So while quantum mechanically the many-worlds interpretation gets around the
quantum measurement problems, and statistically it lets one avoid (or
mitigate) the "this is impossibly unlikely" argument (since every quantum
mechanical possibility -- every bizarre mutation, every set of monkeys
typing, etc., is actualized), but it doesn't explain why the natural laws
and constants are what they are.
Or would the counter argument be that even such laws and constants are
themselves products of quantum mechanical "luck" during the big bang (you'd
need some metalaws to determine the possibilities, presumably), in which
case every q-mly possible set of initial constants would be actualized? I
have no idea if this is a live option wrt current qm theory -- do you? Any
philosophically-oriented physics Ph.D. know the answer?
--John
> -----Original Message-----
> From: evolution-owner@udomo2.calvin.edu
> [mailto:evolution-owner@udomo2.calvin.edu]On Behalf Of Brian D Harper
> Sent: Monday, January 12, 1998 12:21 PM
> To: evolution@udomo2.calvin.edu
> Subject: RE: Big crunch idea on universe exploded
>
>
> At 10:14 AM 1/12/98 -0600, John Rylander wrote:
>
> >Just as background, probably the preferred way to avoid the issue of
design
> >now is adopt the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in
which
> >(as I understand it, though there are probably variations) every quantum
> >possibility is actualized in individual spatio-temporally disconnected
> >universes. So every femtosecond, an unimaginably large quantity of
> >universes is coming into being, said quantity increasing exponentially
with
> >each passing femtosecond.
> >
>
> This is one hypothesis as to how one might get the "many-worlds"
> required for the many-worlds answer to fine-tuning but it
> doesn't seem to me to be particularly satisfying for another,
> I think more fundamental, reason than you suggested. Namely,
> it seems to me that all the branch off universes will have the
> same laws and physical constants as our own. For many-worlds
> to work one has to have the anthropic selection effect which
> requires the other universes to have different laws and
> physical constants. Then one can answer the question "Why
> are we in a finely tuned universe?" with "we really couldn't
> be in one of the others now could we."
>
> >This lets theoreticians avoid, e.g., the quantum measurement problem, and
> >some other aspects of quantum weirdness.
> >
> >Of course, it does pay a rather enormous price for this. Most physicists
> >find this to be truly egregious, a simple theory with an extraordinarily
> >bloated ontology (talk about needlessly multiplying hypothetical
entities!),
> >but it's one way to avoid design, in theory at least.
> >
> >
>
> Brian Harper
> Associate Professor
> Applied Mechanics
> The Ohio State University
>
> "... we have learned from much experience that all
> philosophical intuitions about what nature is going
> to do fail." -- Richard Feynman
>
>