Re: The unbearable heaviness of non-materialism

MikeBGene@aol.com
Sun, 5 Dec 1999 12:56:41 EST

>The Unbearable Heaviness of Non-Naturalism

(by Chris Cogan)

[snip]

>What non-naturalists forget or fail to learn is that it is not enough to
>invalidate a particular naturalistic theory. They must also prove that no
>true naturalist theory is even possible.

Huh? A non-naturalist must prove that *all* naturalistic
speculations are impossible? Even if naturalism was false,
I do not think this could be done. Humans simply have too
much imagination enabling naturalists to come up with all
sorts of speculations that are insulated by the fact that
proving the impossible usually cannot be done. Besides,
even if this was done, would they have to then prove it
would be impossilble for any naturalist in the future to
come up with an imaginary speculation about what is possible?

>If they don't do this, they have not proved non-naturalism, because
>the burden of proof of non-naturalism goes beyond that of naturalism.

I suppose this is important for those hung up with
quests for certainty. But if one has no need for certainty,
the inability of "prove" non-naturalism is meaningless.

>So, even without any current specific explanation for something,
>naturalism must still be assumed, unless one simply chooses to be
>arbitrary, to step outside the realm of rational argument.

Nah. This would only be true if one agreed that proving
all naturalistic speculations to be impossible was the
sign of the one and only rational approach.

>Only in the case were naturalism as such can be shown to
>be contradictory or to imply a contradiction does non-naturalism
>get support.

That's one way, although you have to wonder who gets to
decide if something has been "shown." Let me guess.
The naturalists who get to invent all sorts of possible
speculations that, of course, must be proven impossible?

>Is this asymmetry fair to non-naturalism? Shouldn't
>non-naturalism and naturalism both get the same treatment?
>They would get the same treatment were it not that non-naturalism
>accepts the existence of a natural world (which is were naturalism
>stops) and then asserts the existence of something beyond the
>natural world. Since naturalism does not do this, it has no
>burden of proof in this respect. Since non-naturalism does do
>this, it does have the burden of proof in this respect.

This assumes that non-naturalism = naturalism + something
else. This is one-dimensional thinking. Non-naturalism
may simply be a different perspective/interpretation of
the same thing such that both non-naturalism and naturalism
arrive at different brute assumptions about reality.

[snip]

>Non-naturalists cannot even usefully invert the metaphysical status of the
>real world. That is, it doesn't help to argue that only the non-natural
>world is really real and that the real world is really a kind of
>hallucination.

>Why? Because, like it or not, whether real or not, our world is our
>epistemologically real world, our epistemological base world, our
>perceptually axiomatic world, our cognitively objective world.

So? Ever see the movies "The Matrix" and "The Thirteenth Floor?"
Reality may not be what is seems. A reality that was indeed a
computer program would appear to you to be every bit as
real and objective, yet existence would not stop with it.

>Also, of course, this non-naturalist ploy is circular. It assumes the
>conclusion and then uses that assumption to attack the acceptance of the
>cognitively objective world.

No, a cognitively objective world can indeed exist. Reality just
doesn't have to stop there.

>The purely philosophical approach is essentially the same. Some fact or set
>of facts is alleged to be naturalistically impossible.

But you are the one demanding proofs of the impossible.

>This means that the only alternative is some form of non-naturalism.
>Sometimes, again, the appeal is directly to ignorance (or as nearly so as
the
>non-naturalist feels he can get away with)

And how do you know such appeals are really appeals to
ignorance? Because of your faith that someone will eventually
invent a possible explanation? To claim something is merely
ignorance is to assume, not know, there is a naturalistic answer.

>or to claimed contradictions that, upon examination,
>either dry up, or are seen to rest on unproven non-naturalist assumptions,
>or, in those rare occasions where the naturalistic theory really is flawed
>in some way, on the often-unspoken and unacknowledged premise that, if that
>one naturalistic theory is false, then, obviously, no naturalistic theory
>can possibly be true.

As long as naturalism is allowed to hide behind the skirts of
possible worlds, its intrinsic ability to keep moving the goal
posts will always protect it. Like all metaphysics, it is incapable
of being falsified.

>Sometimes, also, the alleged fact is simply not a fact at all, or is not
>known to be a fact. For example, not only is it circular to assume the
>non-natural status of the mind and then use it as evidence of
>non-naturalism, it is not known to be a fact that the mind is non-natural.

Naturalism does likewise. For example, every single naturalist
I have encountered *believes* abiogenesis happened. But it is
circular to assume abiogenesis happened and then use it as evidence
of naturalism, for it is not known to be a fact that abiogenesis
happened.

[snip]

>Since naturalism, as a metaphysical claim, is simply the assumption that the
>natural world is natural,

No, it's the assumption that all of reality is natural.

>it is not easy to attack it on its own terms. It
>is too simple, too elegant, and way too minimalist.

I don't think so. To me, naturalism quickly gets tied up
in cumbersome, ad hoc knots when we probe to quickly.
We live in a reality where matter and time came into being,
such that they exhibit properties apparently fine-tuned
for the existence of life as we know it. The simple,
elegant naturalistic reason for this boils down to
"dumb luck." Further "coincidences" are then invoked
to explain the origin of life on this planet. Somehow,
reason appears, such that it can plug into the physical
world and actually *understand* it. A moral and religious
sense also appears in this being, with all sorts of exotic
just-so stories to account for this. The dumb universe
begets a being that can not only *understand* the
unseen fabric of the universe, but also transcends
it with its ability to *freely* chose against the instincts
programmed into it by its history. I know of no
simple, elegant naturalistic account that isn't a just
so story.

I saw the movie "Glory" last night (again). In it, a great human
drama is told with all sorts of human issues like leadership,
growth, fellowship, right vs. wrong, honor, sacrifice, etc. The climax
of the movie is the final battle where all themes are tied
together against the backdrop of the crashing waves of
the ocean with seagulls screeching. What a contrast!
The human world is so vivid in ideals while the natural
world, with ocean and birds, is so indifferent to those
ideals (watch the movie and see what I see). Is it really simple
and elegant to write off those ideals as an aberration of
species-specific delusions? Could there be a larger discontinuity
between the subjective world of those soldiers and the objective
world of the beach? And you want to sell me the promise
of a simple, elegant naturalistic explanation that
bridges that discontinuity? Naturalism does not
bridge that discontinuity. It seeks only to erase it.
Nothing I have ever heard has ever suggested otherwise.
And that is the unbearable heaviness of naturalism.

Mike