corroboration,
or falsification, or justification, or any other word that has
epistemological intent, then he or she should define the
terms and specify what philosophical position is being
assumed. In our postmodern context, If this is not done, I would
have to conclude that the writer is either naive or is trying to
put something over on innocent people. (For example, it's
ok to be a naive realist, if you say so, but it's naive not to
recognize that there are options.)
However, unfortunately the philosophical language in common
use here is out of date, its problems having been revealed
in numerous subsequent books and articles. Popper's work
is about 50 years old, and the Vienna Circle's is much older.
Even Kuhn is finally becoming passe.
In some ways I miss the old days of positivism, when as in the
Cold War there was one clearly-defined enemy. That enemy
collapsed upon itself. We are now faced with a new
and more complex set of questions. It would be well for us to
brush up on recent philosophy, because that is really where the
battle is, not geology or biology, as Schaeffer emphasized.
These philosophical issues are fundamental, so "fundamentalism"
in the sense of getting to the bottom of issues should be our goal.
We are living in the postmodern age. Words do not mean
what they seem. Clear definitions are more important than ever.
Paul Arveson