This covers some issues not covered in "The Unbearable Heaviness of
Non-Naturalism"
Scientific proofs of basic theories (theories not merely derived from other
theories) are not validated in the same way that philosophical arguments are
validated. They are validated by reference to their implications, on the
*assumption* that if enough of a theory's implications are found to be
empirically true, there's a fairly good chance that the theory itself is
true. For example, millions of instances of the theory of gravitation's
implications have been observed. It is thought that, if it were not true (or
at least some theory *very much like it* in implications were not true),
then these empirical observational facts would not be true either, at least
not so consistently. The burden of proof for a *scientific* theory is (among
other things) to provide checkable empirical implications that would not be
implied by competing scientific theories. If it does a good job of providing
such implications, and if they are found to be true, and if we don't have
any other theories at hand, we go with that theory.
This does not mean that the theory *is* true, in any strict sense, but it
*does* mean that it is, in some sense *veridical* or "truth-like" in that it
has many of the same implications that the true theory would have, at least
within the domain in question.
At some point, we stop bothering to make this distinction, and simply take
the theory as actually true, at least approximately. For example, "the"
theory of gravitation is considered to be true, though in fact there are
different theories of gravitation, at least some of which cannot be strictly
true because they are incompatible with each other in some ways. What can we
rationally mean when we say that "the" theory of gravitation is true? We can
mean that there is an aspect of reality that we call gravitation that
accounts not only for the falling of apples on people's heads, but for the
way planets orbit each other or stars, the way stars orbit in galaxies, the
orbiting of satellites around the Earth, the arc of projectiles and thrown
baseballs, and the fact that, in a vacuum, objects dropped will accelerate
toward the Earth at the same rate (at least to an engineering level of
accuracy). We *don't* have to mean that either Newton's or Einstein's or
anyone else's *precise* theory of gravitation is true, except in specific
contexts.
But, when I say that non-naturalism has a special burden of proof, I mean
something different from this, because non-naturalism, as such, is a
*philosophical* proposition, and, as such, has a somewhat different set of
epistemological requirements. By definition, the only competing theory for
non-naturalism is naturalism. But, unlike two ordinary scientific theories,
they are unequal in a basic way. Naturalism proposes that there is a natural
world and does not propose *anything* beyond the natural world.
Non-naturalism, in nearly *any* version worth even talking about, *accepts*
that there is a "natural" world (the world we discover via our senses), but
then proposes that there is an entire *metaphysical* level of reality that
is in some sense distinct from the "natural" world, and decidedly *not*
merely *part* of what "naturally" exists in the "natural" world.
The special burden of proof for non-naturalism arises from its special
metaphysical claim. The non-natural world, almost by definition, does not
(and cannot) provide *direct* evidence of its existence, because we only
have our "natural" experiences to use as evidence (including mystical and
religious experiences, "miracles," faith-healing, "just knowing," life,
empirical observation, consciousness, etc., etc.). The problem is that, at
least in principle, there is *nothing* to exclude naturalistic explanations
for such naturalistic data. Thus, if you witness gold dust appearing on
someone while at church, it doesn't do to naively conclude that a miracle
has occurred because there is very likely *no* way at all to truly exclude
the possibility (or even *probability*) that it has a naturalistic cause. To
do so would require almost a kind of omniscience.
Yet, quite regularly, people who have such experiences claim that they are
"conclusive proof" of the existence of God or at least of the existence of
non-naturalistic phenomena.
This is a basic epistemological mistake, leading to the acceptance or
continued holding of non-naturalistic beliefs. Historically, it has led to
the holding of a great many beliefs that turned out to be false.
Put another way, there is no valid rule of inference that says that, from
any experience that is weirdly bizarre or "miraculous," it is valid to
conclude that some form of non-naturalism is true.
Or, put in more objective terms: It is not known to be true that any such
experience or empirical fact can only be caused by non-natural causes. In
fact, it is not known that there is *any* experience or empirical fact that
can only be caused by non-natural causes.
"But, what if there are no naturalistic explanations?"
First, if this means, "What if it is not even logically possible for it to
be naturalistic?" and if this is in fact determined to be *true*, then
non-naturalism, at long last, would become justifiable. I don't think this
has ever happened, though equivalent *claims* are frequently made. The best
that non-naturalism has been able to do is show what we already know: That
we don't (yet) have naturalistic explanations for everything.
Second, if this means, "What if we don't *have* naturalistic explanations?"
then I'd say, "Well, then, we don't have an explanation at all." Why?
Because, in this case, not having naturalistic explanations means: we are
*ignorant* of any such explanations. Since it is invalid to argue from mere
lack of knowledge to metaphysical conclusions, we cannot use the fact of our
own *lack* of knowledge as a reason to leap to non-naturalism.
Naturalism is, by far, the "smaller" of the two theories. It posits only our
natural world, nothing beyond it. Relative to it, non-naturalism will always
have the burden of proof.
Of course, this applies to *all* forms of true non-naturalism, including
Christian theism, and to all forms of non-naturalistic design theory
(whether for the universe as a whole, or merely for life).
Of course, none of this proves that naturalism, as an exclusive claim about
Existence, is true. But naturalism as such has no major burdens of proof
because it is a minimal metaphysics. The idea of proof with respect to
metaphysical claims already presupposes the existence of the "natural" world
(whether it *is* natural or not is a different question, of course).
--Chris C
Now is the time for all good people to come to.