"Not necessarily. Philosophy may deal with physical reality. It simply is
not necessarily *limited* to it. Some philosophers -- metaphysical
naturalists -- actually deal exclusively with physical reality, and their
practices are very close to science. W.V.O. Quine, for example. And then
there's the fact that there is philosophy *of science*. Philosophy is not
to be seen as a type of inquiry which simply picks up where science leaves
off; it is the most general kind of inquiry, and in fact *encapsulates*
science."
I do not disagree with these general statements. I studied the philosophy
of science in undergraduate school and took courses on logic and
introduction to philosophy, plus I have continued to read selected works
since then, so I understand certain basic concepts. Your level of knowledge
already exceeds mine, but I think you will find that some things you believe
now will be contradicted by your professors as you start the program.
One thing I will admit, however, is that I overstated my case. The
metaphysical works I have read suggest that there is Reality, which can then
be divided into Physical and Non-physical reality. Physical reality in turn
can be divided into Objective and Subjective physical reality (all these
terms are my own). Objective physical reality (OPR) is that which we can
interact with; finally there is scientific OPR, which we can observe and
study because it is predictable and reproducible. This leads to what I
believe is one of the best definitions of science I have ever read: science
is the human attempt to understand the predictable, reproducible aspects of
nature, with nature defined as that part of the physical universe with which
we can interact.
In any event, I should have said "scientific reality" whenever I said
"physical reality". Of course philosophy can deal with physical reality,
even OPR, but most philosophers I have read or spoken with agree that
philosophy should not try to deal with scientific reality, because it
invariably makes arguments that turn out to be grossly wrong when science is
finally able to test them. The concepts of geocentrism, impetus,
phlogiston, spontaneous generation and vitalism (the biological version)
were based almost entirely on arguments that were founded on the
philosophical view of rationalism, which believes that the exercise of
reason, rather than empiricism, provides the only valid basis for and source
of knowledge. Yet every one of these concepts has been proven wrong by
people like Galileo, Kepler, Priestly, Pasteur and Wohler (to name a few),
who used the philosophical view of empiricism to demonstrate, by observation
and experimentation, that when these concepts were tested against scientific
reality they were not real, despite all the rational arguments that said
they were.
Which is not to say that empiricism alone is sufficient to do science. The
main reason why scientists like Cuvier, Sedgwick and Agassiz could not
accept uniformitarianism was that, as strict literal empiricists, did not
try to interpret the rock record but read it directly. Uniformitarianists
used reason and inference based on empiricism to fill in the gaps in the
rock record, and this basic method is still used in much of science today.
Both rationality and empiricism are philosophical disciplines being used by
science as tools to try to understand scientific reality, so in that sense
philosophy can be used to study scientific reality. Where this differs from
people like Hegel, however, or concepts like the ones mentioned above, is
what you observed yourself: the scientific method. These philosophical
disciplines, when used properly to collect and interpret data, create
theories that are based on physical evidence and which can be tested against
scientific reality, rather than concepts based on no physical evidence and
thus have no existence as scientific phenomena.
"What? Premise (1) is true if and only if all elephants are pink. If there
are no pink elephants, them premise (1) is untrue. This is no different for
the philosopher than it is for the scientist."
When I said a philosopher would believe it, I meant that he would believe
the argument, not the existence of pink elephants. That's why I said
philosophers are willing to entertain the possibility of things that are not
real. A scientist on the other can only entertain the possibility of things
that ARE real.
My college logic professor used this very syllogism to hammer home this very
point: that what makes a valid logical argument is not whether it is
factually true, but whether it obeys the rules of logic. I had a discussion
with him after class about how this differs from science and he used the
very same story I told you. And like you I asked him if a philosopher would
believe in pink elephants if he had a valid argument establishing their
existence. He said no, of course not, then added that the difference
between science and philosophy (in general) is that philosophy routinely
deals with concepts most people, including philosophers, know or strongly
suspect do not exist, but which cannot be shown to not exist by empirical
observation. As such, they cannot rely on the factual truth of an argument
for its validity because they could never test it. Scientists, however, can
only work with what can be shown to be factually true, so for them the
question of the logical validity of an argument is immaterial.
"As would a philosopher. This is what it means to 'defend a premise'."
Not according to my logic professor, or my logic course textbook. This was
in fact one of the hardest things I had to accept about logic, that despite
the example of Star Trek's Mr. Spock, logic was not concerned with factual
truth, just structural validity (for lack of a better term). To defend a
premise is to create a valid logical argument that concludes that the
premise in question is true, not by collecting empirical data showing that
it is true. One early assignment was to defend the premise that the world
was round (I forget what the argument was that started with that premise).
I came up with what I thought was a brilliant defense base on Eratosthenes'
calculations; I got 1 (out of 10) points for originality, but otherwise
failed the assignment.
"It's worthwhile to remember that philosophers concern themselves with two
matters when examining arguments:
"1) Logical form. Is the argument deductively valid, or inductively cogent?
Do its premises and conclusion relate to each other in the proper way?
"2) Rationality. Are the premises themselves true, or likely to be true?
Ought we to believe them?"
That was the other difficult thing that I had to accept, that logical truth
was different from factual truth. I'm still not sure I completely
understand it, but the idea is that logical truth is based on what is
logically possible, not empirical fact. Truth and falsity are properties of
the statements and propositions. A valid argument is one where the
conclusion would be true if the premises were all true, but this does not
assert that the premises are or even must be true. As such a valid argument
can have all premises true with a true conclusion, at least one false
premise and a true conclusion, or at least one false premise and a false
conclusion; it just cannot have all premises true with a false conclusion.
In determining the validity of an argument, all that matters is whether the
conclusion would have to be true IF the premises were true, not whether the
premises ARE actually true or the conclusion IS actually false.
"Your pink elephant example does satisfy (1), since it is deductively valid
(i.e., it is such that, if all the premises are true, the conclusion would
be necessarily true). But it does not satisfy (2) unless the arguer could
present a convincing case that all elephants really were pink."
But as I explained above that is not a consideration as to whether the
argument is valid or logically true.
"Again, the flawlessness of the *logic* in an argument is not the only
concern for philosophers. Suppose we liken an argument to a building.
Logic is analogous to the form and design of the building; rationality is
analogous to the material the building is made of. Just as a building, in
order to remain standing, must have *both* proper design and the right
materials, a correct philosophical argument must be both logically
constructed *and* appeal to rational premises."
I disagree, based on what I described above. I think you are confusing
soundness with rationality. A sound argument is one that is valid and
contains only true premises. An unsound argument is either invalid or valid
with at least one false premise. A sound argument is said to establish the
truth of its conclusion, whereas an unsound is said to have not established
the truth of its conclusion. This is not to say, however, that the
conclusion is false, nor does a sound argument automatically mean that the
premises ARE true, only that IF they are all true then the conclusion would
also be true if the argument is valid. With this kind of language it sounds
like your building is made of mist rather than concrete.
"Philosophy is still concerned with what really is the case. If pink
elephants do not exist, then your 'pink elephant syllogism' is not
satisfactory for *either* a philosopher or a scientist. Why would you think
your pink elephant example *would* be satisfactory for philosophers?"
Because it is valid, if unsound. If there are no sound arguments to
contradict it, however, then it is better than an unsound invalid argument,
which by the way can also have all premises true with a true conclusion.
Your logical form/rationality dualism sounds like it could get into trouble
in that case; it might even declare such an invalid argument sound if
rationality took precedence over form. However, since in fact form is the
necessary condition and rationality only a minor consideration, a completely
true argument that is nonetheless invalid would be superceded by any valid
argument even if it had at least one false premise.
"Do you think philosophy is content with false arguments?"
First of all, only statements and propositions can be true or false;
arguments are either valid or invalid, with the truth-values of the
statements determining soundness. Secondly, an unsound argument only means
that the conclusion has not been established to be true, not that is has
been established to be false. Thirdly, a valid argument nearly always
supercedes an invalid argument, even if it is unsound. The only exception
might be a valid argument with at least one false premise and a false
conclusion versus an invalid argument that is completely true, but I doubt
it. If you might mean empirical fact rather than soundness or validity,
tell me then, how do you determine which (if any) of the statements in the
following argument are (factually) true?
If the universe is finite, then it has a physical boundary.
The universe is finite.
Therefore it has a physical boundary.
Believability cannot be a factor in determining truth because it is too
subjective. Structurally, this argument is valid, but is it sound? So far,
everything we know of the universe would tell us that premise 1 and the
conclusion are false, but that premise 2 is true. So we could claim that
the argument is unsound. But new evidence might show that premise 1 is
true. That would then make the conclusion true, which would make the
argument sound. Therefore, using only empirical fact we cannot say whether
the argument is sound or unsound. However, a philosopher could construct
another sound argument that concludes with premise 1. That would then make
premise 1 true, which would in turn render the conclusion true, making the
argument sound. If, on the other hand, the argument concluding in premise 1
was valid but had one false premise itself, yet the argument propositions
had an evidential relationship that made the conclusion true, then even
though the argument was unsound it would still assert the truth of premise 1
and thus be an important part of the entire composite argument.
"I think you are simply wrong here. Philosophy can certainly describe
physical reality! The difference between science and philosophy is not that
science deals with only physical reality and philosophy deals with only
nonphysical reality. The difference is in the methodology. Science is
methodological naturalism, where empirical theories are made based on
empirical data. Philosophy is more wide-ranging, allowing empirical
evidence, exercises in pure logic, etc. Science is (IMO, anyways) limited
to the natural realm; philosophy may inquire into the natural or
supernatural with equal validity.
I will concede this point.
"Philosophical claims may even include scientific ones; for example, some
indeterminists use aspects of Quantum Theory in order to argue for their
claim. And science is most certainly based on philosophy. Without
philosophy, the results of science would be meaningless as regards truth.
For example, how would scientific observation be of any use, without the
philosophical premise that observation puts us in contact with an objective
external reality?"
I will concede this point as well.
"How does this impact on the nature of philosophy in general?"
It doesn't; it merely demonstrates what usually happens when an exercise in
pure reason, with no empirical evidence to support it, based on premises
that
are not themselves grounded in scientific reality, tries to describe a
phenomenon in scientific reality that can be directly tested: it falls flat
on its face.
"At one point in the history of science, Lamarck thought that, if someone
lost an arm, that characteristic could be passed on to the next generation."
That is a gross oversimplification of Lamarck's hypothesis. Besides, his
theory of acquired traits was a testable attempt to explain the fact of
evolution. It was based on empirical data to start with and it was
empirical data that eventually refuted it.
"Therefore, the proper realm of science is to make silly claims."
Not silly; preposterous. Because it is only by making claims that seem like
nonsense, then testing them against scientific reality with empirical data
guided by reason, does science advance.
"Surely you don't agree with that conclusion; [see above] therefore, you can
see why I don't agree with your conclusion about philosophy."
Philosophy as a whole does not make silly claims, but philosophers who
believe they can explain scientific reality without recourse to observation,
empirical data or experimentation very often do, because science invariably
proves them to be silly.
Now, regarding Hegel specifically, I think you may actually be incorrect in
describing his views. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy has this to say:"
Where? I can't find it.
"I haven't read *De Orbitis Planetarium* myself. But if you want to use
that example, you might want to give the issue a second look."
Gauss did; so did Bronowski; so have others. Hegel's defenders say the
claim is false; these people say that it is not. What is clear at least,
however, is that Hegel made some claims, based solely on pure reason, that
nonetheless were testable against empirical data and turned out to be wrong.
That Hegel believed his conclusions were right I think should be obvious;
otherwise he never would have made them. Why did he believe they were
right? Because he believed his philosophical system could determine
scientific truth without the need for empirical data. Well, he was wrong,
as has been everyone else who has made the same claim.
"Absolutely, many philosophers do believe this. And there *is* potentially
a better road to knowledge than observation: pure logic."
Except that each case, where pure logic (or rather pure reason) was used to
create a hypothesis in the complete absence of empirical data, has failed.
Why? Because the universe does not conform itself to our demands of how it
should be structured. It has its own structure, but we can only discover
that structure by testing our demands against empirical data collected by
studying the universe. 99 times out of 100 our demands are wrong and need
to be changed. As such, any demand that claims it does not need to be
tested has only a 1% chance of being right.
"Why is pure logic a potentially better road to truth than observation?
Because observation is necessarily *inductive* in nature. That is, no
matter how many times you can observe something, the most this can justify
is that it is *likely* to be true. You can observe light going at the same
speed a hundred times... a thousand... a million; but you cannot state with
deductive certainty that it always travels at the same speed."
Philosophically, yes; scientifically, no. The reason is because, based on
our current theories of light, there is no known mechanism by which the
speed of light may be changed. Also, observation is not entirely inductive;
it depends upon what you are observing. Much of what I do yields results
that do not need to be interpreted, because they are so unambiguous. Under
those circumstances my observation are entirely deductive, because I simply
collect and chart the data, then use it to design new experiments. In fact
I tend to suspect that observation is inherently deductive in any
discipline; the inductive part is when you use that observation to create a
general theory.
"(This is not to say that it is unreasonable to believe that light always
travels at the same speed. Of course it is a reasonable belief. But it is
not a 100% deductively-provable belief, nonetheless.)"
Nothing is 100% deductively-provable; the scientific question is not whether
you can absolutely prove that something is true, but whether you understand
it enough to be able to define what it is, describe how it works and use it
to help you understand something new.
"I would say that is a bit misleading. Science is best regarded not as
something wholly different from philosophical inquiry, but rather a very
specialized kind of philosophical inquiry: empirical & naturalistic inquiry.
Philosophy can, and often does, try to acquire knowledge by *using* the
results of science... just as science itself is ultimately based on
foundations of philosophy."
There is still one major difference between the two: science tests all its
claims against empirical data, whereas philosophy test is claims against
logic. Philosophy can only use empirical data to test claims when it exists
(which it usually doesn't) and science avoids pure logic whenever possible
(which is usually always). As long as this simple fact is true, I stand by
my statement
"Both science or philosophy may address abiogenesis."
But philosophy won't tell you whether it can happen, how it could happen or
even if it did happen, which is ultimately all we on this list group are
interested in finding out.
"For example, philosophy might instead examine whether abiogenesis is a
logically consistent or meaningful concept."
Then let me ask you this: what would you say if a follower of Hegel wrote a
thesis that concluded that abiogenesis was both historically and
mechanistically impossible, therefore it wasn't a meaningful concept, then
the very next year a research team announced that not only had they
discovered conclusive evidence that abiogenesis had occurred, but they also
knew the precise mechanism of how it worked? My point is that any
philosophical claim about whether a scientific phenomenon is meaningful
based solely on pure reason is highly unlikely to be worth the paper it's
printed on once that phenomenon has been verified and explained, as has
happened so often in the past. When a scientific theory makes that many
failed predictions, scientists discard it for a new one, yet no matter how
many times they fail, there is always some philosopher who will try yet
again to develop a method of acquiring perfect scientific knowledge without
empirical data.
"I think the problem is that you hold the layman's view of philosophy."
I don't agree, as I hope I have demonstrated in this post. My problem is
certain philosophers who claim that, based on pure reason, they have a
better
understanding of the origin, structure and mechanisms of the universe than
the scientific understanding that has been developed over centuries of
empirical and rational investigation coupled with direct testing of ideas.
It took science over a 1000 years to crawl out of that abyss; I have little
tolerance for people who seek to drag us back into it again.
Kevin L. O'Brien