Of course, that's entirely your option. But at the same time, I'm not sure
that this could technically be called a zero loss game in the sense that,
say, "God of the Gaps" or some YEC theories could. The reason is that my
method of argument has been for logical consistency, rather than
ontological plausibility, falsifiability, or what have you. Basically, I
agree that interpreting passages as allegorical is an unfalsifiable matter
-- there is no possible evidence such as would tell you "no, you can't
interpret things that way".
The other way to approach it is this. Say that a person has a set of
beliefs: that Genesis is true, and that the results of science are true.
These two beliefs may be wholly justified epistemically. Now suppose that
Genesis, interpreted literally, contradicts the results of science. This,
in turn, falsifies the person's set of beliefs -- *unless* he interprets
Genesis in other than a literal sense. So, there is a reason for this
person to take Genesis as allegorical. It is not because he can
necessarily prove it to be poetic on merely exegetical grounds, or because
he can test or falsify his belief. It is because that belief is the only
way to avoid rendering either "Genesis is true" or "the results of science
are true" false. Differently put, the truth of "Genesis is a true
allegory" is not a synthetic *a posteriori* empirical thing, but rather an
analytic *a priori* proposition.
(Okay, maybe that last sentence was a bit superfluous. But this just
wouldn't be a true philosophical argument if I didn't work in esoteric
Kantian terms somehow.)
>If everytime I run into a passage that 'literally can't be true," I decide
>that it is allegorical, I escape the consequences of that falsehood.
But look at it this way: if you believe that every passage must be true in
some sense -- I don't know if you really believe that, but let's just
suppose you do -- then if a passage can't *literally* be true, it must be
true in some other sense. I guess my whole line of reasoning applies more
to strict inerrantists than Christians in general. Whether it ultimately
constitutes a defense of inerrancy or a *reductio ad absurdum* of it is the
big question, I suppose. :)
>By
>doing what you suggest, i would show my incredulousness and willingness to
>believe anything whatsoever, so long as my religion can be supported.
One important factor to consider here might be the "basicality" of
religion. Is religion generally taken by its proponents as a foundational
truth, or otherwise? Is "God exists" as foundational for most Christians
as, say, the law of non-contradiction or belief in other minds? Or is it a
belief like all others, based on evidence and argument? I guess the answer
is, "for some Christians yes, for others no". At any rate, I've been
considering the truth of religion an irreducibly basic foundation for the
purposes of this exchange, and this may be why you find it to have little
relevance.
>A few
>years ago, I was having a letter exchange with the editor of the CRSQ. I
>sent him a photo of duck footprints on the Green river layers. In the
>context of our discussion this would have invalidated a theological
>position of this fellow. He chose to deny the evidence before his eyes.
>He denied it was a duckfootprint. That is what the conservatives do.
Yes, fundamentalists certainly tend to be the most obstinate on certain
points of religious doctrine (e.g., literalism). Of course, whether this
fellow you wrote to was being *irrational* is difficult to say without
knowing more about how his belief system works.
>The
>liberal Christians when faced with a similar situation deny the historicity
>of the passage and make it allegorical.
True, although I think the really liberal Christians can sometimes take
this a bit *too* far, essentially relegating even the central tenets of
Christianity itself to the level of allegory. It is one thing to say that,
for example, Genesis is an allegory; it is quite another (from a Christian
perspective) to say that the life of Jesus is an allegory. At any rate,
the Christian who goes *so* far in reinterpretation that all religious
claims are taken as allegorical is functionally indistinguishable from an
non-Christian who happens to be interested in the Bible.
>While some think it acceptable to
>conclude that such a passage is merely allegorical but I don't. If it
>looks wrong, we should find a solution or call it what it really
>is---falsehood. Only by risking having one's religion being be false, can
>one really find out if it is true.
A good point. But supposing just for a moment that it is possible and
plausible for God to sometimes communicate via allegory, judging something
*literally* wrong could potentially miss the point. Treating a passage as
literal, after all, is no more empirically testable than treating it as
allegory.
>>>Especially in today's world. My former
>>>boss, who is an atheist, is one because he doesn't think the bible says
>>>anything that is historically true and at the same time significant to the
>>>religious claim!
>>
>>That's a pretty bad reason to be an atheist...! (No disrespect meant to
>>your former boss...)
>
>What do you consider a good reason? He is one of the funniest men I have
>ever worked for. But he feels the same claim can be made against all other
>religions, and I will say that he has gone to the trouble to study them.
Well, it would depend on the variety and strength of the atheism espoused.
I'd say some kind of general philosophical argument making the existence of
God impossible or unlikely (in the case of strong atheism) or the complete
lack of any evidence at all (in the case of weak atheism) would be good
reasons. The simple literal untruth of any, or even all, religious texts
is not any kind of evidence relating to the existence of any God. All
*religion* in the world could be completely absurd, and even this would not
comment on whether a God really existed.
>>>to do that, leaves one picking and choosing what portions they like.
>>>Theology becomes a cafeteria experience. (I'll take some creation of the
>>>universe, but please hold the Fall sauce, and none of that talking snake
>>>steak, thank you)
>>
>>Except that what I propose is not *arbitrary* picking and choosing, but
>>rather to decide which claims are literal and which allegorical based on
>>exterior evidence -- i.e., the evidence presented by the natural sciences.
>>I agree that it would be rather silly for every Christian to simply
>>interpret those parts of the Bible allegorically that he happens to
>>arbitrarily like. What I am suggesting is that the rational Christian
>>scientist can, by considering the totality of evidence available to him,
>>make choices which optimize the consistency of his belief system.
>
>But what it boils down to is 'those parts of the Bible for which I can't
>find a satisfactory scenario within the framework of modern science, I
>should view as allegorical. Depending upon how much work one is willing to
>commit to such a project one arrives at different answers to which passages
>are allegorical.
This is true. But remember, I'm presupposing here the sort of Christian
who takes both the Bible and (probably to a lesser extent) science as
entirely true and authoritative. For this sort of Christian, if the Bible
presents an unsatisfactory account when viewed literally, the *only* option
would seem to be to view it figuratively.
>For instance, you might say that science has disproven the flood account.
>It hasn't. It has disproven the global flood as taught by YECs. It has
>also disproven the mesopotamian flood (it doesn't and couldn't match the
>account). But modern science has not disproven the flood, nor shown it to
>be allegorical. It has only disproven certain flood scenarios.
Whether science has disproven the flood really depends on how you interpret
the flood account in the first place -- as you suggest.
>>>This is why those like you, who do not share our faith, are unable to make
>>>much impact with the young-earth ranks. When you compare the faith of an
>>>animist to that of Christianity, especially when you do it in a way that
>>>makes both faiths really worthless (not real) they will find it offensive
>>>and cease listening to you. I am willing to consider the possibility that
>>>Christianity is false, in fact I almost concluded that several years ago. I
>>>know that if Christianity has no reality it deserves to die.
>>
>>Whoa there! This isn't what I said at all! I was using animism to
>>describe the basic principle of using literally untrue language to
>>communicate true concepts to people with different belief systems. I
>>didn't compare any of this to *Christianity* at all -- unless we suppose
>>the unlikely idea that the ancient Israelites who received the Book of
>>Genesis were Christians!
>
>I didn't mean to give offence. But I remember you saying that you had no
>particular religious belief, if I recall correctly. What I am trying to
>point out is that such comparisons generally are not taken well by those
>who do. I am not offended but there will be some who are.
But I wasn't comparing Christianity to animism at all -- this is my point.
If I had said "Christianity is analogous to primitive animism" then
Christians would be quite right to take offense. But all I said was "just
as we 'more enlighted' western types might best communicate truths to
'primitive' animists by adopting their (literally untrue) language, so too
might an omniscient God communicate truths to we relatively stupid humans".
You are correct that I have no particular religious belief, and, frankly,
it is only the rare Christian who will ever take my arguments seriously on
this account. Many of those who tend to be dogmatically religious also
assume that anyone who is *not* religious must have some ultimately
anti-religious agenda -- if this is what you mean to say, then I agree
entirely. Of course, when it comes to that sort of person, absolutely
NOTHING I could say would ever be interpreted charitably. (I remember one
time, in an IRC discussion, I said something like "I think Jesus' words in
Matthew 5:38-48 present an extremely good moral teaching that religious and
nonreligious people alike should respect." The other (very fundamentalist)
person responded by saying, "oh, so I suppose you think that nobody should
believe religion at all, because all Godly morality can be replaced by
humanism, huh?" Yeesh..)
>>I also never suggested that Christianity was untrue. Obviously, I don't
>>personally think it is true, but that is beside the point. I have
>>throughout been arguing for a way to *preserve* the rationality of
>>Christianity even while being strictly scientific -- i.e., I have been
>>trying to show that the two really can be consistent.
>
>I understand. I don't think it works the way you think it does.
Fair enough.
>>But I'm not ascribing an inability to communicate at all. I'm say that, in
>>some cases, maybe the ideal thing to do -- and consequently, the thing God
>>would do -- is communicate using devices like allegory.
>
>He does in the Psalms. He doesn't always use that form however.
Agreed. But if God can and does use this style, even just occasionally,
then the possibility of allegorical communication cannot be ruled out *a
priori* as either untruth or thinly-veiled subjectivism.
>From
>Genesis 4-11, the writing style is exactly as Genesis 12-50. There isn't
>any demarcation that 4-11 is non-historical and 12-50 is based upon
>history. It is hard to ascribe one to history and one to allegory.
But of course, whether or not there is a demarcation ultimately depends on
what we have already decided about the passage's literal truth. The only
*observable* difference between a figurative and literal account, at least
that I can think of, is the degree to which the account is intelligible in
each sense. So if Genesis is not accurate or intelligible as literal
history, then it would appear to be more likely to be figurative. But
then, the degree to which this would be seen as true depends largely on
one's presuppositions.
> As for whether God
>>can communicate a simple truth... well, it really depends on what "truth"
>>it is we think Genesis is trying to communicate. Is it meant to convey
>>facts about exactly how the universe came about?
>
>This is a case of going to the extreme and an overly broad application. NO
>of course Genesis is not meant to convey 'exactly how' the universe came
>about. It conveys the history of the patriarch which have nothing to do
>with the unvierse coming about. Genesis 1:1 was meant to convey that the
>universe was created by God but not how it was created. If there is no
>history in Genesis 1:1, then God is not the creator of the universe.
I should have said, "facts about exactly how the world came about". You're
right, Genesis doesn't talk about the "universe" too much, but is rather
concerned primarily with the creation of the earth.
>>But allegories *do* have a "nugget of truth in them". Maybe I can show why
>>with a really absurd example. :)
>>
>>Just the other night, as I was dozing off, an episode of "Star Trek: The
>>Next Generation" came on TV. (Wow, a philosophy major / computer geek who
>>watches Star Trek. Go figure. ;) In this episode, the crew came across a
>>group of aliens who appeared, at first, to be saying absolutely nothing
>>sensible. They would speak as though they were telling little snippets of
>>stories.
>>
>>As it turns out, these aliens speak this way because they communicate
>>entirely through allegory -- they find an analog for every situation in the
>>ancient mythology of their culture, and then use descriptions of that
>>mythology to convey their meanings. It's rather like I, wanting to
>>communicate the message "I feel weak", said "Samson's hair is cut".
>>Anyhow, eventually the crew figures out this obscure means of
>>communication, and there's a happy ending, blah blah blah.
>>
>>The question for you is: would you say that these aliens, by speaking in
>>this way, are *liars*? I doubt it. The truth of a communication is not
>>found in whether it is literally true, but rather in whether its *meaning*
>>is true. And meaning may be *either* literal or figurative. An alien who
>>used a fictional allegory to tell you "I have 2 apples", and who does in
>>fact have 2 apples, is hardly a liar simply because the allegory he uses is
>>not *literally* true.
>
>I loved that episode of Star trek. But they weren't communicating by
>allegory. They were communicating history via short statements.
But that's not all they were doing. Remember when the alien was trying to
talk to Picard at their little campfire? He wasn't trying to describe a
historical situation. He was using a historical/mythical situation to
describe *their* -- Picard and his -- situation. This is allegory.
Allegory:
A figurative sentence or discourse, in which the principal subject is
described by another subject resembling it in its properties and
circumstances. Ths principal subject is thus kept out of view, and we are
left to collect the intentions of the writer or speaker by the resemblance
of the secondary to the primary subject.
(Webster's)
>A language I am familiar with, Mandarin Chinese conveys an entire word via
>one symbol. We require many symbols for a single word.
Well, the "symbolism" implicit in allegory is not linguistic symbols --
i.e., representing sounds with words. It is symbolism in general, or
representing a thing by presenting some other thing which in some way
relates to it.
>That episode took
>communication one step higher than Mandarin and communicated everything
>with one sentence. It wasn't allegory but history. If I recall the show
>ended with the alien saying something like "Picard and whats his name blah
>blah at whatever planet". To the alien it communicated an entire book of
>information as one symbol communicates an entire word in Mandarin.
But linguistically, these aliens (like almost all aliens in Star Trek) were
speaking English. The face-value literal meaning of the aliens' words was
to tell little stories about their history / mythology... that was why the
crew found it so incomprehensible.
Your analogy is basically correct, however: the aliens did indeed
communicate information by means of symbols. But these are not linguistic
symbols, but rather symbolism in a more general sense -- i.e., allegory.
>>Similarly, just because we suppose that God sometimes communicates
>>allegorically, we cannot say that God is lying. As long as God's intended
>>meaning is true, God's words are true. So, to get to your example of
>>"areas that touch on observable reality". The question is: is Genesis
>>meant as a literal commentary on reality? Or is it an allegorical
>>commentary which conveys some other truth? I don't see how believing the
>>latter requires in any way invalidating Christianity or the Bible.
>
>The fall, H.G.Wells, in his _Outline of History_ Vol 2
>p. 776-777 (Doubleday, 1961):
>
>"It was only slowly that the general intelligence of the Western
>world was awakened to two disconcerting facts: firstly, that the
>succession of life in the geological record did not correspond to
>the acts of the six days of creation; and, secondly, that the
>record, in harmony with a mass of biological facts, pointed away
>from the Bible assertion of a separate creation of each species,
>straight towards a genetic relation between all forms of life, _in
>which even man was included!_ The importance of this last issue to
>the existing doctrinal system was manifest. If all the animals and
>man had been evolved in this ascendant manner, then there had been
>no first parents, no Eden, and no Fall. And if there had been no
>fall, then the entire historical fabric of Christianity, the story
>of the first sin and the reason for an atonement, upon which the
>current teaching based Christian emotion and morality, collapsed
>like a house of cards."
I disagree with some of this. The real implication is only that things did
not happen historically *exactly as Genesis describes them*, not that some
of the relevant aspects are not historical. For example, the literal Fall
(eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil) might be a figurative
account of human beings falling away from innocence by seeking too much
knowledge (note an analogy here to the Tower of Babel story). Eden would
symbolize that state of innocence. In essence, parts of Genesis could be
stories meant to illustrate a real historical fact: that humans fell away
from pure worship of the divine into the worship of themselves, or some
such thing.
The doctrine of original sin could thus hold whether or not Genesis is
literal history. Surely, the idea of whether or not humans are "fallen"
does not depend on whether a real Adam and Eve ate a real magical fruit in
a real magical garden. It depends, rather, on whether something
*analogous* to the Eden story really happened.
>>(Incidentally, just so there's no confusion, I am not trying to tell you
>>what you must believe about Genesis. I'm just trying to make the point
>>that believing in Scripture as allegory is one way of reconciling
>>Christianity and science, without in any way espousing subjectivism.)
>
>I think by definition it must engage in subjectivism, and it most assuredly
>engages in a no-lose game. No lose games are no fun and indeed are not
>valid games. A slot machine which always pays off, eventually become
>boring and would eventualy cause monetary inflation making the money
>worthless.
I think it only seems like a no-lose game because you are looking at it
from a purely empirical perspective -- i.e., whether or not you can prove
that something ought to be taken allegorically, and whether or not your
conclusions are falsifiable. But if we apply these criteria, then we have
no reason to take anything in the Bible literally either! That too would
be a presumption not even theoretically subject to empirical verification
or falsification. (You could certain verify whether a literally-intended
Bible was *true* by empirical means, but you could not state via this
method that it ought to be taken literally in the first place.) My point
is that I don't think this kind of scientific approach is too applicable to
matters of interpreting Scripture.
One very strict and logical approach which *would* be applicable, however,
is the search for logical consistency. If a Christian believes the Bible
is completely true, and science is very likely to be true, then he has a
very good reason to call Genesis an allegory. This reason is not
empirical, it is purely logical. If such a Christian took Genesis as
literal, then there would be an inconsistency in his belief system;
therefore, he must either rule out one of his operating assumptions (that
the Bible is true, or that science is correct) or alleviate the
inconsistency by seeing Genesis as allegorical. This may sound at first
like arbitrary picking-and-choosing, but consider this: maybe this fellow
has *very good reasons* for believing both that the Bible is true and that
science is correct. If this is so, then any belief which rendered those
beliefs inconsistent (like believing Genesis is literal history) would by
implication be an *irrational* belief.
>> This is all I propose for Genesis. If Genesis makes no
>>sense as a literal account -- and I think science shows fairly well that it
>>doesn't -- then it too can to that extent be seen as poetical.
>
>I disagree that there is no way for science to be joined with Genesis. I
>agree that the way Christians have traditionally tried to do it doesn't
>work. But take a look at synop.htm on my web page and tell me what is wrong
>with my science. What scientific facts I fail to incorporate. I think the
>account can make sense if one does what I do.
Fair enough, I'll have a look at your page.
>>>I am not a theologian--I am a geophysicist.
>>
>>I think you should have worded that "God damn it, Jim, I'm a geophysicist,
>>not a theologian!"
>
>Wouldn't be my style. And Dr. McCoy never used 'God' in any of the
>episodes in that context.
Yeah, I think you're right... he just said "Dammit".
>>I added that qualifier just because I didn't want to assume that I knew why
>>you hold the beliefs you hold. There was no element of "surprise" or
>>condescension there... I was actually just trying to make sure that I
>>*wasn't* construed as attempting to sound arrogant. (Did that ever
>>backfire...!) In fact, I tend towards the view that many religions are,
>>for their believers, *rational* -- rational being understood as "implied
>>given one's evidence".
>>
>>Please don't assume that, just because I am an atheist, I am antagonistic
>>towards religion. Just because I do not believe Christianity *true* does
>>not mean that I believe it is *irrational*. (Indeed, it would be pretty
>>odd if I *did* think it was irrational, since my whole argument so far has
>>been in *defense* of its rationality. Of course, it's certainly fair to
>>suggest, as you have done, that my "defense" misses the point or
>>invalidates Christianity in some way -- but that is not my intended aim.)
>
>I understand. I often see that those who do not share a faith don't
>understand how they are perceived by those of faith. There are cultural
>differences that make communication difficult.
Very true.
>>>You believe these religious
>>>>claims are true; but at the same time, you are convinced that the methods
>>>>of natural science also yield truth. (Excuse me if I'm being unduly
>>>>arrogant in assuming that you believe all this.)
>>>
>>>No, I would say that there is a certain amount of it in assuming that
>>>religious beliefs are less than atheistic beliefs. (I want to make sure to
>>>state that it doesn't bother me. I think you should know how you come
>>>across or appear to come across to people of faith)
>>
>>Frankly, I don't know how I came across that way. But yes, if I come
>>across as arrogant, I want to know about it. I hope I've cleared that
>>issue up above.
>
>I KNEW you didn't mean it. I really did.
Okay. :)
>But as I mention, there are
>cultural differences. When I was in China I know of two times I gave
>offense, and I had no idea I was doing it. I didn't mean it, I didn't want
>to do it, but I did it never the less. I understood the second case, but
>only found out about the first case (still don't know what I did) when
>apologizing for my second case of giving offense.
I follow you. And again, anytime I'm involuntarily giving offense to the
natives, please do let me know. :)
>>>But, in my view, this is merely a surrender of reality which is why I don't
>>>think christians should take this opition.
>>
>>But where is the surrender of reality? I think you agree that figurative
>>truths are still legitimate truths.
>
>Geology today defines for us the actual history of our planet, not a
>figurative history. Geology doesn't give us figurative truths, it gives us
>historical truths.
Absolutely, because Geology is explicitly concerned only with factual
history, not deep philosophical or spiritual truths. But really, even
Geology *could* use figurative language to express itself. Imagine for a
moment that you, a geologist, are trying to explain esoteric geological
matters to a layman. You might do this most easily by speaking in terms
the layman can comprehend -- i.e., by using metaphors, similes, and other
figurative devices. Your speech would not be literally true, but it would
be figuratively true.
>What I see is that you offer for Christianity to never
>say anything real about the history of our planet.
No, because I am not saying that the Bible *never* talks about literal
history. The stories of Jesus could be real history, even if Genesis is an
allegorical account. All I was offering was that *some* accounts in
Scripture -- those which couldn't be literal history -- could still be
interpreted allegorically.
>Since most people
>prefer to believe the real story, it means that Christianity is telling a
>lesser reality.
Not necessarily. Take the "geologist communicating to layman" example
above. You might use figurative language to describe some incredibly
complicated geological process, so that a person can gain some
understanding of it without being too versed in the terminology and
knowledge of the field. But if the point you are communicating is *true*,
it is not any "lesser" merely by virtue of being communicated figuratively.
Moreover, it hardly seems to be the case that general spiritual /
philosophical truths -- which the Bible might be said to sometimes
communicate allegorically -- are lesser truths than strict literal history.
Indeed, if the Bible were nothing but strict literal history, it wouldn't
be a religious or moral work, but a science book.
>>Maybe I should just ask: how do *you* reconcile the claims of science with
>>the claims of the Bible? You are clearly both a rational scientist and a
>>Christian. So, if Genesis says that the world was created in 6 days, and
>>this is to be taken at literal face value, then what do you conclude...?
>
>see http://www.isource.net/~grmorton/synop.htm
Okay. I'll have a look after I send this message.
>>>Science is given this world,
>>>this empirical world and religion is given the realm that has no proof--it
>>>becomes mere belief with no certainty.
>>
>>I disagree, actually. Just because religion is not *empirically*
>>verifiable doesn't mean it is, in principle, unverifiable or uncertain -- I
>>think we can rule out logical positivism and the like. Many things are
>>empirically unverifiable, but nonetheless verifiable and certain through
>>metaphysical inquiry. An example would be *causation*. Causation, to draw
>>again from Hume, is not observable; we observe correlation, and we infer
>>causation from this. But certainly, causation is not a "mere belief with
>>no certainty". We could make no sense of the world at all without
causation.
>
>I think I would disagree. Causation can be empirically verified by a high
>degree of correlation between two events always temporally related in the
>same fashion--one before the other.
But how can it be empirically verified? We infer causation from constant
correlation only because we have the (untestable) metaphysical belief in
causation. That is, the connection between causation (which is not
observable) and constant correlationg (which is observable) is not itself
empirically testable.
Another example from Hume could be the Problem of Induction. Science uses
induction to predict events in the future based on the way things happened
in the past. In doing so, it must presuppose the Principle of the
Uniformity of Nature -- i.e., a principle that things will generally happen
in the future as they have in the past. But this principle is not even
potentially solvable by empirical inquiry without begging the question. My
point is that even science must ultimately rely on foundations (causation,
Uniformity of Nature, etc.) which are not themselves provable by strict
empirical means. From this in turn we can infer that not all inquiry must
be empirical. Indeed, the only people I can think of who *do* think all
inquiry must be empirical would be logical positivists, verificationists,
and the like.
>>>But if you sitting on the hill just next to me set up your experiment in
>>>such a fashion that you only look at light as a wave, the energy you see
>>>went on both sides of the galaxy. If the lens galaxy is a billion light
>>>years distant, then somehow you and I decided how light would behave 1
>>>billion years ago! That is a truly metaphysical power.
>>
>>I'm not sure that's "metaphysical" in the relevant sense. By metaphysics,
>>I mean claims about reality beyond the reach of strict empiricism.
>
>I am not sure that causation fits that bill! Causation is according to
>Hume, if I can recall correctly (it has been over 20 years since my
>graduate work in Philosophy) constitutes a high degree of EMPIRICAL
>correlation.
Yes, we infer causation partially through an empirical process -- i.e., we
empirically observe correlation, and from this infer causation. But the
principle of inferring causation from constant correlation is not itself an
empirically verifiable thing. This is why the Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy calls causation "one of the central problem areas *of
metaphysics*" (emphasis mine).
Incidentally, what was your grad work in Philosophy? Did you focus on any
particular area? (Please say philosophy of science... then I can ask you
for help on my own Phil of Science course... ;)
>And one could possibly argue that God himself is not totally
>beyond empirical verifiability. The origin of the universe requires a
>cause. If there was nothing, there is nothing to cause the universe.
But that is not empirical verification, it is an exercise in logic. Modal
logic would appear to be distinct from empirical observation by a wide margin.
>Most
>big bang theories start with vacuum fluctuations causing the universe. But
>a vacuum is not nothing. It is something especially in the context of GR.
>The vacuum is a storm of virtual particles. Thus one either must believe in
>the eternality of the vacuum (a god-like property) or one must beleive that
>something created the vacuum(God). Thus, God, while not strictly
>verifiable, can be inferred as one of the possiblitilies for the origin of
>the universe. In any event, one is driven to have to believe in something
>which has one of God's attributes--eternal pre-existence.
I agree that this may be done, but this is not an exercise in strict
empiricism. It is rather an exercise in logical argument on the subjects
of necessity and possibility. The only arguably empirical element in the
First Cause Argument (or its modern variant, the Kalam Cosmological
Argument) is "something exists". The "and therefore there must be a First
Cause" part is where philosophy takes over.
(BTW -- there are problems with the First Cause Argument. That would be
best left aside for now, since this list is hardly the place for that kind
of debate. But if you want to discuss that in private email, let me know.)
Regards,
Mike Hardie
<hardie@globalserve.net>
http://www.globalserve.net/~hardie/dv/