I think there's some truth to what you're saying, though I (and perhaps
you?) don't see it as a criticism of TEs. Howard can speak for himself much
better than I, but I'd guess he'd say that it's empirically detected by
those who are open to the Holy Spirit's guidance. So this detection is not
a purely scientific matter, but also a spiritual matter.
In general, a TE's spiritual beliefs may or may not be based on evidence,
but they're not based on the failure of natural explanations wrt the origin
or development of life on earth. (They would see that as "God of the gaps"
argument, of which they are typically extremely suspicious.)
> 2. Do not most adherents of TE embrace methodological naturalism while
> most ID theorists reject it? This might mean that rungs 5 and 6 need to
> be modified to distinguish between the ID theorist who adopts
> these positions
> because of the evidence (and the perceived lack of evidence for 7
> and 8) vs.
> the ID theorist who adopts 5 or 6 instead of 7 or 8 largely for
> philosophical
> or methdological reasons.
Re: MN: I think you're right, though presumably even IDers at rung 7 or 8
could accept it if they're not theists, or if they're theists but don't
think -God- was the designer. The strident opposition to MN has always
struck me as a bit odd given the parallel insistence that ID doesn't engage
the issue of whether or not the designer is a natural being.
I can see stridently pointing out the difference between methodological and
metaphysical naturalism; or how methodological naturalism implies that
science will miss certain potentially critically aspects of reality, even
including empirical reality (e.g., the effects of a miracle); or how science
should be willing to abandon methodological naturalism if a revolutionarily
new paradigm proves more empirically successful. I would strongly support
each of those assertions.
But those don't seem to be the arguments IDers make, though I admit I'm
judging this largely on the basis of Johnson's writings (and he's nothing if
not a polemicist and provocateur) and also Steve's seeming conflation of
methdological and metaphysical naturalism here. (He often seems to think
this conflation is an insight, rather than a confusion -- ah, they're really
more or less the same thing! But, IMHO, he doesn't have a clear enough view
on the matter to critique clearly, except that he thinks methodological
naturalism is very bad. I've tried in exhaustive detail a year or two ago.
No luck.)
>
> 3. Finally, TEs almost universally embrace the "blind
> watchmaker" mechanism
> of design, implying a rational mind that employs the blind watchmaker to
> design *every* biological feature.
I think this too is correct, though they would say that while nature is
blind, the "watchmaker" isn't.
> But again, is this claim rooted in
> evidence or
> assumption?
Both, I think; or a bit of each.
This goes back in part to the methdological naturalism issue (though it's
not quite the same issue).
For atheists like Dawkins, the methodological naturalism is simply a
byproduct of metaphysical naturalism, and indeed, atheists will often
conflate the two in an attempt to transfer the prestige and power of science
to their ideology. Similarly, some Christians (including most IDers and
pretty much all YESC folks) want to conflate the two so as to gain the
prestige and power of the Christian faith v. atheism in their battle for
their revolutionary science. (This approach can work well with intelligent,
non-scientific lay people; it has as an unfortunate byproduct the pushing of
many scientifically oriented people into Dawkins hands: "gee, even the
Christians say that he's right that if I accept science, I have to reject
Christianity.)
For others, theists and atheists alike, methodological naturalism is a
pragmatic principle that (1) helps to define science as a study of the
natural (not supernatural) world, to distinguish it from other fields of
inquiry, (2) helps to restrict science to matters for which there are (in
principle, anyway, and ultimately) clear, mathematical, testable models
(something that presumably doesn't apply to God), and (3) has proven to be
extraordinarily fruitful over the last few centuries compared to more
inclusive methodologies (e.g., philosophy).
Methdological naturalism does limit science -- if you want the deeper
realities (if any, as I think there are), one need resort to philosophy and
religion -- but this limitation has been a tremendous pragmatic boon for
science.
Unlike some, I don't see MN as truly ESSENTIAL to science. It is POSSIBLE
that science could one day fruitfully reject it. But such a science would
need be empirically, demonstrably superior to its rivals, superior on
scientific grounds, not only philosophical or theological grounds. ID
theory isn't even close to this just yet. But if it does become so, then it
won't need to waste time arguing that opponents are blind and dogmatic,
because superior results, not superior rhetoric, will do the job.
(Some ID supporters don't seem to me to understand the difference between
science and philosophy, or between science and theology. In their view, if
it's true, or at least if it's rational, it must be covered by science.
After all -- isn't that what science is about? The Truth? This seems like
an obvious error to me -- it's just old-fashioned scientism, even if it's
being pushed by Christians with what they think is a great new scientific
theory. It's as though when scientism was associated with atheism,
scientism was bad; but now that they think science demonstrates a designer,
scientism is good, despite the same philosophical arguments holding against
it.)
And given MN, evolutionary theory has been extraordinarily effective
compared to rivals. It's utterly vague and error-prone compared to physics
or even genetics and general biology, but it's much more empirically and
predictively impressive than any rival to this point.
> Again, any TE who claimed there is no evidence of intelligent
> intervention, but plenty of evidence of the blind watchmaker
> could be properly
> called ID (if he/she adopts rung 5/6). But the TE who claims we cannot
> consider intelligent intervention and must only consider the
> blind watchmaker
> (or something like this) is smuggling in MN (which excludes ID given their
> theism) and should not be considered ID.
I'm not sure I follow what you're saying here. Why couldn't a scientist who
accepted MN be a firm proponent of ID as depicted in rungs 5 or 6?
Perhaps you're thinking of their views on the creation of natural laws
themselves: would science need to explore that using MN? Presumably so; but
I think many scientists are willing to say wrt the origin of the cosmos, or
the natural object that gave rise to the cosmos, science can either do
nothing or will simply speculate. Science doesn't really handle those
questions, many would argue. (This is different from saying "Science does
handle them, and scientifically proves a designer," which is what the ID
people often seem to say.)
(If IDers were simply saying that right now, abiogenesis isn't handled very
well by evolutionary theory, or that there are all sorts of assumptions made
by evolutionary theory, and so that the underlying truth may be different
from the story current science asserts if any of those assumptions are
rong -- in other words, if they were offering a powerful philosophical
critique -- they'd be in pretty good shape, I think. [Kevin would disagree
wrt abiogenesis, but a lot of scientists wouldn't have any problem with
these assertions at all.] But often, they'll make claims that they've
proven that evolution couldn't deal with something, etc., or that they've
proven the odds are vanishingly small. That's where they get into trouble,
I think, because their proofs are defective.)
> Thus, the issue seems to be one of evidence and detectability. Do
> TEs really claim there is *evidence* of design? For example, what is
> the nature of this evidence such that it allows us to infer a
> designer behind
> the origin of the universe, yet not behind the origin of life?
I think TEs will span the spectrum on this. Some will see indisputable
evidence for the design of the cosmos, others will see strong but disputable
evidence, others will recognize design but agree that it requires spiritual
guidance to discern it, and still others will presume design but believe
it's hidden. Some TEs will believe individual organisms are (in part or in
whole) designed by God, but that the design was wholly realized through
natural means, as a divine plan laid down in the forming of the cosmos.
Others will see the cosmos as designed, perhaps with an explicit goal of
creating life, but think after that God wasn't too concerned with
particulars.
Those who do see evidence for design of the universe but not for life (or at
least, no interventionist design) tend to argue that there are no known
mechanisms for producing universes, let alone well-tuned universes, whereas
there are known mechanisms for at least -possibly- producing life. (And
given MN, we ought to work along those lines unless some
counterargument/evidence demonstrates otherwise. ID folks sometimes claim
to have such a counterargument -- from irreducible complexity, e.g. -- but
so far as I can judge them, such arguments are only suggestive, with nothing
like the demonstrative force typically claimed for them.)
> Just some "low-quality" thoughts.
>
> Mike
Mike, your thoughts are not low quality at all. I've been pretty tough on
Steve, as have many others, but while I'll never convince him of this, it's
not because I think ID should be abandoned. Indeed, it's out of my respect
for ID and for some of its thought leaders, as well as a concern that
Christianity not be linked with appealing falsehoods, that I strongly
criticize what I see as persistently bad arguments for traditional ID theory
(rungs 7 and 8). (And remember the difference, as I do, between opposing
bad arguments for ID and opposing ID itself, except insofar as ID
incorporates those very arguments into its definition.) You won't see me
using this forcefulness of criticism on the rare occasions when Paul Nelson
or Bill Dembski contribute to this list, because their arguments tend to be
(in my experience) of much higher quality, being more careful with both
their reasoning and their conclusions. Their conclusions are often much
more tentative than the popularizers (sadly, sometimes even than their own
popularizations) would suggest.
Thanks for your thoughts, Mike. I value and respect them, and you.
John