Me
>I'm starting to get the feeling that a double standard is
>in play here. You get to infer evolution behind myoglobin
>because you find evidence you would expect if evolution
>is true, you have a mechanism to extrapolate, and you
>think the case for design is no good. You don't have
>to come up with data that only evolution can explain.
Tim:
>What other natural mechanisms do you think explain the
>patterns of life observed? If we're going to invoke
>"supernatural" mechanisms or "intervention", then all
>bets are off; in that case there is *no* data that only
>evolution can explain. (see my description of IPUs below...)
I can think of only three known classes of mechanisms
that could be involved in the patterns we see behind life:
1. Chance
2. Non-intelligent causes
3. Intelligent causes
Clearly, we can extrapolate what we know about
intelligent causation to determine if it is effective
in an explanatory sense. Whether or not the intelligence
is supernatural does not matter to me (see below).
Me:
>Yet the only thing you will consider as a positive model
>for design is the identification of things that only design
>can explain. The way I see it, to be balanced, design theorists
>should be allowed to adopt your "less-than-certain" approach
>or you should start by finding things only evolution can
>explain (to rule out the possibility that design "might"
>be behind it).
Glenn:
>ID'ers are certainly welcome to adopt my "less-than-certain"
>approach. But they'd better be pretty honest about the shortcomings
>and current lack of a theory that pulls anything together.
I agree.
>And they had better find some way of distiguishing between natural
>mechanisms and supernatural ones, because ultimately, that's the
>only way that progress will be made. Paul Nelson, for one, openly
>admits this necessity.
Again, I agree, buy only as long as you are not expecting
the silver bullet test. Instead, one can adopt criteria
in a provisional sense to see if a theory emerges that
begins to pull things together. What you then would
have are two competing, yet mostly parallel, explanations.
This is why I think it is in the vested interest of many
anti-ID people to demand the silver bullet test that
unequivocally makes the distinction. As long as they
keep the debate in this realm, they don't have to worry
about the emergence of a competing theory.
Tim:
>>It's not sufficient for a good model to merely match the output of
>>another, or to rely on negative evidence; it must hope to provide
>>a differentiatible example or one that positively explains why one
>>possible result is favored over another that a competing theory
>>cannot provide.
Mike:
>So what has science shown that a design explanation cannot
>provide?
Tim:
>I'd rephrase it: "What _can't_ a design explanation _not_ provide?"
In my opinion, any serious design explanation must extrapolate
smoothly from what we know about intelligent design. This
means that things that don't make sense from a perspective
of rational planning and implementation are not something
that I would expect from ID and thus ID would effectively
fail to provide an explanation at this point.
Tim:
>Let's take the following statement:
>"The world was made last Tuesday with the perfect appearance
>of age by Invisible Pink Unicorns."
>This is a perfectly valid "design" explanation that is completely
>at odds with but yet is indistinguishable from a "natural"
>explanation of great age. However, were we to see other
>evidence that a cosmic Loki-designer is indeed at work
>(ie. find alternate, orthogonal support for the young-
>universe idea), we might be able to distinguish between the
>alternatives.
It would seem to me that an ID proponent is constrained
to working closely with the analogy of human design (the
only truly known example of intelligence capable of
sophisticated engineering). Such constraints entail
a clear link between design and rationality, meaning
that any attempts to attribute tricks, artistic license,
sense of humor, etc., to the designer are out of
bounds. ID does not reduce to an IPU as long as
these constraints are adhered to.
I should also point out that modern science is premised
on the faith assumption that empirical reality is rational.
This faith, in turn, was derived mainly from the Judeo-Christian
world view (explaining why so many founders of modern
science adopted this world view; their science being ways
to "think God's thoughts after Him.") In my opinion,
ID works only if it continues in these steps. After all,
it is my impression that you are a Christian theist (correct
me if I am wrong). If so, as Christian theists, we have
a very rich tradition of theology that rules out the notion
that the Creator is a trickster and deceiver. And if one
is to equate the designer with a supernatural designer, then
as far as IPUs are concerned, it makes no sense whatsoever
to ignore this theology.
Tim:
>>Sure, a designer can make something very complex
>>biologically. However, there is a competing explanation which
>>suggests that there can be "non-intelligent" routes to
>>biological complexity.
Mike:
>So? I think we are not communicating because you are still
>looking for proofs of design (things that cannot possibly be
>explained by non-intelligent routes). I just think that's
>not a very helpful way of approaching this topic.
Tim:
>I disagree; identifying corraborating evidence from completely
>different fields of inquiry can provide *powerful* support for
>a theory.
Like I said, I do not think finding black obelisks constitute
merely corroborating evidence and powerful support. That
would be data that goes far beyond this level of knowledge
and take us close to the realm of certainty. But I don't
think we need to jump from "no evidence" to "certainty"
to think about ID.
Tim:
>For example, let's propose that Noah's Ark really
>existed and that a flood really covered all the land masses on
>earth. We could look for support from geological evidence (many
>possible lines of research here), biological evidence (species
>distribution, genetic analyses of populations, fossil records),
>and human records.
I agree. If we postulate such a specific event as a recent,
global-wide flood, it leads to specific expectations about
the physical world. But in what way does postulating
intelligent design lead to the specific expectation of
black obelisks being deposited on the earth? The
only thing that ID leads me to expect are things best
explained as a trace of intelligent intervention, such
as the existence of CSI that doesn't seem to fit into
the surrounding environment. And I think such
traces could very well exist, life itself being one of them.
>I think it's a wonderful way of approaching the question. I
>agree I'm being more hard-nosed on this subject. That's because
>I am a discussing this from the standpoint of doing science
>(methodological naturalism). I'm also asking: "What does
>proposing intelligent intervention get you, scientifically?"
That depends on the subject being discussed. See my
message concerning proof-reading and specificity.
I wrote:
" The moral to the story seems to be that the very core biotic processes
that make life as it is intimating involve sophisticated, efficient,
and elaborate proof-reading mechanisms. This clearly supports that
the notion that cellular life depends not only on these very basic
processes, but also on ensuring the processes exceed a certain
specificity-threshold. Clearly, an ID scientist might want to
employ various experiments to identify and quantify this specificity
threshold. "
Thus, as one example, what we can get scientifically from ID
is a fresh perspective and impetus for exploring the extent to which
proof-reading is intrinsic and necessary in this thing
we call life.
Or consider the backward wiring of the vertebrate eye. The non-ID
approach sees nothing anomolous about this and simply accepts
this odd "design" as the results of natural selection jury-rigging things
together. Thus, there is no need to probe further. But an ID approach
(that proposes the eye was designed) might look for a rationale behind
this wiring that exposes a previously undetected level of sophistication
and elegance.
Tim:
>If you can find Sober's work on the subject (Philosophy of
>Biology), you might see where I'm coming from.
I have too much on my plate of things to do, so perhaps
you can provide a synopsis of these views so that I
might better understand where you are coming from.
Tim:
>>So how do I choose between possible explanations?
Mike:
>But you apparently have. You do think that myoglobin
>is the product of evolution, do you not? What was
>the basis for your choice?
Tim:
>I think that myoglobin was the product of evolution, but
>I do not know the origin of its ultimate globin precursor.
>I _propose_ natural mechanisms because:
>1) I haven't seen any other "interventionist intelligence" at work.
That's reasonable, but should we expect to see "interventionist
intelligence" at work today if it was at work long ago? Unless
we can answer this with a clear "yes," such a failure to see is
not very meaningful beyond the conclusion that an
"interventionist intelligence" is not at work today. It's
important to remember that ID is not like a law of nature,
as ID would be much more like a singularity than a
regularity (unless one posits a puppet-master-designer).
Thus, we'll need a forensic approach (where we don't
excuse Jones of murder last year because no one has seen
him murder over the last month).
>2) I haven't seen any auxilliary evidence of a past interventionist
>intelligence.
What data would you consider to be "auxilliary evidence of a past
interventionist intelligence?"
>3) Consequentially, I have no idea how to frame an inverventionst
>explanation that is anything but a just-so story.
Yes, but like you say‰¥Ï
>I recognize that hypotheses about natural mechanisms may be
>just-so stories as well,
It's not maybe, it's usually are.
>but I would argue that past experience
>suggests that many naturalistic just-so stories have the potential
>for being validated in the future, and also provide a decent direction
>for further work.
I see no reason to think this would not apply to ID. ID could
very well be used to construct a just-so story that gets validated
in the sense where its auxilliary hypotheses (that are contrary
to non-ID hypotheses) receive support and provide further
direction for further work.
>Let's take "car-key gnomes" as another example of the problem. I
>propose that car-key gnomes steal the keys from our pockets and hide
>them somewhere in our houses. Now, I don't know what sort of powers
>or methods of cloaking they possess, but I really think car-key gnomes
>exist. What allows you to believe that they don't exist or, if we can't
>confirm their existence today, that they didn't exist in the past?
>What's the basis for the decision? Something to do with a razor or
>something?
Again, I see no necessity in equating the designer in ID with
IPUs, gremlins, gnomes, or whatever. The only necessity is
in equating it with a human-like intelligence.
Mike:
>In the end, I suspect it all boils down to a judgment call, as
>this may be one place in epistemology where our inability to arrive
>at certainty is not helped much by science. Thus, at the
>most we might have two parallel explanations and our
>perception of their relative merits might be a function of
>other background beliefs.
Tim:
>Until more work is done and an answer becomes possible, then I agree
>it is a philosophical choice. However, as a research program I don't
>see ID as viable alternative at this time.
But how meaningful is your judgment? I'm not trying to be
rude, but exactly how much effort, thought, and creativity
have you invested in actually trying to use ID to guide a research
program? Having a passing interest, or reading up on what
others propose, is not a substitute for actually trying to apply a
concept
.
If, on the other hand, you have invested some significant
effort in trying to employ ID, only to conclude the project
was doomed, I would be greatly interested in the results
of these efforts prior to the point of abandonment.
Mike