Kevin:
>The point is that psychologists have shown that, all else being equal, a
traumatic >childhood does have a tendency to produce "damaged" adults. The
connection is >not absolute, but it does exist.
Bertvan:
If the connection is not absolute, the factors which prevent it from being
absolute are unknown, right? We can not say whether or not they are
material, measurable, consistent, the result of individual will, god --or
anything else, can we?
Kevin:
>It would be impossible to eliminate all alternative possibilities, so
scientists >concentrate on evidence and probabilities. For example, one
cannot absolutely >rule out the possibility that the sun will rise out of the
west tomorrow morning, >but all the evidence we have tells us that such an
event is highly improbable. So, >is there evidence of spontaneity in the
actions of bacteria and protists? So far, >the answer to that question is
no. As such, how probable is it that an anomalous >experimental result is
due to spontaneity and not some kind of error? For the >time being, that
probability is considered to be insignificant.
Bertvan:
First, the sun rising in the east and the actions of bacteria and protists
don't seem similar to me. The sun has never been observed to behave
differently. The behavior of bacteria and protists is always probabilistic.
One might say the result of an anomalous experiment is due to spontaneity or
error, depending upon one's philosophy. Whether or not it was considered
insignificant might also depend upon the individual scientist's point of
view, wouldn't it?
Kevin:
>...philosophical naturalism assumes that all events are physical events;
that is, >there are no non-physical events. Methodological
materialism/naturalism simply >acknowledges that physical events are all that
science can investigate, and that >"direct, material, measurable, predictable
causes" are the only way science can >explain physical events.
Bertvan:
Would that mean that science should not try to investigate such phenomena as
"mind" unless it can be reduced to a "direct, material, measurable" physical
substance? In medicine, science recognizes the "placebo effect" in spite of
lack of understanding the mechanism by which "mind" produces changes in the
body.
Kevin:
> Even miracles have causes; even free will is a cause. The question is,
what kind >of cause is the most probable? If a rubber ball sitting on a
table suddenly jumped >straight up in the air, what would you say is the most
probable cause? Some >hidden mechanism? The atoms in the tabletop hitting
the ball simultaneously with >enough force to move it? God mischievously
gave it a nudge? The ball just >suddenly decided on the spur of the moment
to start bouncing? Most people >would assume that even possibilities two and
three were much more probable >than possibility four.
>Science simply chooses to restrict itself to one narrow set of causes; in
doing so, >it is not saying that those are the only possible causes, only
that from the >evidence they are the most probable.
Bertvan:
I don't disagree with all that. But if all science can say is that young
earth creationists are probably wrong, what business does the supreme court
have declaring it can't be discussed in front of school children. :-)
I'm unclear whether you believe in free will. If so, whether you believe it
exists in only humans?--primates?--mammals? Or where you would draw the
line. (I've read of a recent experiment suggesting plants "choose" which
sperm they accept for fertilization.)
Kevin:
>Philosophical naturalism says that all events are physical events and that
all >physical events must have mechanistic causes. What I said was
**specific** >physical events. I did not say that the only events were
physical events, nor did I >say all physical events. By using the term
specific I was referring to the select >group of events that science has
chosen to investigate, and I did not imply that >these were the only events
that existed.
>...one cannot test -- let alone prove -- a hypothesis that does not assume a
>specific, measurable, physical cause. It is difficult enough to demonstrate
what >motivates people; how in Hades can you demonstrate a paramecium turned
left >because it wanted to?
Bertvan:
Precisely. However, most people are under the impression science has ruled
out everything but measurable, physical causes.
Kevin:
>However, there are scientists who are not satisfied and are looking for
other >explanations, but they are still looking for natural, mechanistic
explanations rather >than metaphysical explanations.
Bertvan:
Those scientists who are philosophical materialists will limit the areas
where they look for explanations. That's fine, so long as they don't try to
limit where scientists with other philosophical view points look.
Bertvan