RE: Evolution: Facts, Fallacies, Crisis

Glenn Morton (grmorton@waymark.net)
Sat, 13 Dec 1997 18:16:11 -0600

At 03:32 PM 12/13/97 -0600, John E. Rylander wrote:
>Glenn,
>
>(1) "Solipsism" = Only I exist; "Skepticism" = I suspend judgement in general,
>or wrt X (or, more crudely but often popularly, "I think X is false", and most
>crudely, "I think X is false, and anyone who believes X is a fool!" :^> ). I
>think you meant to use "skepticism" (in its proper sense) rather than
>"solipsism".
>

I stand humbly corrected, in other words I am now properly skeptical that I
used solipsism correctly.

>(2) I think a big part of the disagreement between you and Lloyd comes down to
>this: You see the job of science as coming up with physical theories that work
>(pragmatic), he sees it as coming up with physical theories that are true
>(alethic [from the Greek word for "truth"], realistic). Hence, if, for
>argument's sake, evolutionary theory has some serious holes, you'll see
>objections as a bit pointless until they're complemented by superior working
>theories, whereas Lloyd will argue that the theory is in those respects false
>completely regardless of whether there's a better theory to replace it.

This is probably close to the real issue. Although I don't think that
falsifying data to a given theory should be ignored. If a theory doesn't
match the facts it is wrong and needs correcting. But the job of the
scientist is to correct the theory not sit and do nothing. But then I don't
believe ANY theory can be TRUE in capital letters. But without theories,
there is nothing but a pile of unagglomerated facts lying all over the place
with no particular order for anything.

>
> Wrt (2), it's important to realize you both can be right -- there is no
>contradiction, so long as you make the pragmatic v. realistic/alethic
>distinction, and hence realize that you're judging the theories and criticisms
>thereof according to different standards.

In what sense are theories TRUE? The only sense I can see is that they
match the data. But this is different than metaphysical truth.

>
> A personally interesting example is reductionistic theories of mind. I find
>them very implausible, even demonstrably false, but at the same time I'm
>enthusiastic about them as engineering projects, since I don't know (a) which
>alternative theory is true, and (b) how to make any competitor more
>scientifically useful. So I support them as practical science, but reject
them
>as reliable philosophical guides to the deepest understanding of
consciousness,
>personhood, morality, etc. And I know there are plenty of working scientists
>who do the same.
>
> The key thing, in my experience anyway, is to make clear which goal(s) of
>science you're focussing on, truth and/or utility. Otherwise the discussion
>becomes subtly incoherent.

Thanks

glenn

Adam, Apes, and Anthropology: Finding the Soul of Fossil Man

and

Foundation, Fall and Flood
http://www.isource.net/~grmorton/dmd.htm