On Tue, 5 May 1998 19:22:16 -0400 (EDT), Lloyd Eby wrote:
[...]
>SJ>Clearly we *can* (at least in some instances) "distinguish between natural
>>and supernatural events". The people who saw Jesus' miracles knew that
>>they were beyond natural causes, ie. supernatural:
LE>No. They did not know this. They *thought* they knew it, or at least they
>are represented in Scripture as having thought they knew it (as per your
>following quote), but they didn't have enough grasp of either natural or
>supernatural to come to a conclusive judgment on this question.
This is a shift of your argument from *distinguishing* between natural and
supernatural, to being able to *conclusively* prove that a claimed supernatural
event was supernatural.
Thinking something is all that mere humans can do. On your basis one couldn't
know that a claimed supernatural event was really natural, either. All that a
human being can do is *think* it is natural or supernatural.
Consider the Gospel account of Jesus healing the man with the withered hand in
Lk 6:6-10 (cf. Mt 12:10-13; Mark 3:1-5):
"On another Sabbath he went into the synagogue and was teaching, and a man
was there whose right hand was shriveled. The Pharisees and the teachers of
the law were looking for a reason to accuse Jesus, so they watched him closely
to see if he would heal on the Sabbath. But Jesus knew what they were thinking
and said to the man with the shriveled hand, "Get up and stand in front of
everyone." So he got up and stood there. Then Jesus said to them, "I ask you,
which is lawful on the Sabbath: to do good or to do evil, to save life or to destroy
it?" He looked around at them all, and then said to the man, "Stretch out your
hand." He did so, and his hand was completely restored."
Now if you were watching and you knew the man well (even better if you were
the man), that his arm was indeed shrivelled (KJV "withered"), and yet as soon as
Jesus said to the man to stretch out his hand, it was "completely restored", would
you not rightly conclude that this was a supernatural, rather than a natural, healing?
If not, why not?
LE>I grant you that my view is not a mainstream one in religious circles.
>I've been thinking a lot about it in the intervening days and I'm going to
>attempt a long post on it soon.
I still am not sure exactly what your "view" is? I suggest you clarify what exactly
you mean. If you are claiming that human beings cannot *know* that what they
think is supernatural *is* supernatural, but they can only *believe* it is, then I am
sure that it is indeed the "mainstream" view "in religious circles".
[...]
>SJ> What is your position Lloyd? Are you a theist or a metaphysical
>> naturalist?
LE>I'm a theist.
If you cannot "know or can distinguish between natural and supernatural
events", on what do you base your theism?
LE>I think that the proper division is not between naturalist
>and supernaturalist, but between materialism (i.e. metaphysical monism --
>the claim that all that exists is matter, material forces, and
>matter-in-motion) and spiritualism (i.e. the existence of a non-material
>but nevertheless fully real world). I'm a metaphysical dualist, of a sort
>(that qualification needs working out because I think that there's a
>spiritual dimension to material existence and material events) who
>believes in both material and spiritual reality.
I agree that a major division is between metaphysical monists like
materialists (idealists are also metaphysical monists but rarer), and
metaphysical dualists.
But in practice in our culture metaphysical naturalism and metaphysical
naturalism are virtually the same thing:
"Naturalism and materialism mean essentially the same thing for
present purposes, and so I use the terms interchangeably. Naturalism
means that nature is all there is; materialism means that matter (i.e.,
the fundamental particles that make up both matter and energy) is all
there is. Because evolutionary naturalists insist that nature is made up
of those particles, there is no difference between naturalism and
materialism. In other contexts, however, the terms may have different
meanings...These other meanings are irrelevant for our purposes."
(Johnson P.E., "Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds", 1997,
pp15-16)
LE>This difference may seem to you to be merely a semantical quibble, but it
>is not. Supernaturalists, in so far as they are supernaturalists, cannot
>be scientists because science deals with what is objectively or
>intersubjectively knowable and testable
This is not so in the case of unique past events (eg. origin of universe,
origin of life, origin of life's major groups, etc). They are not "objectively or
intersubjectively knowable and testable":
"Our theory of evolution has become, as Popper described, one which
cannot be refuted by any possible observations. Every conceivable
observation can be fitted into it. It is thus "outside of empirical
science" but not necessarily false. No one can think of ways in which
to test it." (Ehrlich P.R. & Birch C.L., "Evolutionary History and Population
Biology", Nature, Vol. 214, 22 April 1967, p352)
LE>...and, by any usual understanding
>of the supernatural, it is not objectively testable (in the way that
>science understands the objectively testable). But those who hold
>to the existence of both matter and spirit can be because we can raise the
>question of whether there can be a science of spirit. I think that this is
>possible.
Since modern-day "science" is based on metaphysical naturalism, it is
not surprising that "the supernatural, it is not objectively testable (in the way
that science understands the objectively testable"!
The problem lies with the *materialist definition* of "science", not with
"the supernatural":
"...many argue that any reference to the supernatural in science is illegitimate in
principle. Thus in this context it typically is believed that an explanation in terms
of intelligence is scientifically legitimate if "it seeks natural intelligence [but] any
theory with a supernatural foundation is not scientific." But such objections do
not seem compelling. If there are no gaps in the fabric of natural causation, then
obviously appeal to divine activity will get us off track. On the other hand, if there
are such gaps, refusing on principle to recognize them within science will equally
get us off track. We should perhaps be wary of both ways of going wrong. If in
our intellectual endeavors we are attempting to get at truth as best we can, then
if we have rational reason-from whatever source-to believe that God has taken a
hand in the origin or ongoing operation of the cosmos, arbitrarily excluding that
belief needs some justification." (Ratzsch D.L., "The Battle of Beginnings", 1996,
pp193-194)
LE>I agree if you were to object that my remarks here are cryptic and need a
>lot more working out.
Actually I think they are *wrong*, not just "cryptic*!
>> LE>(For myself, I'm not yet convinced that the demarcation problem
>> >is unsolvable or meaningless, although I do agree that it cannot be
>> >solved by positivistic or syntactical (i.e. Popperian) means.)
>SJ> Fine. But this is just a faith-statement of what you are "not yet
>> convinced" of. When someone comes up with a a "demarcation between
>> `scientific' and `non-scientific'" that does not exclude things that
>> are normally regarded as "scientific" then we can discuss it!
LE>What would you include in "what is normally regarded as scientific"?
I would include those listed by Meyer below as the main demarcation
arguments that have been used against design:
"Unfortunately, to establish this conclusively would require an examination of all
the demarcation arguments that have been used against design. And indeed, an
examination of evolutionary polemic reveals many such arguments. Design or
creationist theories have been alleged to be necessarily unscientific because they
(a) do not explain by reference to natural law, (b) invoke unobservables, (c) are
not testable, (d) do not make predictions, (e) are not falsifiable, (f) provide no
mechanisms, (g) are not tentative, and (h) have no problem-solving capability.
Due to space constraints, a detailed analysis of only the first three arguments will
be possible. Nevertheless, an extensive analysis of (a), (b) and (c) will follow.
These three have been chosen because each can be found in one form or
another all the way back to the Origin of Species. The first one, (a), is especially
important because the others derive from it-a point emphasized by Michael Ruse,
perhaps the world's most ardent evolutionary demarcationist. Consequently an
analysis of assertion (a) will occupy the largest portion of this section. There will
also be a short discussion of arguments (d), (e) and (f) and references to
literature refuting (g) and (h). Thus while an exhaustive analysis of all
demarcationist arguments will not be possible here, enough will be said to allow
us to conclude that the principal arguments employed against design do not
succeed in impugning its scientific status without either begging the question or
undermining the status of descent as well." (Meyer S.C., "The Methodological
Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There be a Scientific `Theory of
Creation'?" in Moreland J.P. ed., "The Creation Hypothesis", 1994, Inter Varsity
Press, Illinois, p77):
Steve
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3 Hawker Avenue / Oz \ Steve.Jones@health.wa.gov.au
Warwick 6024 ->*_,--\_/ Phone +61 8 9448 7439
Perth, West Australia v "Test everything." (1Thess 5:21)
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