Re: Beyond the Fossil Record ...

From: Stephen E. Jones (sejones@iinet.net.au)
Date: Sun Mar 05 2000 - 03:59:16 EST

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    Reflectorites

    Here is a review in American Scientist by the Darwinist historian Peter Bowler
    of a book by paleontologist Henry Gee about the fossil record. According to
    Bowler, Gee believes that:

    "...all the old paraphernalia of evolutionary explanations must be dismissed
    as unscientific speculation. All we can do is assess degrees of relationship.
    We cannot identify ancestors or "missing links," and we cannot devise
    testable theories to explain how particular episodes of evolution came
    about."

    Steve

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    http://www.sigmaxi.org/amsci/bookshelf/Leads00/Bowler.html

    [...]

    American Scientist

    March-April 2000
    Scientists' Bookshelf
    Life's Sometimes Artful Arrangement
    Peter J. Bowler

    In Search of Deep Time: Beyond the Fossil Record to a New History of Life. Henry
    Gee. 267 pp. The Free Press, 2000. $26.

    Henry Gee is a senior science writer for Nature, but he was trained as a
    paleontologist and is thus in an ideal position to write a popular account of a major
    revolution in scientists' approach to the fossil record. But this is not an impartial
    outsider's account: It is a passionate advocacy of the new perspective by someone
    who actually participated in the revolution. The new paleontology is based on
    cladistics, the rigorous use of morphological (structural) characters to work out the
    degrees of relationship between species on the assumption that evolutionary
    novelties only appear once and thus define a group or clade of all the species that
    inherit the new character by descent from the hypothetical common ancestor. But
    cladistics imposes rigid limits on how far one can trace such relationships. In
    particular it insists that one can never know if one form is directly ancestral to
    another--all we can do is work out degrees of relationship. This means that fossils
    have to be treated in exactly the same way as living species. Just because a fossil
    member of a group appears in an earlier geological stratum than any of the other
    members, we cannot assume that it was the common ancestor.

    Gee explains this by appealing to the notion of "deep time," the vast extent of
    geological time that dwarfs our normal human perception of historical relationships.
    The fossil record is often so sparse that we have no idea when a group first
    appeared, because there are plenty of cases where groups survived for tens of
    millions of years without leaving a single fossil. (The coelacanth is the classic
    example: This fish was once thought to be extinct because it had disappeared from
    the fossil record, then contemporary specimens were taken from the Indian Ocean).
    The first known fossil is thus no reliable guide to the date or the structure of the first
    member of its group. Nor, Gee insists, does the record tell us anything about the
    adaptations of the species we study. Apart from the difficulty of reconstructing the
    ancient ecologies, and the impossibility of knowing the effect of, for instance, ancient
    parasites, there are many cases where it has become plain that a structure for which
    there is now a clearly defined adaptive purpose was first evolved in forms that could
    not have used the structure in the modern way--so how can we possibly tell what
    they did use it for?

    The consequence of all this, the cladists insist, is that all the old paraphernalia of
    evolutionary explanations must be dismissed as unscientific speculation. All we can
    do is assess degrees of relationship. We cannot identify ancestors or "missing links,"
    and we cannot devise testable theories to explain how particular episodes of
    evolution came about. Gee is adamant that all the popular stories about how the first
    amphibians conquered the dry land, how the birds developed wings and feathers for
    flying, how the dinosaurs went extinct and how humans evolved from apes are just
    products of our imagination driven by prejudices and preconceptions. They reflect
    our modern ideas about the purposes of adaptive structures and about the
    progressive trend we think we see in the history of life up to humankind. They cannot
    be part of science because they cannot be tested against the fossil record. This is
    not an anti-evolution diatribe because cladism depends on the notion of common
    ancestry, and Gee admits that Darwin's theory can be applied in the modern world
    where we can actually see ecological relationships at work. But cladism places
    severe restrictions on what kind of questions can be asked about the distant past, in
    the cause of raising paleontology to the ranks of a hard science.

    The two great strengths of Gee's account are its iconoclastic destruction of many
    popular evolutionary scenarios and the author's intimate knowledge of the
    personalities and events surrounding the revolution. We learn how new fossils, and
    cladistic interpretations of existing fossils, have exploded the old myths about the
    great steps in evolution. Limbs evolved in fish that could clearly never have used
    them to venture onto dry land. The whole complex of bird-like characters, feathers
    and all, evolved in dinosaurs that could not fly or even glide. We are also introduced
    to the paleontologists who pioneered the revolution, including the "Gang of Four" in
    the fossil fish department at the Natural History Museum in London, led by Colin
    Patterson, with whom Gee himself studied. The outraged complaints of old-
    fashioned paleontologists such as the late Bev Halstead--who tried to dismiss
    cladism as a Marxist plot--are described with relish. At this level, Gee's book works
    really well, giving the reader both an introduction to the new lines of evidence and a
    real sense of the excitement generated by scientists promoting a new approach to
    their discipline.

    Gee is surely right to claim that many of the old evolutionary scenarios were based
    on prejudice and outdated thinking, although his account misses some significant
    points. He criticizes the American paleontologist A. S. Romer for telling a "fairy story"
    about how the earliest fish developed armor to protect themselves from the
    "dragons" of the time, the eurypterids, or sea scorpions. How, he asks, do we know
    that the eurypterids were responsible? He does not mention that it was Romer who
    first questioned the popular myth of the amphibians developing limbs to conquer the
    dry land--he suggested they used the limbs to crawl to the next pool in times of
    drought.

    Gee also attacks the modern assumption that humans evolved through a sequence
    defined by fossil species. (There were howls of anguish when this point of view was
    included in a display at the Natural History Museum.) Again, he fails to mention that
    it was commonplace in the early 20th century to sideline the known fossils from
    human ancestry. This was because paleontologists then thought that many lines of
    evolution would independently develop human characters, exactly the opposite of
    the cladists' position.

    Gee's assault on the old stories is effective, if selective, but we need to think
    carefully about the cladists' insistence that all such historical narratives must be
    banned from science. It is surely contradictory to dismiss them as untestable and
    then provide good evidence to disprove several of them. Unless I am missing
    something, a hypothesis that has been falsified must have been falsifiable--so what
    does Gee mean when he says that all such narratives are un testable? He certainly
    does not mean that they are unverifiable, because his own philosophy of science
    insists that all hypotheses are tentative and open to falsification. Perhaps he means
    that, having destroyed the old narratives, it will be difficult to come up with new ones
    that can be similarly tested. But this is a practical claim, not one based on a
    methodological principle.

    Others have argued that narratives are unscientific--Misia Landau made this point
    about paleoanthropology some years ago, noting how stories about human origins
    parallel the structure of many creation myths (Narratives of Human Evolution, 1991).
    But the fossil record has demolished several "myths" about human origins, including
    the once-popular idea that our ancestors developed big brains before they became
    bipedal. Narratives are not in principle untestable, for the obvious reason that some
    have been refuted in the course of the past hundred years.

    In the end, I remain profoundly unhappy about any attempt to claim that certain types
    of questions about the past should be banished from science on methodological
    grounds. The history of science shows us that this is often a mistake. Charles Lyell,
    the founder of uniformitarian geology, applied his methodology so rigidly that he
    dismissed as unscientific all efforts to understand the earth's origin. Yet nowadays
    we routinely discuss theories about the formation of our planet, because lines of
    evidence have opened up that were simply unavailable in Lyell's time.

    I welcome the critical side of the cladists' assault on the popular myths about
    evolution, but I suspect that their effort to dismiss all historical narratives from
    science is another product of the physics envy that occasionally tempts
    paleontologists and geologists to adopt impossibly harsh methodological criteria. As
    Ernst Mayr, among others, has argued, we need to recognize that studying the past
    requires a different kind of relation between theory and evidence. There is not, as
    Gee implies, a single kind of science, nor does the use of the imagination in itself
    make a hypothesis unscientific.

    There is another reason for concern, however, which derives from the public
    perception of science. Paleontologists may want to impress their scientific
    colleagues with the "hardness" of their new methodology--but if they tell us that all
    efforts to explain the origin of new forms in the course of evolution are unscientific,
    they leave up for grabs the whole area of how the natural world came into its present
    form. If science admits that it cannot in principle explain origins, the creationists will
    be only too willing to tell the public that alternative sources of information are
    available. In these circumstances, do we really want to concede that science cannot
    even ask the questions everyone would like to have answered?

    Peter J. Bowler, a scholar of Darwin and evolution, is a prolific author and professor
    of the history and philosophy of science at Queens University of Belfast

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    "The point of my letter (Science's Compass, 30 July, p. 663), which
    perhaps was not well articulated, is that there is one hypothesis, central to
    evolution, that remains barely tested-that evolution proceeds through the
    process of survival and reproduction of the fittest." (Hogg, David. W.,
    Science, Vol. 286, 26 November 1999, p167)
    Stephen E. Jones | sejones@iinet.net.au | http://www.iinet.net.au/~sejones
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