Bertvan@aol.com writes
in message <3b.22f8644.25fffb95@aol.com>:
> Ted:
> > Answers must depend on definitions. The only coherent definition
> >of "free will" I can think of means that the human will is
> >not constrained by other humans. This is quite compatible with
> >materialistic science. To argue that the human will is not
> >constrained by anything is not consistent with what we think or
> >feel.
>
> Bertvan:
> Hi Ted. What do you believe to be the "constraints" on "free
> will"? If you define "free will" as merely the inevitable
> results of atoms, molecules and neural connections in our brain,
> I would have to protest that wouldn't fit my definition of
> "free". In arguing that unconstrained "free will" is not
> "consistent with what we think or feel", surely you can only
> speak for yourself. Some of us think and feel differently.
What I mean is I don't understand a definition of "free will"
that says we make decisions based on nothing. It seems
contrary to experience and common sense.
> Ted:
> >One way to define "creativity" is the process of arriving at
> >patterns of thought or expression that have not existed in
> >the universe before. This is also quite compatible with
> >materialistic science.
>
> Bertvan:
> Did "patterns of thought or expression that have not existed in
> the universe before" come from outside the universe? Or were
> they merely random rearrangements of existing patterns of thought
> or expression?
Why must creativity be necessarily explained by looking outside
the universe? Again, that seems contrary to experience and common
sense.
What I'm getting at in both cases is that a definition of "free
will" and "creativity" that invokes the "super" natural has more
problems with it than one that doesn't.
> Ted:
> >God, if an entity having real affects on matter and energy, is
> >within the realm of science. God, if an entity outside the
> >universe having no affect on the universe, is outside the realm
> >of science as long as science has no hope of discerning things
> >outside the universe. God, if an entity outside the universe
> >but affecting the universe, will be either interpreted as a law
> >of the universe -- if his actions are consistent -- or as a
> >chaotic effect -- in which case uniformitarian assumptions will
> >begin to break down.
>
> Bertvan:
> For me "free will" and "creativity" are easier to define than
> God, and I'd like to include them in this discussion about what
> has the power to effect the universe. I'm not sure what the
> above paragraph says, but since you define yourself as an atheist,
> I assume you are saying God could have no power to effect the
> universe, because that would violate the laws of nature.
No, if God was an entity outside the universe, he could
certainly effect the universe. However, if his actions
were consistent, he would appear indistinguishable from
a natural law.
> Are the "laws of nature" human concepts, or something more?
> Divine?
They are descriptions or characteristics of the universe in
a form which humans can understand and communicate.
> As for the uniformitarian assumptions, must we all adopt
> the same assumptions, or are we each free to choose our own?
No, I don't believe assumptions are adopted out of thin
air. Assumptions follow from observations. Unreliable
observations lead to bad assumptions, reliable observations
to good assumptions.
> > Bertvan:
> >> Are you saying "the tools of science" can examine all questions?
> >> Even those they have declared to be "outside the realm of
> >> science"?
>
> Ted:
> I believe so. Do you have an example in mind that we can
> test?
>
> Bertvan:
> 1. The origin of life
> 2. The nature of consciousness
> 3. The origin of conscience
> 4. Whether the universe is open or closed
> 5. The nature of free will and creativity
> 6. The origin of complexity
> 7. What lies beyond infinity
> 8. The nature and origin of time
> 9. The nature of thought
>
> I agree that scientists can discuss all of the above, and some scientists
> have great confidence about eventually explaining some of them. Are we
> forced to accept that optimism as an accomplished fact?
Optimism, itself, says nothing about the validity of an argument.
It is only the reason for the optimism of these scientists that
can be accepted or rejected. Anything otherwise is an argument
from authority (which can turn out to be quite valid, though,
but certainly doesn't "force" anyone to believe anything).
> > Bertvan:
> > > It is generally the agnostic position that humans are incapable
> >> of understanding whatever created life, the Earth or the universe.
> >> That doesn't prevent us from acknowledging it was apparently
> >> created (or sprang spontaneously into existence) and the evidence
> >> convinces me that creation was the result of a rational design.
> >> A rational design might well include teleology.
>
> Ted:
> > Can creation be distinguished from non-creation?
>
> Bertvan:
> I'm not sure what that means. Is a presupposition different from an
> assumption?
Let's assume I said nothing about presuppositions. How can
creation be distinguished from non-creation? In other words,
is it possible to look at something complex and decide that
it occurred naturally even without knowing what mechanism
could have done it?
> Bertvan:
> Another way of looking the laws of nature might be that they
> are all relative, rather than tidy mathematical equations. A
> force of nature ensures that particles cannot escape from the
> nucleus of an atom. Except sometimes they do, and in a manner
> that is unpredictable for individual atoms. The speed of light
> might not be a specific number, but an approximation. An
> approximation which could be minutely affected by many things
> -- God," free will" or forces about which we know nothing.
> We've discovered that light doesn't always travel in a straight
> line. Rupert Shelldrake thinks of the "laws of nature" as
> entrenched habits. Like all habits, they might be susceptible
> to small modifications. Thoughts are generally confined to
> individual consciousness, unless communicated in some known
> physical manner. The Princeton Anomalies Lab claims to detect
> tiny, but statistically measurable ESP effects. As a materialist,
> I'm sure you insist these measurements imply the "supernatural"
> and must be in error, no matter how many times they are repeated.
That would be a ridiculous conclusion, especially from a
materialist. To deny observations because they might possibly
give support to supernatural assumptions is just plain silly.
The simple fact is that we don't know all the laws that may
exist in the universe and a vastly simpler conclusion for "new"
affects is that a new law is being discovered, not that the
supernatural now exists!
In regards to the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Lab, all that
is required is for their results to be consistently duplicated
by other research efforts with finer control and less potential
experimental error and their conclusions will gain considerable
weight. The problem right now is that the effect is so slight,
there seems to be nearly infinite numbers of possible explanations
that might be preferred over ESP.
> As a non materialist I can keep an open mind. You speak of
> "materialist assumptions of science". I assure you I do not
> criticize your assumptions. They are as valid for you as mine
> as mine are for me. Would you insist that all scientists adopt
> your assumptions?
Again, one doesn't adopt assumptions, they follow from observation.
If someone has a strange assumption, I simply assume they saw
something weird. However, it is very easy to be fooled into
thinking one has seen something weird and therefore I conclude
that *reliable* observations are the only key to forming reliable
assumptions. Anecdotes, for example, is a very bad way to form
reliable assumptions.
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