Thanks for a very thought-provoking, relevant, and insightful post. I've
been pretty much a lurker the last few months, continually being too busy
with business matters to give these ideas the attention they deserve (and
feeling myself becoming intellectually rusty in the process). But I thought
I'd give my -very- quick thoughts for what they're worth.
> 1. Does the "sovereignty" of God necessarily entail the idea that God
> "controls all things" (events, processes, etc.)? How does one move from
> "sovereignty" to the concept of "control"?
No -- there is no entailment there, unless one views any degree whatever of
creaturely free will (i.e., our choices being more than a mix of random
[though they might appear that way to physics, conceivably] and
pre-determined factors, both being beyond our control) as logically
impossible. (Which presumably it isn't, since even on the typical hard core
theological views, God has such freedom, so the concept itself isn't
incoherent, on a Xian view.)
I would further argue, if I had time :^>, that there is not only no
entailment, but not even a contingent implication. I.e., God does -not-
control all things IN THE SENSE OF pre-determining all of them such that we
(or other moral agents) could not ever do otherwise. He could have -- He is
sovereign, after all -- but apparently He didn't.
>
> 2. Would this concept of divine "control" (or governance?) mean that God
> directly causes each "event" to happen?
>
> 3. In the extreme, then, would God's sovereignty lead inevitably to a
> concept of divine "micromanagement" of all of the affairs of the Creation?
>
I don't know, but that's not as -direct- a concern of mine since I do not
have the micromanagement view of God's sovereignty.
> 4. If God micromanages all events and processes in the Creation, then are
> there no authentic contingencies?
>
Even on the micromanagement view, presumably there are contingencies in a
non-creaturely sense, i.e., God could have chosen for the creatures to do
otherwise. But the creature's have no degree of autonomy, on this view.
To reconcile a bit this phrasing with what Terry said: Creatures are
utterly contingent in the sense that they needn't even exist, and absolutely
everything about them is beyond their control. But the absolute source and
controller-without-remainder of all the contingency is God, on this view.
> 5. If God micromanages all events and processes in the Creation, then do
> creatures ever do anything themselves?
>
In a secondary sense, the same way that, say, a hammer pounds a nail: it
doesn't do it on its own, but in a real sense it still does it.
> 6. If God does all and creatures do nothing, what happens to the ideas of
> authentic creaturely being, or of creaturely responsibility? Would not God
> now be responsible for all that happens (since he is said to "control" all
> things)?
>
So it would seem. Even if people, say, are responsible in a causal sense
(cf. the hammer analogy), God would also seem causally responsible, and
the -only- one -morally- responsible, on this view, in that he is the only
one who can make choices one way or the other.
>
> I do not raise these questions to "pick a bone" with anyone. I raise them
> because I believe that they are extremely important questions and deserve
> to be treated with great care and precision. If we choose to continue this
> discussion, we will have to pay great attention to our vocabulary, lest we
> misunderstand one another or overlook important theological concerns.
>
> Howard Van Till
>
I couldn't agree more, Howard. For a non-philosopher, you're doing alright.
;^>
BTW, these are some of the issues I wanted to bring up in response to your
much earlier excellent post on optimal giftedness.
(Others superficially: why would God use such a seemingly coarse and harsh
means to His ends, or any flawed means at all, or any seriously flawed means
where the flaws are not due to the creature's free choices? To put it
another way: why not just create the desired end state directly and avoid
the myriad evils of the means, particularly when the evil in the means,
being natural rather than moral evil [prime facie, anyway], is completely
avoidable [being without remainder entirely up to God] and wholly causally
unnecessary for the final good [which God could simply will into being
immediately]? Or is the means, -including natural evil-, somehow an end in
itself? What role does non-human or human evil play in evolutionary
history? E.g., did Satan have an impact? What is the moral status of
animal pain, suffering, and choices [if that's the right word]? Was there
ever something akin to an Eden like state for mankind, animalkind, or the
universe in history? Obviously, all these questions require more work.
Some day....)
Thanks again for the thoughtful note, Howard.
--John