MikeBGene@aol.com wrote:
I wrote:
>>I must presume that ID
>>advocates much prefer a construction that puts the emphasis on the
>>inexplicability (thus far) of complexities in nature, and avoids an
>>emphasis on what they are really about.
>Let me guess. If something is explicable, by definition, it entails an
>explanation with reference to nothing more than physical laws, chance,
>and natural selection. For some reason, ID is rejected as a plausible
>explanation, thus ID necessary fails to resolve the inexplicable.
>Of course, this reasoning begs the question.
The reason that ID is rejected is that ID is an explanation that doesn't
explain, according to the suggested definition of explicability, which is
the one that scientifically-minded people adhere to.
>For example, maybe the
>reason abiogenesis is inexplicable is *because* such explanations
>ignore ID. From the ID perspective, the origin of life is not nearly as
>inexplicable as it is for those whose minds are closed to ID. Sorry, Cliff,
>but your observation is nonsense.
The explanatory power of ID is too great to be of any value. Couch it
any way you like, it's still deus ex machina.
Abiogenesis will be explained someday, like so many other things that
once were inexplicable but now are not. Unfortunately, when this occurs,
those whose religious views depend on inexplicability will be put out,
their religion undermined by an advance of knowledge.
How does ID theory distinguish between things which might be explained
in the future and things which can never be explained naturalistically?
How do you judge what is a proper object of research and what is not?
--Cliff Lundberg ~ San Francisco ~ cliff@noe.com
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Feb 14 2000 - 16:07:30 EST