Re: Cambridge Publishes Neo-Creationism

David J. Tyler (D.Tyler@mmu.ac.uk)
Mon, 19 Oct 1998 14:14:11 GMT

David Tyler responding to Mike Hardie's post of Thu, 15 Oct 1998.

> I agree that this is essentially "God of the Gaps". We could, after all,
> just as easily posit that life comes from the 4th dimension (as Petersen
> does with loess); or we could say that invisible space aliens from Sirius
> designed life. All of those theories have something in common with the
> idea of an "extra-natural designer": they are unscientific, in that they
> posit entities not even theoretically addressable by science. They are
> also unfalsifiable, at least through scientific methods.

What measure of agreement that exists between us must not stand in
the way of a profound disagreement over what constitutes "science".
The science that I embrace is the science of the scientific
revolution: it does not subject God to the microscope, but it builds
its concepts of consistency and predictability on the character of
God. Belief in God is the foundation stone, and it is not
inconsistent with science to infer that God has acted in what
we might describe as "primary causation" mode as well as "secondary
causation" mode. (I am not wanting to defend these terms!).

> This is not to say that God did *not* design life. It simply makes the
> point that Dembski's argument is better seen as a variation on the
> theological argument from design rather than as a scientific theory per se.
> This is in fact the problem I have with the entire idea of "intelligent
> design theory". It presents as science something which, quite obviously,
> belongs in the realm of *metaphysical* inquiry. Again, this is not to say
> that it isn't *true*, just that it belongs in the realm of philosophy /
> theology.

IF "intelligent design" is true, there must be a way of addressing
design issues in our science, without having to appeal ONLY to
contingency, adaptation and undirected processes. It MAY be argued
that we have not yet found the right way to do it, but this does not
mean that design must be banished to the realm of philosophy/theology
and that we must proceed in our science as though design has no
relevance to our research questions.

> What are everyone's thoughts on this? Does anyone believe that things like
> extra-natural designers (or, for that matter, 4th dimensions and invisible
> aliens), regardless of their truth, can properly be considered science?
> Harold Kincaid, in the context of arguing for laws in the social sciences,
> properly notes that "the science / nonscience distinction is a continuum"
> (as opposed to a strict line). But all the same, doesn't any theory
> proposing things outside of empirical naturalistic inquiry necessarily fall
> well into the "nonscience" side? Indeed, if *not*, then is there
> *anything* that could be consistently called nonscience?

The "demarcation" approach to defining science has not had a good
record. This particular attempt points to "empirical naturalistic
inquiry" - ruling out all non-empirical science and all
non-naturalistic science. This is highly contentious! (a) I know it
has been discussed before, but it is necessary to point it out again:
the historical sciences cannot use the same methodologies and cannot
work to the same agenda as the empirical sciences. (b) The
principles of naturalistic science have never been proved - only
assumed. I have not been able to see why it should have any prior
claim to being "science" in preference to, say, theistic science.

With best wishes,
David J. Tyler.