[I plan to respond to your last to me, but I had composed it at home last night and forgot to bring it in with me today, so I will have to post it tomorrow. Meanwhile, I would like to jump in here if I may.]
"I guess at this point I need feedback(from anyone) on the exact nature of the "ID argument". My understanding from reading the work of Hugh Ross is that there are dozens of physical constants in the universe which much exist in very narrow ranges for life to be possible. If this is correct then there would be only one value, or a very narrow range of values, which would allow life to develop. If I've misunderstood the ID argument I'm open to correction."
I think you have it right, as far as Ross is concerned. However, there are several problems with his conception. The first is the notion that the constants must be "fine-tuned" at all. We simply do not know in many cases if the values for this universe are the only possible values, or if a range of values can be tolerated. All we can do is speculate; this is not something we can test using our current technology. Another problem is that Ross assumes only carbon-water-based, DNA, protein, carbohydrate life is the right kind of life. Other constant values that make us impossible may in fact make silicon-based life, or life based on magnetic polymers, or even pure energy life much more likely. As such, the range of constant values that could produce "life" (any kind of life, not just our kind) might be much wider than we currently assume. Another problem is that the values of the constants might change in a way that they cancel out any deleterious effects and come to a new balanc
e that would still make our kind of life possible. In other words, Ross changes one value, discovers that life becomes impossible and then declares that all the values must be exactly like those of our universe in order for life to occur. In reality, however, the values could all become very different from what they are now, but if the balance they still might make our kind of life possible.
"My understanding is that only those universes with just the right values for these physical constants could sustain life. Numerically, this would be a vanishingly small percentage of all possible universes(assuming that my understanding of the ID argument is correct)."
But again if we enlarge our definition of life, the range of possible value combinations that can sustain life might in fact be quite large instead of "vanishingly small".
"My understanding of the ID argument is that it holds that fine-tuning is necessary for any kind of life that science believes is possible. Again, I'm open to correction."
But again the number of possible value combinations that can produce life might, though fine-tuned, be large enough to insure that most universes will contain some kind of life.
"But unless the initial conditions in the universe were correct life could never begin. If life never begins it never gets the chance to adapt."
But the initial conditions might be broad enough to allow for a wide variety of different types of life to begin, but one type (say our kind) will eventually prove to be well-adapted enough to be the most common, and the most likely to produce intelligence. Change the values slightly and the same kinds of life might appear, but now a very different form of life (say raw energy life) eventually proves to be well-adapted enough to become the most common, and the most likely to produce intelligence.
"Again, my understanding of the ID argument is that extremely little variation of the constants is possible."
Yes, that is what ID claims, but as I have already pointed out this is probably not correct.
Kevin L. O'Brien