>Part 3 of my reply to Tim:
Mike:
snipped...
>I can think of only three known classes of mechanisms
>that could be involved in the patterns we see behind life:
>
>1. Chance
>2. Non-intelligent causes
>3. Intelligent causes
This is Demsbki-esque. But #2 and #3 are mutually exclusive
(for any one cause), so this leaves "chance" kinda just hanging
out there.
[...big snip...]
Tim:
>>It's not sufficient for a good model to merely match the output of
>>another, or to rely on negative evidence; it must hope to provide
>>a differentiatible example or one that positively explains why one
>>possible result is favored over another that a competing theory
>>cannot provide.
Mike:
>So what has science shown that a design explanation cannot
>provide?
Tim:
>>I'd rephrase it: "What _can't_ a design explanation _not_ provide?"
>
>In my opinion, any serious design explanation must extrapolate
>smoothly from what we know about intelligent design. This
>means that things that don't make sense from a perspective
>of rational planning and implementation are not something
>that I would expect from ID and thus ID would effectively
>fail to provide an explanation at this point.
You may note that the Clovis sites thought to be early evidence
of humans in the Americas were not investigated from a perspective
of rational planning or implementation, but by the relative
location of various artifacts (e.g. close positional relationship
of charcoal, flint points, and animal remains). If we find a
primitive flint point, how do we determine whether its origin
is natural or manmade? First, we see if it is tied to a period
and/or location where we know humans were. If that fails, we
can examine whether there are many other objects like the point
nearby (a statistical probability argument - we do know that
natural causes can sometimes produce objects which can be
confused with primitive stone tools). We would also
look for other signs of human occupation (charcoal from fires,
stones from cooking rings, cut markings on nearby bones, & etc.)
Lacking corraborating evidence, we'd have to admit that there
is little to support an ID hypothesis for that particular stone
point.
Purpose and intent can be assessed after the identification of
an agent.
Tim:
>>Let's take the following statement:
>>"The world was made last Tuesday with the perfect appearance
>>of age by Invisible Pink Unicorns."
>>This is a perfectly valid "design" explanation that is completely
>>at odds with but yet is indistinguishable from a "natural"
>>explanation of great age. However, were we to see other
>>evidence that a cosmic Loki-designer is indeed at work
>>(ie. find alternate, orthogonal support for the young-
>>universe idea), we might be able to distinguish between the
>>alternatives.
Mike:
>It would seem to me that an ID proponent is constrained
>to working closely with the analogy of human design (the
>only truly known example of intelligence capable of
>sophisticated engineering). Such constraints entail
>a clear link between design and rationality, meaning
>that any attempts to attribute tricks, artistic license,
>sense of humor, etc., to the designer are out of
>bounds. ID does not reduce to an IPU as long as
>these constraints are adhered to.
An unconfirmed auxilliary hypothesis and counter to
known human examples. There are many objects created
by humans for which we can no longer fathom the purpose.
Humans also have humor and employ pranks. There is
no pre-requisite that says a designer must be understandable
to be detected.
>I should also point out that modern science is premised
>on the faith assumption that empirical reality is rational.
>This faith, in turn, was derived mainly from the Judeo-Christian
>world view (explaining why so many founders of modern
>science adopted this world view; their science being ways
>to "think God's thoughts after Him.") In my opinion,
>ID works only if it continues in these steps. After all,
>it is my impression that you are a Christian theist (correct
>me if I am wrong). If so, as Christian theists, we have
>a very rich tradition of theology that rules out the notion
>that the Creator is a trickster and deceiver. And if one
>is to equate the designer with a supernatural designer, then
>as far as IPUs are concerned, it makes no sense whatsoever
>to ignore this theology.
I am not Christian. I am a scientist and my working assumption
is that empirical reality is rational. However, I make no state-
ments about the possible intentions of a supernatural designer
and I would not claim that such an intelligence would have
fathomable objectives or motives. One objection I have which
I've discussed with Paul Nelson is the problem that many in
the ID movement (certainly most of the leaders) are Christian
and this has limited their views of ID to how their Creator may
behave, as opposed to how *a* creator may behave. Paul has admitted
this presupposition does limit some of their expectations.
Besides, the question is not whether a designer is a
trickster or not, but whether a designer could be detected.
This is a question of distinguishablity and my one
central query for you.
[...]
Tim:
>>I disagree; identifying corraborating evidence from completely
>>different fields of inquiry can provide *powerful* support for
>>a theory.
Mike:
>Like I said, I do not think finding black obelisks constitute
>merely corroborating evidence and powerful support. That
>would be data that goes far beyond this level of knowledge
>and take us close to the realm of certainty. But I don't
>think we need to jump from "no evidence" to "certainty"
>to think about ID.
I have given other examples which may support ID in ancient
history but which would be far from certain. Find other
evidence of an ID creator in the distance past and you've
got a lot more to go on. I also cited other examples which
do not rely on direct evidence of the existence of a designer.
Merely finding a possible agent does not mean that the agent
did anything. But it does provide evidence of a possible
mechanism (the agent) at the right place and time.
[...]
>>I think it's a wonderful way of approaching the question. I
>>agree I'm being more hard-nosed on this subject. That's because
>>I am a discussing this from the standpoint of doing science
>>(methodological naturalism). I'm also asking: "What does
>>proposing intelligent intervention get you, scientifically?"
Mike:
>That depends on the subject being discussed. See my
>message concerning proof-reading and specificity.
>I wrote:
>
>" The moral to the story seems to be that the very core biotic processes
>that make life as it is intimating involve sophisticated, efficient,
>and elaborate proof-reading mechanisms. This clearly supports that
>the notion that cellular life depends not only on these very basic
>processes, but also on ensuring the processes exceed a certain
>specificity-threshold. Clearly, an ID scientist might want to
>employ various experiments to identify and quantify this specificity
>threshold. "
>
>Thus, as one example, what we can get scientifically from ID
>is a fresh perspective and impetus for exploring the extent to
>which proof-reading is intrinsic and necessary in this thing
>we call life.
I saw that post.
Currently, we are limited to studying life as it currently
exists. So if we were to measure some minimum "complexity
parameter" required for any particular know form of life,
you'd only have a static measurement for a particular form
of life. If a bacterium's complexity measurement comes out to
"5" and a single celled eukaryote at "8", that doesn't tell us
whether a bacterium could evolve into a eukaryote. These
measures may tell you very little about the possibility of
transitional intermediates, which is a separate (but related)
question. This question has been addressed previously by
Hubert Yockey (directly, and through reports from Brian
Harper). Yockey's conclusion: Not knowing how the transition
from non-life to life may have occurred tells you nothing
either way. It only says that you don't know -- We cannot
exhaust all the "possibility space".
Mike:
>Or consider the backward wiring of the vertebrate eye. The non-ID
>approach sees nothing anomolous about this and simply accepts
>this odd "design" as the results of natural selection jury-rigging things
>together. Thus, there is no need to probe further. But an ID approach
>(that proposes the eye was designed) might look for a rationale behind
>this wiring that exposes a previously undetected level of sophistication
>and elegance.
And, very likely, indistinguishable from a natural explanation.
Why should we thinkg that evolved, jury-rigged systems would
not display some level of sophistication or elegance?
Tim:
>>If you can find Sober's work on the subject (Philosophy of
>>Biology), you might see where I'm coming from.
Mike:
>I have too much on my plate of things to do, so perhaps
>you can provide a synopsis of these views so that I
>might better understand where you are coming from.
Cheat: Go to a local Borders or something and browse the
second chapter. It's short but direct.
Basically: Lacking direct evidence of a designer, creation
theorists can only test their ideas (and make them
distinguishable from natural mechanisms) by making additional
assumptions about how a designer may behave (Sober calls
these: "auxilliary assumptions"). These auxilliary assumptions
are hard to defend for an agent with intelligence and so far
no one has succeeded in generating a coherent, testable package.
Sober doesn't rule out the possibility that someone will
be successful in the future but notes that the track record
of creationist theories are poor.
[...]
Tim:
>>I think that myoglobin was the product of evolution, but
>>I do not know the origin of its ultimate globin precursor.
>>I _propose_ natural mechanisms because:
>>1) I haven't seen any other "interventionist intelligence" at work.
Mike:
>That's reasonable, but should we expect to see "interventionist
>intelligence" at work today if it was at work long ago? Unless
>we can answer this with a clear "yes," such a failure to see is
>not very meaningful beyond the conclusion that an
>"interventionist intelligence" is not at work today.
No, I think it tells you something about the operating
procedures of a creator. But let me ask you something;
why shouldn't we expect to see evidence of an interventionist
designer in the recent past? This is the religious bias which
I discussed previously with Paul. I agree that we can
reach no conclusion about design if we didn't see it in the
recent past. But we shouldn't we look to the recent past?
That's where the "tracks" are likely to be freshest.
>It's important to remember that ID is not like a law of
>nature, as ID would be much more like a singularity than
>a regularity (unless one posits a puppet-master-designer).
Well, you've brought up the intial creation of life,
the globin gene family, the emergence of eukaryotes and
the wiring of the invertebrate eye as possible examples
of ID. That's 3-4 events right there, spread out over a few
billion years. And if we're going to postulate ID involvement
in vertebrate eyes, there must be many, many examples of
involvement in other events for other organisms.
>Thus, we'll need a forensic approach (where we don't
>excuse Jones of murder last year because no one has seen
>him murder over the last month).
But we do excuse Jones if there is no sign that he ever
was there a year ago, or in fact, whether a murder was
actually committed.
I understand that we need a forensic approach to studying
life's history. A one-time event in the deep past is
something we may never understand. Multiple events suggest
an MO.
Tim:
>>2) I haven't seen any auxilliary evidence of a past interventionist
>>intelligence.
Mike:
>What data would you consider to be "auxilliary evidence of a past
>interventionist intelligence?"
I've answered this in previous letters. The "pi" example is
pretty good too.
>>3) Consequentially, I have no idea how to frame an inverventionst
>>explanation that is anything but a just-so story.
>Yes, but like you say‰¥Ï
Tim:
>>I recognize that hypotheses about natural mechanisms may be
>>just-so stories as well,
>
>It's not maybe, it's usually are.
>>but I would argue that past experience
>>suggests that many naturalistic just-so stories have the potential
>>for being validated in the future, and also provide a decent direction
>>for further work.
>
>I see no reason to think this would not apply to ID.
What? Past experience with ID in life or geological history
has had a string of successes? We know that at a bare
minimum, some of the natural mechanisms at work today and
it is not a stretch to suppose that similar mechanisms
existed in the past. In contrast, there is no track record
of intelligent intervention on earth prior to humans.
>ID could very well be used to construct a just-so story that gets
>validated in the sense where its auxilliary hypotheses (that are
>contrary to non-ID hypotheses) receive support and provide
>further direction for further work.
Excellent. Let us know when it's successful.
Tim:
>>Let's take "car-key gnomes" as another example of the problem. I
>>propose that car-key gnomes steal the keys from our pockets and hide
>>them somewhere in our houses. Now, I don't know what sort of powers
>>or methods of cloaking they possess, but I really think car-key gnomes
>>exist. What allows you to believe that they don't exist or, if we can't
>>confirm their existence today, that they didn't exist in the past?
>>What's the basis for the decision? Something to do with a razor or
>>something?
Mike:
>Again, I see no necessity in equating the designer in ID with
>IPUs, gremlins, gnomes, or whatever. The only necessity is
>in equating it with a human-like intelligence.
I don't equate a possible designer with other invisible
entities. I ask how to distinguish or prefer one invisible
entity from another, and more importantly, how to distinguish
it it from possible natural explanations. BTW - "Human-like"
intelligence is not a pre-requisite for detection.
Mike:
>In the end, I suspect it all boils down to a judgment call, as
>this may be one place in epistemology where our inability to arrive
>at certainty is not helped much by science. Thus, at the
>most we might have two parallel explanations and our
>perception of their relative merits might be a function of
>other background beliefs.
Tim:
>>Until more work is done and an answer becomes possible, then I agree
>>it is a philosophical choice. However, as a research program I don't
>>see ID as viable alternative at this time.
Mike:
>But how meaningful is your judgment? I'm not trying to be
>rude, but exactly how much effort, thought, and creativity
>have you invested in actually trying to use ID to guide a research
>program? Having a passing interest, or reading up on what
>others propose, is not a substitute for actually trying to apply a
>concept.
Actually, I've put a lot of throught into what Behe and others
have written. Check some of my old posts. I do not see how what
they have proposed can be translated into a viable research
program. They sure as heck don't and they're very committed
to the idea. And all this is definitely not a "new" area of
study -- Theologians ruled the intellectual world long before
sectarian thought emerged.
>If, on the other hand, you have invested some significant
>effort in trying to employ ID, only to conclude the project
>was doomed, I would be greatly interested in the results
>of these efforts prior to the point of abandonment.
Right, as if I'm going to look at ID as a means of understanding
the mechanisms behind how bacteria sense and respond to nitrogen
metabolism...
Better to employ ID as a means of detecting when the first humans
colonized the Americas.
I haven't concluded that the project is doomed, although I'm
willing to bet it won't fly.
Tell you what, try some research yourself and get back to us.
Or, if not, sit around and see how far Behe et al. get.
Regards,
Tim Ikeda
tikeda@sprintmail.hormel.com (despam address before use)